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ABSTRACT
The illient or this rescaro.::h i~ to evalu;\te the implement'llion or ellvironmental regulatory
polky governing industry in Newfoundland generally .md in lhe specific C;l.~e orthe
Corne By Cham:e oil reriner)'. Since crfective regulalion of industrial pollution is
illlponantl(l hlllh human health ;lIId ecolugic.lI suslainability, this research .lllempt.~ to
cxplilillllow government clTOrtS w regulale i:tdustry and prolcctthe cnvironn''':!ll might
he o.::()lllprnll1i.~ed h)' specific limit'ltiuns related 10 political ;mu financial resources.
Through an cmpirkal ca.~e study. involving both archival resc..rch and interviews with
informed individuals represellting rekvant interest groups. this thesis therefore c.~amines
how specific financial ;lI1d political CIlrlstr;lims alTect and intlucnec govcmmelll
ill1pkll1enwtion or cllvironrnent:ll regulator)' policy. This research found th;ll in the
Newfuundlallll political econol11)'. specific rc.~otlree limitations do eompromiSl.' the
enVinllJlllenl:11 regulatory process governing lhe provitJ(.:c'.~ industrial pollulers. Proposals
for further research in inuustriul ['luliUlion control arc also presctllcd. including hrief
diso.::ussious of policies relating to social reguh.tion and the de\'elorment of zem-cmission
'induslrialduslers.'
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CHAITER I: fHE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATORY POLICY
I.llnlroduction
At an ever increasing numbcrof locations around the globe. the 'negative externalities' of
the production processes of industrial capitalism result in the discharge of poilutanIS into
lhe air, water and soil. In the province of Newfoundland, the operation of the Come By
Chance oil refinery has resulted in specific environmental problems. in particular
prohlems relating w atmospheric emissions. For many ycars, researchers have reponed
Ihat industrial pollution represents a significant threat to the lifc sustaining ecosystems of
the eanh's biosphere. The media. as well. regularly report on the link between pollution
and changes in global ecology. outlining the potentially life threatening consequences of
environmental hazards such as ozone depletion and global warming. Affecting human
life. industrial pollution is Dlso associated with numerous health hazards such as
'industrial' and respiratory diseases. all of which negatively affect the quality of life of
industrial employees and the exposed public.
Although many environmental hazards reSUlting from industrial pollution have
been extcnsively researched and well documented. it continues to be an ever increasing
problem around the world. The global nature of this problem, in pan, reflects the
irnpon;Jnce of industry to the economies of Westem. 'newly industrializing,' and
developing nations. The Brundtland Commission (WCED, 1987:206) writes in Q!!!
Common Future that:
industry is central to the economies of modem societies and an indispensable
motor of growth. Jt is essentinlto developing eounl1;es. to widen their
development base nnll meet growing need.... And though industrial izcd nlllntrics
are snid to be moving into;\ post industriuL inform:llion-bascu era. this shin must
be powered by a continuing now of weahh from induslry. Many cs.~c11li:l1 hllllwn
needs can be met only through goods and services provided hy inc!tlstry.
Given the econ0mic importance of industry 10 loc:!!. region:1L and national economics.
governments will often cumpele to support and promote (he in\,cstmcllIof private'
industrial capital. At the same time. Canadi:m federal. provinei:ll. and lllUllicir:tl
governments must display same level of legitimate environmental conCCfll.;\S wdl as;1ll
institutional c"pacity (0 provide citizens wilh reasonable sl:II1(l;lrds of ell\'iroll111ell1al
quality.
The environmental policy instruments developed by governmenls (0 faciliWlc the
control of induSlrial pollution can take a number of specific forms. btll :trc perhaps hest
viewed as part of a continuum of increases in the level of government coercion. The 1c;I.~t
coercive forms of environmental policy include self-regulation. economic inslrumel1t.~
like tradable pennits, tax incentives and cost sharing. while the most coerdvc rolicy
instruments include environmental regulation (Shrubsole. 1989). Although economic
inslrumen.: :mch as tax incemives and COSI sharing have been employed by the Feder,11
government through pollution control initiatives in sectors such as the pulp and pilper
industry, the principal means used in Canada to control the discharging of induslrial
pollutants into the environment is regulation. Thus. lhe primary focus of this research will
be to examine the effecliveness of government efforts to conlrol industrial pollution
through the process of environmental regulation. Regulation here refers to lhe "imposition
of constraints, backed by government authority, that are intended to modify economic
behaviour in the private sector" (Thompson, 1980: 13), The implementation or
enforcement of regulations is the "consistent application of fonnalrules and sanctions to
secure cornpJi,JOcc with the en:lbling legisllltion Hnd promulglJled regulations" (Snider,
199(374). Allhough Canada's nalional government maintains jurisdictional authority
over industrial pollution through statutes such as the Fisheries Act. the provincial
governments rnaintain primury responsibility for implementing and enforcing
environment'll rcgulmions in Canada (Sko£stad and Kopas, 1992).
In Canada. the environmental regulatory process has been the focus of
C(ln.~,t1crahlecriticism, Schrecker (1989: 173) for instance, argues that "industry has
enjoyed a IrJditional de facto right to deposit its wastes in the natural environment." As
well, Snider (1993: 192) argues thut "control over corporate pollution ...has been weak to
non-cxistenr~, Given Ihc imponancc of industry to the promotion of economic growth and
development and since human survival is dependent upon a healthy natural environment,
it is therefore imperative that the currem policy problems associated with the comrol of
industrial pollution be critically eXDmined.
1.2 Research Problem
Ovo.:r the past two decades, social science research has indicated that many ecological
problems, including those associated with industrial pollution, are socially constructed.
According to Ncwby (1990:4).the natural sciences have been most effective at defining
"the parameters of environmental ch:mgc. but they will describe lhe sympt\lllls :md no!
explain the causes. The causes lie in human societies and their systems of l'COll\ll1lk
development." Similarly, environmental policy is soci;llly constructed as this proCl'SS
often involves social choices amongst alternative uses of a natural resourcc. t\ hlilly lit
w:lter. for instance. cnn be used for either recreatiun;ll activit1l's sHch as hll:lting. ami
swimming, or it can be used:ls a 'sink' for industrial W;lste tSchrcch'l". 11):\1)1
The environmental policy process is also subject to considerahle sl1cial and
political influence, Schrccker (1990: 179) ob.~erves thaI "policy UlIh;Ol1lCS ;Ire cllllling.cllt
upon not only the relative strength of panicul:lr groups...hut also on the institutions ;11111
fonns of org,milation characteristic of a particular political sy.~tclll." f'urtherlllore, Ncwhy
contends !hat environmental policy decisions and outcomes <Ire often the fCll:lIs or
political debate and conflict. The conflicting issues may includc'
the expansion of individuul choice and the satisfaction or sociailleeds: individll;11
freedom versus a planncd allocution of resources: distributional justice und the
defence or private property rights; the impact of science and technology 011
society. Beneath the con met over 'the environment' thcre is thcrcfore Hmudl
deeper conflict involving fundamental political principles and the kind of sndely
we wish to create for the futurc (Newby. 1990;3-4).
The process of developing and implementing environmental regulatory policy is therefore
subject to and conslrained by considerable political pressure and inOuence fmm multiple
and often conflicting inlerest groups, each representing particular political. economil.:,
environmental and community interests. In addition. environmental policy is inOuenced
and affected by the relative power of these inlerest groups, mobilized for thc purpose of
innuendng both the development of policy and the effectiveness of implcment3lion.
Moreover, power directly affects the equity of environmental policy decisions. In this
Cf)n1cxt, equity refers to the relative degree of public pOlnicipation in the regulatory
procc.~s and how the social costs of pollution are distributed in socicty (Hahn. 1990:
Schrccker.1989).
The concepts of eqlJity and efficiency :Ire commonly employed to evaluate the
effectiveness of a regulatory program. In a study of regulation in Canada. the Economic
Council ofCun<lda (ECC) described equity as representing a measure of fairness.
According to the ECC (197~:29). equity:
is concerned with what people would consider to be filling or right and includes
synonyms such as Just', 'unbiased', and 'h~gitimate.' Equity differs from efficiency
in that it is n purely ethical concept whose definition lies in the values of the
heholder, ralher than an absolute measure of benefits and costs.
Determining the efficiency of a regulatory program often involves a cost-benefit analysis
of the bencfits of the activity versus the costs ofregul:ltion. The effectiveness of 11
regulatory program for pollution con~rol is often described as the sum of equity and
efficiency measures. In terms of evaluating regulatory effectiveness, Thompson (1982)
maintains that although the benefits and costs of regulation are difficult 10 quantify, it is
rcasonable to i1ssume that the benefits of environmental protection exceed the costs of
regulation. However. regulatory effectiveness has been a problem in Canada. Generally
the problems have been attributed to poorly defined goals and objectives, inefficient
information systems, inlldequate funding for programs and staffing. inconsistent
enforcement policies. and;1 lack of public p:micip:l1ion (Thompson. I'JN:!) Au ilHk'ptll
discussion of funner problems orconslrainls <lffecling lhc ellvimlllllCUlal [q:1l1:llllr~
process will be pre:>cmed in the litcrature revicw Sl"clion heloll',
The centml purposc of this research is 10 cV:lluate the adminislratiw cllcL'!iI'L'n,'ss
of cnvironmental regul;lIor)' policy in Newfoundland, The slX'cifi,' qllL'Sli"ll III Ix'
investigated in this research is: Do financial and polilical rl"Sllurcc cl1llslrailllS lilllilllw
effective implementation of environmental regulatory policy spccific:llly inltll' case of IIlL'
Come By Ch:ll\ce oil refinery and generally in Ihe province of NcwfolllHlI:mJ'! FinmH:i:II
limitations facing government regulmors may illchuk insufficient rC.'ourL'CS. amllimilct!
personnel available for eonsistenl monitoring of eompliam:c agrccment" eOmllll'lin~
thorough investigations or prosecliling offeadcrs ill lhc case ofinduslrynOIH.·ulllpliaIIl'L'
Political constrainls may include Ihe power of induslry to withhold or COllrOlimllcdmie:ll
infommtion regarding emissions data. and lhe threal or pl'lIlt dn'iurc or joh lo:;s ill
response to strictregu[ation,
There appears to be very lillIe empirical research regarding environmental policy
in Newfoundland general:y apart from the research rel:lling to fisheries rcgul<llioll .1Il1i the
ecological impact of fisheries policy, TIlUS, it is hoped thm Ihis study will nOl only expand
upon social science research regarding Newfoundland cnvironmcllI<lll:onccrns, hUI l1l:ly
also serve as :l basis or guide for future policy research in this arCll,
As noted above, environmelllal degradation resulting rrom industrial rollution is:l
global problem, Although this study will examine environmental regulation al lite local
kvel. it i~ app:ucnt lh~t regulatory effons \0 moniwr ~nd control industrial pollution must
hc crfl'ctive ,It the community level ~s pan of larger glubal effons towards sustained
cl1vir<lnment~1 heillth,
I,JTheorclical Pcrspcctil'c
I'riorlo a review IJf the literature and a discussion of the constraints affecting the
il11plcmcntatiollof environmental regul;llory pohc)'. it is important to specif)' the
tllco[l'lical perspective of this thesis. The research will evalu,lte Newfoundland
l'Il\'i[ol11ncnt:l1 rcgulawry polky frum a politic;l1 cconomy perspective. This theorctical
po.'rs[JCctivc proviul:s the ilnalytica[ basis from which 10 explain how political and
cl.:ollol11ic structures inOuence the environmental regulatory process in capitalist ~ocieties
Flirthalllorc. "Marxist theory and method. divorced from orthodox dogma. still
n:preSL'nts one of the most fenile intelleclUal traditio;JS in which to locate ecological
j'kas.Il:lscd as it is upon both the sociOlI construction of nature and the 'naturOllizOltion' of
hum:m cOllsciousncss" (RedLlifl. 1987:45), A polilical economy of environmental
prohlems :llso pennits studies of the transfonnation of nature under capitalism, the
distribution of envirOlllnent:l1 costs and benefits asmciated with ecological change. and
the ."itkological content of environmental ideas..... (RedcliFt, 1987:46).
As mentioned prcviously, a polilic:lf economy of environmental policy permits an
<:x:Ullinatiol1 of how powcr relations and political connicts rdate 10 the competition of
UM'S surrounding a natural resource (Schn:libcrg, 1994). Schnaibcrg, for instancc,
illustrntcs the inhercnt conflict in environment:ll policy choiccs in st;ltin~ thaI:
essentially, the dialcctic:lllension in relalionships l~!wccn modem sl'..:i~'tics llild
theiren\'ironments emerges from two axioms: (I) most demcnts "f l'cologic:ll
systems cannot meel both exchange valuc (ic. market) necds and 1ISt'·valIW (il'.
recreational) needs; :lnd (2.) thc treadmill of production places a prillla.:y nn
exch:mge-value uses of ecosystems, while othereeologiealuscs arc II hio[(lgiclll
and social necessity for all classr.s (Schnaibcrg, 199-1:29·:-01. (Parenllll'sl's add,',1)
An :malysis of the inherent conflicts within environmental pnlicy choices rc!<IIl's lIS wl'll
to the distribution of social costs :md the equit)' of environmenlal policy tll'l·isillns. In
reference to equilY, Faber and O'Connor (1993: 18) contend thal..:l~Orlcs ami
communities that have the least political power or social resourccs h> dcknd lhl~lllsl'1\'l'S
are most \·ulnerable." In addition, political economy provides for:lI1 analysis 1>r the
ideological underpinnings of environmenlal policy outcomes. As Dcorn and l'hidd
(1988:53) observe:
ide('logies remain an imponanl element ofpoJiticallifc not because ideologil's
"cause" or automatically lead 10 policy preferences and action hy gOl'erlllllelits in
power, but because ideologies can help foreclose certain policy options or reduce
levels of commitment to panicular courses of aClion and 10 particular idcllS.
A political ideology, for insulOce, may place greater imponancc lIpon cC<lllul1lic anti
industrial development policies while maintaining il weak commitment 10 envinlllmcnl;ll
qualilY and protection. This may include the presence of ideas ami allilucb within
govemmentlhat suppon the now classic dichotomy of'johs versus the cnvironnlcnt' as
opposed to ~obs and the environment' (Mobley, 1995).
Although the concepts of power, equity aod ideology arc not the specific lilcus of
this research, th.ey are fundamentally imponant to:m analysis of lhe cnvirunmcntaJ policy
process. These proccsse.<; also affecl the manner and extenr (0 which financial and
polilical resourccs shape and influence regulatory decisions and policy outcomes. Thus.
lhe js..o;Uc.o; of flOwer. equity and ideology will be identified and discus.o;ed when direclly
rclcvant IOlhe research.
A political economy of cn\·ironmenlal regulation pennils an tlnalysis of the
political rc.o;ources of inicreSI groups amllhc extent to which these resources arc
tlluhili7.cd to influence the implementation OInd administration of rcgu!:ltory policy. A
political resource rcfcrsto:
...a means by which one person can influencc the behaviour of other persons.
Political resources therefore include money. infonnation. food. the threat of force.
jobs, friendship, social standing. the right to make laws. votes, and a great ,'ariety
of other things (Schrecker. 1984185:43).
Throu£h a case study of the Come By Chance oil refinery, this research will evaluate the
manllCr and the extent to which political and financial re.wurces, such as depilI'lmcnlal
progrJ.ffi finances. vilal technical information. lind the thre.::l.t of l.::I.yoffs and plant closure,
have been used to COflstrain the effective implementation of environmental regulatory
policy in Newfoundland. In addition to identifying specific financial and political
CQnSlr:lints, this research will expand the literature which addresses the political economy
of environmental problems. As Williams (1992:5) observes, "there is remarkably little
wrillen within the Canadian political economy tradilion that directly addresses the
degr'ldiltion of our environment."
III
1.4 Literature RC\'icw
In a discussion of the constraints affecting lhe implementation of environment,,1
regulatory policy, four specific ~reas in the literature :Ire panicularly impoTlanl. '111<:S<:
include environmental regulatory legislation.lhe prominent usc of 'hargllinin!-' rOI
compliance in industrial pollulion conlrol. the position of corporale capital in the
environmental regulator)' process. and the role of government in cn\'inllllllelllal [ll'llicctioll
undercapilalism.
1.4.1 Environmental Regulator\' Legislation
Since the early 19705, Canadian federal. provincial. and municipal gOVCrll1l1\:llls have
been increasingly developing and implementing cnvironmcntllllcgisimion. n:gul:llions.
and by-luws to maintain standards of environmental quality. The general purpost of tllis
legislation is to outline environmental pn'tection objectives ,.md cnfOrl:Clllcnt guidelines
for pollution conlrol. An example of provincial environmental legislation of this tyrlC is
the Newfoundland Department of Environment and Lands Act (191'1 I J. Cml'II.1ian
environmental legislation ha~. however, been Ihe focus of considerablc criticism
Schrecker (1989:174). for instance contends th<lt il is "enabling" legislation and contains:
laws which give ministers certain powers. but do not require them to do ;mythillg.
<lnd whose actual impact on economic activity and environmental qualily is <l
function of the content of regulations made and administrative decisions t;lken
under the provisions of the legislation.
According to Schrecker, provincial minislel'5 of the environment therefore maintain
II
considerable discretionary power regarding the enforcement of environmcnlallegislalion.
At the federal government level, the central environmenlallegislation is the 1988
Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA). This panicular legislation represents a
consolidation of e:lTlier federal statutes and is primarily intended to provide national
standartls for environmental quality. According 10 Swanron and Hughes (1990: 133).
CEPA represents the "toughest" piece of environmcmililegisialion in Canada, ohhough
Ihey also note that lhe... "offcnse provisions have ne\'cr been used to prosecute a polluter."
Although provincial governments maintain primary responsibility for
implementing and enforcing environmental legislation <lnd regulations. f<:der<ll1egislalion
such as CEPA is meant to serve as a guideline for national pollution control objectives
and is intended to reduce the possibility of anyone province becoming a 'pollUlion haven'
(Schrccker. 1984). To funher facilitate the development of national pollution standards,
decision-making forums such as Ihe Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment
(CCME) were established to promote intergovernmental cooperation and consultation
between the federal. provincial. and territorial governments in the environmental policy
rield. In shon, the process fealures: "federal leadership in proposing national guidelines
and objectives; federal-provincial consultalion and bargaining to establish regulatory
standards: and provincial enforcement" (Skogstad and Kopas, 1992:44).
The intergovernmental environmental policy process in Canada, however, has
c;<pcrienced certain problems. These include jurisdiclional conflict, difficullies relaling to
dishamlOny and duplication of policies, and significant costs and delays in policy
"
implementation associated with reaching a comensus between IWcl\'l' different provinri:lI
and territorial minisuies. In addition, Skogslad ami Kopas (1992:50) nllte thill a m,ljor
constraint to the effective implementation of policy is Ihat:
'key interests' in provinces have been able to inOuencc the provinces III :ldept
relatively lenient standards, and the nalional government's ncccpt;ll\CC tlf these
lesser standards is owing to provincial jurisdiction rcgilrding the environmellt .mll
the federal desire to keep provinces on side.
The influence of key interests refers :0 corporate lobbying and the direct p;lrticipatiol\ of
industry in policy forums to the exclusion of otherconccmcd publics.
In tenns of stated environmental protection and quality objccli\'c~. "environll1en1.,!
statutes in Canada were designed to controllhe traditional form~ of water poilu lion
including suspended solids, biochemical oxygen demand. faecal coliform. ;lml heavy
metals, and air pollutants such as particulates. SUlphur compounds, carbon monoxide, anti
hydrocarbons" (Nemetz, 1986:560-561). Although Canadian environmental Icgisl:,tinll
appears comprehensive in its coverage of known environmental hazards. this legislatilm
is funher criticised for being 'unrealistic' and failing to outline specific offense provisions
to guidc:enforcement agency procedures (Webb. 1990). Similarly, Emond (1982: 12)
insists that "vinually all environmental statutes are vague, They profess commitment to
environmental protection, but hope thai regulators will discover, unaided, an acceptable
level of environmental protection." Moreover, environmental legislation has been
criticized for being too narrow in focus and thereby treating all pollution prohlems in a
similar manner. Swaigen (1982) for instance, argues that the narrow nature of
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cnvironmcnlullcgislation h<l!:i made it panicularly ineffective at controlling the behaviour
of major industrial polluters. The observed weakness in environmcnlallegislation led
McMulJun (1992:91) to conterll' that:
Canada's environmental protection strategy is incoherent and uncertain. It is
expressed through a bewildering body of statutes. regulations, policies and
principles, and is implemented by a confusing assembly of disparate groups thai
lack the resources to gel the job done.
Environmental legislation in Canada has been the focus of funher criticism for not
conlilining provisions for 'environmental rights: or more specifically, for not pennitEing
the "ietimg of pollution to obtain compensation for personal damages reSUlting from
corporalc pollulion offenses. Swoigen (1982: 107) insists that even if compensation were
to he pursued lhrough measures such as private litigation under tort law, "the victim has
lillIe chlmce of success againstlhe corporate polluter. backed by his insurance company.
his trade association. his in-house experts. and his hired consultants." In addition. the
1978.B£ID.!ill v. Sault Ste. Marie case is often viewed as a criticaltuming point in
I:nvironmemal regulatory legislation. The decision in this case has been crilicized for
making it easier for corporate polluters to avoid social responsibility for pollution
ocrcases (Jeffery, 1984). In~ v. Sault Ste. Marie, IheSupreme Coun of Canada
ruled that in certain cases the polluters must show only thallhey undertook all possible
care or displayed 'duc diligence' in attempting to avoid the polluting offense. Swaigen
(1982:94)observcs that:
in practice the defense is used not only by companies that maintain a high
standard of care. but also by defendants who can delude themselves or persuade
1"
the Coun that their negligence amounted to mere errors illjudgCIlIClIl. Siner only
the defendnnt knows what really happened, discharging the onus of proving on a
balance of probabilities that he exercised reasonable prcc:1Ulions mil)' be
shockingly easy.
The ease in which industry may avoid prosecution for pollution offcllses also
reflects the significant discrepancy in environmentul1cgislation between the written {IT
'black letler' of the law and the 'law in action' (Webb. i9S8; Rankin and FinkI<.'. ]9821.
For instance, pollution control in Canada is OOsed upon the 'command-penally' 11lIxid l'l
environmental regulation. Command-penally measures imply a principle of strict
adherence and application of law by regulatory lluthoritics. Thompson (1 'Jl':O:46\
illustrates this principle in stating that "normally. if you break the law. Y\llI cxpccll11 hI.'
prosecuted Dod to be punished if you are caught. That is the paradigm of the comrtl:lIlu-
penalty model of regulalion." However, this model appe,lrs 10 operate in a manllcrlluitl'
different than the term suggests. Rankin and Finkle (1982: 170) observe lllat:
though the wriuen environmental legislation in a p:micular jurisdiction is
stringent, industrial and other polluters accurately perceive, on the basi.~ of the
routine, habitual, and expected behaviour of public officials anu politicians, lhal
there exists little likelihood of any legal aClion being commenced ilgainst them for
the violation or that legislation.
Furthermore, Webb (1988: 17) notes that "what legislation suggests government i~ doing.
and what government is actually doing have often been two different things." Aceonling
to Webb (1988) an 'implementation gap' exists between lhe stated objectives of
environmental regulatory legislation and ils actual implementation anu impact in practice.
As previously mentioned, any industry found 10 be in violation of a regulatory
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statute or pollution 'standard: (defined in either the legislation. control order, or in a
compliance :Igrcement with the polluting finn) is subject to an immediate punitive
rcsponre by regulatory authorities. Under environmental legislation. thecommnnd-
penally control measures available to regulatory agencies include administTativeorders
and injunctions (revoking a pollution comrollicenceor requiring the corporation to cea~e
operations until ab:lIement measures achieve compliance). In reference to the canlr.oJ
mci.lSUrcs utilized by rcgulolors. Thompson (J 982:62) observes tbat "the granting or
withholding of permits and licences, and the opportunities they provide for imposing and
enforcing terms and conditions. arc the main bargaining tools of provincial pollution
control agencies." Roman (1982) explains, however. that the polluting finn can avoid
enforcement of its control order by applying routinely to the environment ministry
Director to have the control order amended, and then apply to an appeal board each time
the request for amendment is denied, The result is a lengthy delay in the government's
rcspon~ to alleviate a potcntially hazardous pollution problem,
Another command-penalty measure available to regulatory Ul.thorities is legal
prosecution. An advocate of prosc<:ution, Swaigen (1982:90) insists that:
when all attempts at negotiations have failed, when companies have violated the
leons and conditions of their operating licences, and when Orders have been
impmed hut ignored, government agencies have turned to prosecutions as a last
resort. Under these circumstances, prosecution has often been an effective
deterrent. Prosecutions frequently result in changes in manufacturing processes
and methods of waste disposal. and abatement of pollution.
Although many writers argue that prosecution is an effective deterrent against corporate
'6
pollution offenses. il is rarely employed by regulators ;md is often vicwl.'d as lht: ':l\'t'IlIW
aflas! resort' whell all other attempts:1l achieving compliance h:t\'c failed (Snider. 11)<).':
Daily Commercial News, 1992: McMullan. 1992: Swaigcn. 1%2\. Thus. surroundiuj:
environmental regulatory legislation is a limited bureaucratic inter1l \('I cnflln:..- tIll' !;1WS
and regulations and 10 develop measures that effectively control indllSlrial]l\lllulioll al its
source (5eis. t 993). Sieidlmeier (1993: 145), for inst;mce, nOle.~ that:
.. because the legislation has defined the disease (environmental pollutiun) liS n
collection orsymptom"s, it mandates only mitigating mC'l~urcs. The notioll or
preventing pollution ·the only measures that really work - ;lppcar.; hUI fitfully in
the environmcntallaws nnd has neverbcen given any :ldlllinistrativc force.
The limited administrative force behind cnvironmenlallegisliltioll significantly rdk'(ts
lhe condition that "the tenns of command-penally lcgislation usually do not mlmil to the
substantial amount of informal negotiation which lakes place in conjunction with
enforcement activities" (Webb, 1990:203). In~tcad, regulalory authorities lend to engage
in informal negotiations or 'bargain' with corporate polluters for compliance.
1.4.2 Bargaining For Compliance
The tendency for regulatory authoritie~ to bargain forcompli<mcc with industri:ll pfllllllCrs
indicates that the organizational mandate and enforcement procedures of regulmory
agencies often operate along a 'compliilncc-detcrrence continuum' (Gunninghmn, 19M?).
A review orthe literature pertaining to the actions and procedures of environmental
regulatory agencies indicates that the majority of agencies operate cJo~er tIJ the
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compliance end orlne continuum. generally preferring {O maintain a cooperative
relationship with Ihc regulated firm (Swaigen. 1985). According to Aalders (1993:77),
"thc pamdox of enforcement of cnvironmenlllilegisialion leads us to Ihc general
conclusion that accommodative. conciliatory styles of enforcement by environmental law
inspCClormes are felt to be more effective than stringent, penal styles of enforcement."
This pamuox of environmental regulatory enforcement is alsu prevalent in Canada,
N~melZ (1986:564) observes thai:
extensive consultation is undertaken with industry in Canada in the formulmion of
environmental standards nt both the federal nnd provincial levels of government.
More importantly, the :lelUal practice of enforcement is frequently characterized
less by the l<lying of charges than by a negotiating or bargllining process with
indust!)' in order to induce future compliance.
TIlus. in the process of industri.lI pollution controL regulatory authorities typically refrain
from exercising the full weight of their legal powers. This response by regulatory
agencies ~ ...suggests either that the regulated voluntarily comply in large numbers. rarely
necessitating the use of the state's full force, or that effective enforcement has been
stunted in some part by various factors in social organization" (Yeager, 1991:25 I).
According to Hessing (1993), the state's preference towards a conciliatory relationship
with the regulated firm reflects the nature of social organization under capital ism.
Furthermore. Hessing argues that the bargaining process can be viewed as a 'game,' which
often C'lUses the implementation and enforcemenl of environmental regulatory policy to
be socially compromised. For instance, the game "appears to be devoted to the
maintenance of favourable economic conditions, rather than to the issue of environmental
protection. The current economic infrastructure is ;l$sulIled to he a primary and ullivcrsal
condition of regulation" (Hessing. 1993:40).
Similar to other planning and policy forums. such 'IS the cnvironl11ental impact
assessment process, the negotiation process surrounding compli'lI1ce agn.'l,:mellts for
pollution control has been criticized for excluding the public frolll initial St'lgCS of
planning and discussion, and l.Jr permitting public p:lrticipation often 1,IIl' ill lhl'
implementation process (Smith, 1982). According to Novek ami Kampen (199.'1.1hL'
private and closed nature of regulatory bargaining servcs to keep environmental Cllllccms
at a distance from both the social policy agenda as well as the public. In reference hI
environmental policy decisions. Schrecker (1989:211) contcnds that:
In Canada, these decisions are charactcrized by broad areas of unappealahle
administrative discretion. hi:,:! i,:vels of secrecy and few formal avenucs of acce.~s
to infonnation and panicipation ....The effect is 10 facilitate the cilmounaging of
imponant ethical conflicts a.. decisions about scientific evidencc nreOrnnlOllSL:tlSC
weightings of costs and benefits, especially when th<lt procc.~s orcamllunilgiTlg
serves the ends of powerful beneficiaries of the status quo.
Regulatory authorities therefore make cxtensive usc of conciliation with polluting nrrn.~,
often at the exclusion of concerned and directly affected publics. Hence, Macdonllid
(1991) concludes that pollution control outcomes arc the result of privllie Ilcgotiatinns
between the corporate officials of the wasle'generating industries and govemmcnl
authorities. This pattern of private "clientele-based" policy nelworks innuenccs holh the
setting of pollution standards and the enforcement of environmental law hy regululOry
agencies (Winfield, 1994:132). Many researchers also argue thai such a clo.~e conciliatory
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relationship belwecn the regulator and the regulated serves 10 limit Ihe regulator's
uUlonomy.legal authority and power. leading 10 agency 'capture' by the regulated industry
(Snider. 1993; McMullan, 1992).
Private negoliations nnd clicnt-b<lsed consultative bargaining over p011ution
t;Olllrol represent a significant departure from ImditiOllal methods of social control
involving strict adherence and enforcement of the law. It is therefore important to
cx;uninc the rea.~ons why cn\·ironmentul regul;lIory authorities depart from tradition in
exercising legal authority.
One explanation given for the prevalence of bargaining is the inherent nature of
pollution offenses themselves. Webb (1988:20) for inslance, argues that:
lhe complel' and ongoing n:llure of many pollution situations and the continuous
<ltlcntion frequently needed so that equipment can be adjusted to meet changing
circumst3nccs docsnol mesh well with the fonn31 rules of procedure and the
orientation of the couns 10 making single, discrete decisions 3bout single. discrete
events.
Although pollution control is a dynamic and complex problem, Webb (1988) also notes
that in rnuny caSils the government is often aware that pollution control violations arc
laking place. but responsive action is delayed due to uneettaimy regarding how (0
alleviate the problem. The result is an inherent slowness in regulatory response and
action.
EqUOllly imporlantlo understanding government regulatory procedures is the
relationship between bargaining and the nature of social and political demands pillced on
government in the framing of regulatory decisions. According to Webb (1988:20):
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working out solutions 10 polllllion problcms is frequently :ll1cxtrcllIdy dif(jcnll
(ask given the technical. scientific nnd economic uncerlaillties which surmuilli the
vnrious abatement options. and givcn the broadcrsocio-political is.~ucs undcrlying
these factors. such as pressure from environment;l! groups. riparian landowilcrs
and fishermen for immediate effective control vcn;us delllands fmm C\ll1lpany
officials. employees who fecllheir jobs:lfc thre;llcncd. IOC;ll polilkians :md
business peoplc to move slowly .md thus maint:lin the ecunomic \"i:lhility oftl\\'
operation.
It appears. therefore. that the prevalence of bal1l:lining is partially 'hl' result or sucil"
political conflict. often rcnectin£ government efforts 10 ;lppcase lile illieresl.~ or Illuhipk'
interest groups. In addition. Thompson (1980:3.'1 observes th:Jllhl' "rilles sl:llcd !!\
statutes or regulations are merely points of departure for Ilcgoti;,tilll.: llIodificalions III
behaviour; ilnd 'compliance' or 'non-compliancc' means 'agreement' or ·disagl'eellll·nl·...
Hence. the often vague nature of environment;ll regul,ltiolls pcrlllil.~ corporall' pnllul<'rs 10
m,mipulate the barg3ining process by shifting the focus of discussions aW:IY from a strici
assessment of rule violatiOIiS towards 3 point of dis:lgrcement bOlscd Oil rcl:ltivc v;llllC~.
opinions or beliefs. For instance. the limited and onen contradictory informatioll
sUlTounding the ecologicnl impaci of the pollutant in question can oc used hy the
regulated to direct discussions away From the law and towards a mailer or'scientific
debate' or 'value judgements' (Thompson. 1980). According to Schreckcr (19S4/X5).
scientific uncertainty surrounding m3ny environmental problems can be llIuhilized W bia ....
the regulatory process.
The conflict and controversy sUlTounding the 'science of pollution' appears 10 he
inherem 10 both the environmental regulatory and impact a.~sessment process Cnllunpslm.
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I'.1Xfl; Scllrcckcr. 19M; Rjch:lftl.~on et aL. 1993}. Forcxamplc. in a case study ofthc
cnvimnrnentllJ assc~smcnt review proccs.~. Richar~~on Cl al. (1993: 114) found that the
ucvc!opmcnl ofstanuards lind lhcllsscssmcnl of the impaci ofpollutanlsonthe
clII'ironment arc oflen not based on "~ood science· data to !xlck up conclusions.
rcplic'llioaofcxrerimcntaltrials,slalcmemsofuncertainty.and pccrrcviclVcd sources of
tlal11 ,tnl! irlIJnnalion." As well. the prt:villeocc of bargaining in the cnvironmcnml
rC~lIl:ltory process reneels tnc government's limited desire to acquire the accurate
scicntillc infmrnalion which is nccessury for effective pollution control decision~.
nlOlllpson (1982:J9) lIolcsthat:
knnwledgc gaps require a negotiming lind bargaining process wllich comprehends
thcwidcrangeoftechnologiealandfinaneialinlereSlsalstake.but the industry
~idc in the negotiations will frequently be bener informed than t~ governmental
~idcastomanyorthesefactors,
Oflcn the 'more informed' posilion of the regulated firm is tlte resull of maintaining direct
;lccess 10 pri\'ileged informatioR concemiRg self-regulatory data. tedmological pollution
;lb;ltemcnloptionsandfinaJ1cialiRformation.lndustrycontrolofscientific and techRical
information makes it panicularlydifficult for interest groups with limited resources to
COUl11emCl industry a~scnions regarding tilt environmental impact of tlleir activities,
Rankin and Finkle (1982:173) observe that:
negoliatioo amongsl interest groups wllo are far from equal in their fin ancialor
information resources is. however, a relatively meaningless exercise. From the
lawyer's perspectlve, the lacl; of formalized arrangements which experieRce has
shown docs nOl equalize the contest between the weak and thestrongisascrious.
perhaps fatal. deficiency in Ihe bargaiRing process.
Moreover.lhe existing imbalance!' in negoliating powcr appear 10 be recch'ing limiled
attention as governmenls have nOi demonstrated any ",micularly strong interest in
implementing the necessary infonnalion gatherinl:. processes 10 cffcctively :dler thl-
existing imbalance of power and knowledge. As Y~ager (1991 ::!6R) indicales. ~thl' lad. tlf
modem, comprehensive computerized d:l\a bases is hy itsclf a sllhstamial impo.-dimcnlttl
effective and rJ.tional enforcemenl of llle 1:1\\'." In C:lllada. it sludy of the pulp iUll11l<lper
induslry revealed "lhe failure of government to initi:ue infoml.lIion systems Ihal I\'ill
supply answers that are cruciullo iI successful pollulion ahalem..:lll program" (TholllIIS11ll.
1980;40).
It appears Ihat indusll)"S privileged acccs.~ 10 lechnical. scientific, and finall..:i,.1
information represents a significant conslrainl 00 effectivc regulalion, lherehy forcing
regulatory authorities into the position of negOli:lling forc:ompli:mcc. As DiMcntu
(1989:113) observes. "to be effective. a regulator}' agency needs :u:a:."s 10 infunn"liull
about the finn's subjective and shirting calculations of cost... and benefits as well a.... lh..:
company'scompelitivc profile: Indeed, ill calculating lhe costS of regulation hy Ihe
corporalion, often.....the benefits of delay are typically...great in comparison wilh Ihc coslS
of complying..." (Schrecker, 1990: 167), In addition. political resourees such as technical
informalion often permit induslry to define emission standards oultined in cClmpli:mce
agreements, For instance, the regulated firm is typically able to diclatc Ihe specific: tYre nf
pollution abatemenl equipment that it will install. In Canada, the common policy of 'hcsl
practicable technology' pennits the adoplion of the most efficient pollutionllbalcmenl
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cl/uipment lhat a company can reasonably afford (Schrecker, 1984).In~ence,the
corporation determines thc nctual pollution control standards since the film dictates the
type of ab<!tcmcnllcchnology to be implemented (Schrecker, 1985), Even illihecase
where the best available technology is implemented by 11 firm. "the private seclor will
comply...only if government cares wllelher it complies" (DiMento. 1989: 117l. More
oft~n. however, industry will argue that investment in expensive pollution abatement
equipment could jeopardize the economic \'iabilily of the firm an~ therefore its future a.s
an employer in the community. This argument has been particularlycffec!!vc allimiling
rcgulatoryerfort.sinlheinnumcrnblesing~eindu5IrYlownslhat·dof the Canadian
lands<:ape(Schrec.l:cr.I99I).Jrislhereforeirnportanltoexarninethereasonswhy
rcgulaloryaulhoritiesoftenehoose not to use toereh'e powers to seture tornpJiaocefrom
wasl~-gener.ltillg industrial torporalions. Do limited enfo~menl and rc:/iallte 011
cOllsull.llilfe bargaining also ref1ect thepolilical resources of corporaIionsllllder
capitalism?
1.4.3 The Political Resource~ of Corporate Capital
Til.: above limitations and constrainls affecting environmental regulation often apply to
both Cllpilalist and socia1ist societies,AllhoughHessingconlendslhatindustrial
capillllism is ·predisposed· 10 environmenlal degradation. According to Hessing
(1993:33):
characterislicsofcapilalistproduclion-shorttcnnprofilabililY.lhelackof markct
incentives 10 ensure environmental protection. the "cxternaliz:uion" of the costs of
environmental degradation, competition among finns ,\tid rhe minimi;r.atilln nf
production costs, increasing resource scarcity. rising production costs and
inflation - discourage environmental protection,
Funhennore. it is argued that the curren! methods of produclion in a (rec m:rrkct system
based on competitive capitalism el'emuall)' lead to ecological degfiJdnriol1 :md l·ontlililm.~
indicative of 'Ihe tragedy of the commons.' Ophuls (11)92:'1181. (or instlUll'c. writes th:ll:
...an unregulated, competitive. laissez-fairc market system. in which all havc
access to the economic commons and in ,"hich common-pool resourccs :Irc
treated as free goods. has produced a tragedy uithe commons: the ovenrsc.
misuse. and degradation of resources on which lYe all depend for CC0111~ic,11 hcallh
and economic wealth.
Therefore. both environmental degradation and the existing wnslraints which
compromise regulatory policy may reflect the dominant :md influential position a, ~(Jrdcd
to industrial corporations under capitalism. Schrecker (1984/85:50) nores that:
indirectly it is pos~ible (0 :L~sess rhe extent to which program.~ .~uch <IS
environmemal protection have to fit into a set orpriorilie.~ builr around economic
growth and effects on investment climate on the basis of ll(Jminislralive
requiremems...to the effect that all new regulations must he preceded by arr
assessment of such factors a." their impact on investment climate. the incentive til
work and the formation of new businesses.
Environmental regulatory and enforcement policy is further constrained hy rhe
structure of capital relarions with respect to corporate investmenl. Shareholders and
managers of corporate enterprises often lobby or allemptlo rcsi."t any MJCial reguilition
which places restrictions on operations or reduces corporate autonomy. Corporate leaders
often argue that any imposition offunher regulations will adversely affect their
competitive position in the marketplace as well as the investment climate of the regiun.
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Moreover. corporalions S(lmelimes employ 100 blackmail' by lhremening to close or
move an operation loa lessstricilyregulaledtcgion oroounlry. ThreaL~ of capital flight,
disinvestment, and the loss of jobs provide a powerful countermeasure to increased
regulatory and enforcement effons by government (Grossman and Kazis. 1991:
Schreder, 1990). Schr<:<:ker (1984J&5:S0) also notes that:
whether or not .m explicillhreol is made, the background possibility of production
cUlbacks,disinveSlmelll, plant dosureandjob loss can !Jeused loenlisilhe
upposilionofworkers and local communities 10 environmental. orOIher,
regulations.
Regulatory restrictions can l!zereforc be viewed a~ "...barriers to accumulation. and their
SUCCC.~sflllcjrcumnavjgatjonbypioneeringeconomicagel1tscanconfer significant
competitive advanlages...as well as providing lhe opportunity to...opermerclalivclyfrllc
from regulatory surveillance" (LeyshOIl, 1992:251).
Aspecific indic::llion of policy c1ecisions which favour large corporationsnlaybe
seen in lhe organizational priorities of regulatory agencies. Given Ihe limitations on
a\'ailable resources,lhe legal cosls:tSSociatedwith prose\:ulion, and Ihe necdlodisplay an
cffcctiveellforcement record. regulatory agencies are often forced to rnake choices that
fll\'OUr cenain priorities or enforcement efforts over Olhers. Yeager (1991 :262), for
inslance,observeSlhat:
pulling a large portion of Ihe agency's limited resollrces into a few cases against
powerful oo1pOrate ooversaries that might win in court could be seen as less cost
cffeClivc·from tllc standpoim of bureaucratic politics ifnot fromthatorthe
environment· than spending the same resources enforcing the law against smaller
violators the ageoc)' could more readilyexpeCI 10 bring into compliance in the
neartenn.
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Consequently, regulatory priorities and actions will often fi\\'our large corpomtions on the
basis of their relative political resources and economic power.
As noted above, economic power peonits large COrpOfllliollS to manipulate
imponant technical and financial infoonation, Large corporations have acn:ss tIl lin;mcial
resources which m~y allow them to purchase and utilize 'scientific expertis..-' t(lr the
purpose of supporting their legal position, In this regard. Yellger (1991 ::!S4~2S~lnotes
that:
the indirect advantages involve the larger companies' greater Heecss l{llcchnical
agency procedures by which firm,~ can gencrale exceptions to the regulatory
requirements imposed on them. thereby bringing lhe law Inore inlo line with lheil
intent or capacity to comply,
Thus, in a political economy under the dominant sociaL poliliclli and economic power
position afforded corporate capital. the regulatory process may serve 10 reproduce
economic inequality as well as structural bia~es in the operation of the law (Ycager.
1991),
In the Canadian political economy, current conditions tend to favour policies
directed towards capital growlh in order to provide the necessary conditions for shorl*
teon profits, despetately needed ta:-; revenue and job growth. As a result, resource
management and regulatory polices consistent with government's commitmcnl to policics
like 'sustainable development' will probably receive only limited eonsidcralion. Schrecker
(1990:187) observes that:
a more likely scenario involves aHempls by both business and government to
persuade the attentive public ofthc necd to minimize the unprouuctive co;,ls of
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pollution abatement, ilnd to abandon the careful planning of de\oclopmem prOjeclS
which is essential to sustainable resource management
Corporate lobbying of governments for reduetioos in the 'unproductive costs' of
pollution control and cn'tironmental regulation is genemlly consistent with 'Righi Wing'
ideology. and in particular the political ngenda of the 1';e\1l Right' (Marchak, 1991). In
rcrcrcnce topollulion control. business proponents aligned with the RighI of the pol ilkal
s~clrum often argue thai pollution and regulatory conflicts can be more efrcctively
managed or eliminmcd through the free market, and in particular Ihrou~h the use of
economic instruments such as marketable effluent permits (Doern. 1990). Furthermore.
Right Wing policies advocating grtlllcr regulatory cooperation between the regulator and
rhe regulated are often legitimated on the basis of the failul'C of the exislin£ command-
penalty regulatory model. For instance, it is argued th:lt existing legllllll1d criminal
sanction.<; life IWely used by :Ullte r~£ulatory agencies and this is therefM: an indication of
limiledsllliecontrol overcorpoolleaclivitylllld regulatory failure. In order loxhie\'e
mQfe effective control, supporter1 of the Right argue that corporations would become
more ~ially accountable by assuming greater responsibility for their own activities since
external stale controls are failing to 'foree' corpornlions in this direction (Snider, 1990). in
short. the policies of the Right advocate increased cooperation with industry through a
proccss of environmental deregulation.
It ::IppearstherefoTt that environmental quality, regulatory policy and enforcement
prJctices are indeed political issues. The relative power of the actors involved determines
the nature of policy initiatives and their implementation undercapitalislll, The political
economy of environmental regul310ry policy C3n h~ further cxplored IhrouJ;h all
examination of the role of government in environmCnl.lI protection underl'apilalisl1l.
1.4.4 The Role Of The Envirflnmental Siale
Government C3n pl3Y a primary role in environmenloll protection. Allhough ~nvcrnmelll is
the primary 'conserver' of environmental rcsources. it pluys an equally important role ill
stimulating business interests by promoting a favourable climate for c:lpital il\\'c,~tll1ent
nod production. In short, government is responsible for protcr.ting envirolllllent:11
resources while at the same time advocating their exploitation ,inti utilizati\1I1 through
economic nnd 'resource development' policies, Thus. the govcrnmcllI mainl,.ins dual 'illtl
oflen conmcling and contradictory roles, Fo]' example, in:1 study of provincial
environment ministries and agencies, Gould observcd that poor regulatory crforts rcsulted
from the conmcting and oftcn contradictory 'dunl rolc' of government agencies.
particularly in single industry, economically dcpendent. company lowns (Gould. 11)1)4).
Gould (1994:240) argues that:
in terms of environmental policies in particular 'the state has sevcre intern:J!
connicts around environmental issues.' Thc result of thcse connicts ami
contradictions is Ihat government cnviror.mental ilgencieslministrics attcmpt to
promote the least costly remediation with the greatest dampening cffcct on puhlic
consciousness (or international pressure), in order 10 achicve political legitimation
for state industrial-eeonomic policies with minimal hindmncc to tlll:se policies.
A weak commitment to environmental protection wns recently made evident aL the
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rcdcralgovcrnmcnlleveJ.Anexaminationoflhe 1991 S3billion'Green Plan'indicatesa
weak commitment to regulatory reform. In the Green Plan. the majority of policy
instruments arc dirtcled towards education and information dissemination programs,
whilcconlaining"asurprisingpaucilyofmeasurestodirecllyprolect the envil'Qnmenl.
whethcrrcgulationsloreSlrictorpreventpolJulion,laxeSlopenalizepollmingbehaviour,
orspcndingforcleanup·(HobergandHarrison.19~:119).
In the comcXI of the Canarlian political economy. the slate appears tooperaleina
position of latenl lension between the need to limit tile potemiallydamagingnffeclsof
husiness:lctivities on the environment and the need tQsupportlnenecessarycondilions
fOf carital accumulation. A,'cording 10 orfe (1984: 120):
lheinslilutionalself-interestoftheslateinaccumulationisconditioned bylhe fact
that lheslate is denied lhe power loconlrol the flow of resources which are
nevertheless indispensable for the exercise of ~ate power. Although the agents of
accumulation are not primarily interested in using the power of the state, state
actorsmu~lbeintcreSled-forthesakeoftheirown power-inguar:lIJteeingand
safeguarding a heallhy accumulation process.
From lhi~ perspeclive, environmental regulatory policy and irnplewmtation efforts can be
vieweda.~contradiclorytolherelationswithinpoliticalinslilutions and the preferred
motivesofindividualpoliticiansundercapilalism.
In the Canadian polilical economy, forces of regulalory opposition areequally
significant in lerms of Canada's representative system of government. The nature of the
CmJ:ldian political landscape often maintains political divisions which emphasize
regionally based issues and concerns. According to Schr~cker (1990: 180):
3n
Canada's electoral !>ystem rewards concentration on issucs with stron~ regional
winners lind losers, lind penalizes emphasis on policy positions (lik~ many having
to do with environmental protection) characterized by dispersed !lillional support.
Thus, the degree of opposition to environmental regulation oftcn relates 10 thc rolitics
and economic conditions of a particular region. Again this rclmionship i.~ particularly
evident in the 'one industry town,' in which a local pulp and p:lper mill. for example. is
the largest employer and provides the bilsis for the local economy. Under tbesl'
conditions, any atlemptlo enforce existing or further regulations may be regarded as a
threat 10 the economic viability of the mill and may be striclly opposed hy the t:\llllpany.
its employees, the community, and therefore local politicians. Thus. rcgulalory 1}OIicy
advocating stricter effluent restrictions on the pulp llnd paper industry may have majority
political support at both the federal and provinc:iallevcls. but may face sliff 0pPlisition :ll
the local leveL
The Canadian legal system appears 10 be equally constfllining in terms of hcing
highly restrictive of the opportunities afforded citizens to participate in the regulatory
policy process and to influenc,,". government decision-making. Greater public participation
in regulatory and environmental policy discussions is presently occurring in sllme
jurisdictions, and political resources are being made available to citizens and auvocacy
groups, but participation rarely extends from the point of inilial discu.~sions through tn
implementation. In some cases, press releases and public hearings arc legally required for
proposed policy changes, but this more accurately reflects an opportunity 10 comment 0/1
the final content as opposed to actually participating in policy development (Schrcckcr,
JI
199{)j.
Inuddition,Cllnadiancnvironmcntallcgislarion(unlikctheUniledSlateS)n::stricts
thc ability of privutccilizens 10 use privllIe litigation through 'environmemulrighls'lo
oppose government (XII icy and regulatory decisions. Schrecker (1990: 182) slules thallhis
thai Cunudiun national govemments are fur freer than their U.S. cQUnlerpurls [0
pursucaccommodalionslYilhindustryandlobJlanceregionaleconomit
objcclives(oftenachicYcdlhroughexlensive federnl subsidies for energy and
mincrJI development) ugainsilhe achievement of broader environmental goals
wilhlcssdearlydetinedandpolificullyeffccliveconSlituencics.
Incs.~encc,Canatlianpo!iliclllle;)dcrsavoidanychangcstocnvironmenlulpolicythal
would pennil an increased roleforprivllte litigalion or that expands the rolc ofcitizensin
'public'l.lccisions. Indeed,afcdml minister oflhc environmem was quotcdassaying
"Ihatcntrenchingemployees·right.~.environmel\tal rights, and olher bills of rights in the
arcas of public policy...could very well undermillC the capacity of elected and therefore
<lccountablepeople torepresentlhc publicinteresl as they see fit" {Schrecker. [990:183).
Instead of the cilizenrybeing granted legal entitlement or righlS 10 environmentalquality,
cnvironmcntaladvocalcsandthepublicarcplacatedintoassumingthat such standards
'legilimately'existthrooghlhellscofcnvironmentallegislationtypically framcd and
promoted in symbolic tenns (Rankin and Finkle. 1982). Rankin and Finkle (1982: 175)
arguethnt:
J)\'litici:lll\ can curry favour at eleclions by poillling 10 ostensibly lough
cnvironmentallegislalion which has been passed. FederaUprovincial agreemcllls
may never be concluded, for a great variety of reasons. Aprogramme may never
be adt.-qualcly funded or legal resources may no( he pnwilk:tl Stl as III cnforn" Ihl"
laws on Ihe books.
Inadequate funding for environmental protL"Ction prOgr:l1ll!i is nut a pmhklll inherclll tn
only capitalist coumries. The problem is similar to the difficulliL"S sumlumlinJ;
government funding of olher collective or 'social services' which e;1I\ alstl he a pf\lhlclIl in
socialist countries. As Miliband (19K9: 21 1-2 I:!.) ohserves:
11,e level of such service.~...v'lrics from cmllliry III elllUllry; hilt pulllie ]JnlVi.~illll;n
the re:llm of health. education, transport. l\llll.~ing, lhe clwinllllllclll. leisure, slll:i:ll
henents. Hnd pcnsion.~ will continue to be gencndly rmll". shllrt of rtllllts ami
resources, burctlUeralic,llly administcred. and grmlgingly, rc!lh,:wlllly dispCllSL·(1.
Although this review h;ls focused on the mle Ill' government in cll\'irnnlllcnt;ll
protection umler capitalism, significant environmelllal dcgr.uJatitlll has llCcum':ll ;md
cominues to be a seriOLIS problem ;11 many socialist st:llCs a.~ \VclI, In p;lrtit:u!;lr.lllIwcvcr.
this review found that under capitillism, both environlllental n~glliatory pili icy and
standards of protcction can be significantly eompmllli~'\l hy !:llvel1llllenl.s that serve tn
promote economic growth through supporting the :llCcumulatil'lll illtercsts uf capil:tl while
maintaining primary responsibility rorcnvimnmcmal lIe:lltli ;uKI1lualily.
CHAPTER II:
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the case study method of research, outlining
its strength~ and weaknesses. and explains why the Come By ChanC(l refinery was
.\clccttdforthccascs!udy.lnaddition.thc,haptcrlinksthetheorcti,al franteworkof
political econom)·to qUillitativc research and the case study method, concluding with a
rJcscription of the rJata galhering process. Both the U!ieof primary dOla sources and the
interview ,dcetionproccss arediscusscd.
2.2 The Case Stud)' Method
r-or an empirical analysis of the political economy of environmental regulatory policy in
NcwfounrJlilnd,this research utilizes a casc study approach. Acase sLUdy is broadly
dcl"incd as "an in-depth. multifaceted investigation. using qualilative research methods. of
a single social phenomena. The study is conducted in greatdctail and often relies on the
usc of ~cveral data sources· (Feagin et aI., 1991 :2). Furthennore, this method is a holistic
cxamination of a phenomena which seeks "...10 avoid the separation of components from
the larger context 10 whkh these matters may be related" (Jorgensen. 1989: 19). For
instance, the constraints affecting the environmental regulatory process at the Come By
Chance refinery may be related to problems affecting the regulation of industrial pollution
in Newfoundl:md a.~ well as in other n:gions of Canada. As Feagin et al. (1991 :2) observe,
"the case study is usually seen as an instance ofa hroader phenomena, as part of a larger
set of parallel inst.mces."
The case study method ofrescarch is often identified as having hoth sp... ..:ifil·
strengths and weaknesses. According to Mitchell (1989), criticisms uf this approileh
include limited baseline data for the purpose of pre- and post-program wlllparisnn, till'
absence of control groups for isolating independent vari:lbk.~, and limitiltions :lssOl:iatl'd
with observations taken only al iI single point in time. These sh0l1comings may
undermine the utility of research employing case swdies :l~ thl'ir primary II1l'"ns "I'
analysis.
The above criticisms arc also relevmltto:1 Cilse .~tudy of the COl11l' By Chillll:l'
refinery. For example. prior studies of the constrilints affecting the itnplcmelllilli'1I1 tit
environmentnl regulatory policy:ll the refinery do not exist. Therefore. this stully liaS un
basis on which to compare its findings with other research on the Come By ('ham;e
refinery. In short. this case study of the refinery hilS no bilsclinc d"w for the Ilurpl).~e.~ of
eomparlllive analysis and no control group for i.~olating independent v'lriahles.
However, a particular strength of ca~e study research is its usel'ulness in
identifying significant variables :lnd relmionships. As Fcagin ct al. (1991 ;6) ohscrvc. "il
provides information from a number of sources and over a period of time. thus pcrmilling
a more holistic study of complex social networks and of complc...c.~ of social aclion i!ml
soci:ll meanings." Mitchell (1989) further notes that the ability of c;lse studic~ 11. idclltil'y
complex and signific:lnt relationships is particularly valuable when lillIe prcvi{)u~
rese:lrch h:lS been conducled. as it pennits further refinement of conceptual frameworks.
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In addition. the analysis of a ~ingle and sufficien!ly imponuill case can be used as a basis
for a comparative case study, adding greater predictability to its findings (Jorgensen.
19H9; Mitchell, 1989). Rather than being viewed as anomalies, Ihe analysis of single
c.;a~cs should be accepted a~ a positive means of conducting empirical rescllrch. This
c.;ondusion suggests that single cases have value for study. Therefore. an examination of
llic wns!r:.Iints afreeling environmental regulatory policy as it npplies \0 the onl}' oil
refinery in NcwfnundlJmd presents:m important case worthy of study.
2.2.1 1\ Case Study of Come R\' Chance
Although it is possible tu examint: ollter environmemal regulato/)' concerns in
Newfoundland. the Come by Cbancc refine!)' is an important case for several reasons.
rir.~t. it is the only operating oil refining facility in the province of Newfoundland. Oil
refineries throughout Nonh America have been the focus of considerable political
controversy and have received considerable public and media attemion. The emi.~sions
and pollutants discharged from oil refineries often represent significant environmental
;Uld hum'lIl health haz:lrds to the communities in which they are located. These hazards
arc primarily associnted with the release of lOX ins into the atmosphere, inclUding
chemicals known to cause cancer. birth defects and serious health problems. For example.
hydro~cn sulphide. a compound commonly released from refineries, is known to cause
scriQu~ IlI"alth impacts and death. In response to these environmemal hazards, grassroots
nrgani7.ations such as the National Oil Refinery ACTION! Network in the United Siales
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are taking legal action againsllhe polluting. activities of tile oil rdining industry (Karras.
1996). This case study of the Come By Ch:,mcc refinef)' will indicate Iha! t:crl;1in
environmental problems at the facility were specifically rchued 10 the refining pnll:c.~s
3nri the manner in which this facility was opemled.
Second. from ils initial conception. on into the construction phasL', and Ihl\lllgholli
much of its operating history. Ihe refinery has 1lt.'C1l associ'lled wilh political COIlIHl\'Crsy
and h<ls been the focus of considerable public :md media attention.
Finally. the environmental problems surrounding the Come By Clwllcc rcriner}'
have not been a subject of aC:ldemic investigation until quite recellll}'. Til d<llc, vL'ry liltk
academic research on the refinery has been published. For the above rcasolls. ;l slUdy of
the constraints affecting the environmental regulatory process :ltlhe refinery represents ,11\
important case worthy of academic research.
2.3 Political Economy and Qualitative Rc~arch
A political economy of environmental regulalOry policy examin~s how faclon; Sllch as
political and economic Structures influence the policy process. Specifically. this research
will evaluate whether or not the effective implementation of environmental regulutory
policy is limited or affected by financial and political resource constraints. For example,
the research will attempt to detennine whether the provincial Department of Envirnllmenl
has adequate financial resources to implement and achieve the Slated objectives of the
existing regulatory policy. Are there sufficient resources and personnel available
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consistently to monitor and enforce compliance agreement~, or (0 investigate and
prosecute cases o(suspccted non-compliance? Are environmental proteetion and
regulatory program goals 'ideologically' conslrnincd or affected by current polic)'
discussions and initiatives promoting economic and industrial development and the
dcrcgulalion of industry? Has the management of the Come By Chance facility ever
~lIcccssrully mobilized polilical resources 10 limit access to critical technical informlllion
required hy both the pUblic and provincial government regulators? Has the threat of
refinery closure or Job blackmail' bl:en used to impede regulatory procedures?
This is a brief outline of the types of questions presented as part orlhe research
process. For lhe purpose!; of data analysis, a qualitative approach employing a case study
melhod is most suitable. This approach pennits the idenlification of social processes and
relationships that influence the policy making and implementation process in relation to a
specific case. In addition. qualitative research permits the social scientist to e)(plain better
the underlying causal networks that shape a particul.lr policy outcome.
2.4 Primary Data Sources
A~ part oflhe research for the case study of the refinery, extensive use was made of
primary data sources. Through archival research, these data were obtained through an
extensive review of Newfoundland community newspapers. magazines. eBC Radio and
Television transcripts, Canadian oil industry journals and reports prepared by
environmental consultants, all dating from approximately 1970 to the present.
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Archival research was conducted <It The Centre for Newfoundland Studies located
in Memorial University and at the SI. John's Arts and Culture Centre Public Lil'orJr)'.
These facilities each contained collections of local newspaper and maguzinc :lrlidcs
pertaining particularly 10 the imporlance oCthe refinery's COllslntclion :md o~r:lti(lll In the
region's economic development. In addition. extensive use W;lS rni.ld~ ura personal
collection of newspaper and oil industry journal anicles. minislerial !cUCTS :lml ltK:;l1
media interview transcripts provided on loan by n Department of Environment regulatory
official. This collection provided detailed infonnation on the cnvirOl1mclllal prohknts mId
relmed controversies associated with the refinery over its oper.llion~1 history.
Further primary data were de~ived from the repons of independent cnvironrllcllt;11
consultants, prepared for the Department of the Environment /\t lhc request of the
prOVincial governmem, the Toronto based consulting Iirm Concord Environmenlal
conducted an on-site inspection orthe refinery in 1993. The resulting Teport olilliliCU the
current status of the facility's environmental management procedures and SystCIlIS. In
parti<:ular. the Concord report assessed the relincry operator's compliance with ,I
miniSlerialletter ordering a clean-up of the sources of obnoxious odours al the site. As
well, the repon descrilJed problems associated with sulphur emissions and the focility's
sulphur recovery unit, in addition to identifying problems relating to the refinery's sub-
standard heater and process equipmenl. Soon after the Concord report wus rclew.cd 10 lhe
pUbliC, a second independent study was commissioned at the request of the DcP'irtmcnt of
Environment Dr. LesbiaSmith, an Environmental Health ~ndToxicology Consultant
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from Toronto was rcqUesled 10 examine the p:lSsible ~Iationshjp between the refinery's
c:xccssivecmis.sions and tile subsequent increase in health related compJainrs amongst
citizens living adjacent 10 the facility. Together. these repons scrvt:d as imponantsources
of prim:Jry data for the C3SeSludy.
A.~ discusr.ed in Chapter I. the environmental regulatory process is shaped by the
power aoo political resources of connicling interest groups. oflen mobilized to inOuence
the implementation of policy. This research must therefore identify those individuals
directly affecting or influencing the implementation and administration of environmental
regulations governing the Come By Chance oil refinery.
2.5 The Interview Seleclion Pro«ss
An evaluation of the extent 10 which financial and political resoult:e constraints affected
the implementation of environmemal rcguJatOl)' polky required conducting illlerviews
with informed indiyiduals repre~nling "<lricus intereM groups. A partialliSI of potential
interviewees was deyeloped on the basis oftbe names of regulalory offICials and other
'experts' idcnlified in media reports published in response to regulatory COllCems at lhe
rel"inery. In addition. the interviewees were identified and selecled through the use of a
network or 'snowball' sampling lechnique. As Neuman (1994:199) explains:
il is bnsed on an analogy to asnowball, which begins small but becomes larger as
it is rolled on wet snow and picks up additional snow. Snowball sampling is a
multistage technique. It begins with one or a few people or cases and spreads out
on the basis or links to the initial cases.
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Forexample. following the completion of an illlcrview.thc interviewee \\';L~ il"ked 10
identify other individuals who have either participated in the co"irOl1lnenl;l1 rCJ;ulal\lry
pfaces!'> or have expertise and knowledge of the process generally :md its appliCaliollltl
the Come By Chance refinery specifically. Once identified. initial contact was made with
polemial interviewees to explain the purpose of the resc:lfch. further to I.klcfminc thdr
suitability, and if lhey were then identified a" an eligible cimdidnlc.l0 arrmlgc rUT ,Ill
interview.
However, the use of a snowball sampling technique can be probktmllic .IS there is
the potential for biased s;lmpling. For instance. an interviewee ilia)' recollllllend that
interviews be conducted with individuals holding simi 1m opinions or positions rcg:mling
the effectiveness of the environmental regulatory proces.~ :ltthe refinery. AS;I result, the
sample, and in particular the empirical findings derived from the intcrvjt:ws. 1Il00Y he
biased towards a particular position on Ihe issue.~ presented. Therefore. ill the proces~ uf
evaluating tbe suitability of the interview eandidales forthis research. all efforts were
made to develop a 'balanced' sample by selecting individuals with differing professional
or personal affiliations and positions.
Tbe use of qualitative non-random sampling techniques are often criticized for not
~mploying inferential statistics or similar techniques which permit greater ;Jt:curacy in Ihe
evaluation of a population on the basis of the individuals sampled. For inslance, the
research data derived from an interview with II Department of Environmenl regulatory
official is nOI necessarily representative of the views held by all provincial environmental
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reguJatOf)' personnel employed in Newfoundland. Instead, this research has attempted,
through 11M: use ofscmi-slrtlclured interviews, to access a range ofinfonnation and
positions regarding Ihe effectiveness of the environmental regulatory process governing
the refinery.
The twelve individuals interviewed forthis research project included both fenner
and current employees of lhe provincial Department ofEnviromnenl. a representative of
Environment Canada, an environmental consultant. an environmental lawyer, employees
of North Atlantic Refining Limited. including both management officials and a union
~prcl'cnl3livc. und individuals representing community interest organizations.
Although this sample permiued access to an adequD.tc quantity and quality of data,
:Itlempts were also made to arrange interviews with three other potential interview
candidatcs. In twoof the three cases, involving individuals representing community
concerns. the potential candidates were either away from the region or absent from the
province for an extended period of time. An attempt was also made to arrange an
intl.'rview with the fonner Minister of the Environment. Patricia Cowan. Ms. Cowan was
selected as a potential interview candidate as she was Environmelll Minister in 1993
when considerable media ,mention and public concern regarding the refinery's
atmospheric emissions was expressed. According to Ms. Cowan, she refused to grant an
interview because "as a fanner Minister of Environment, I remain under an oath of
secrecyrc any decisions that were made in Cabinet, and do so for all my lire. Thererore I
r~'e' it would not be appropriate for meta become involved..... (Personal Correspondence,
March 7.1996).
Interviews with the Minister and with the ab:;cnt communit)' r<:prcs~llt,llivcs nm)'
have provided greater depth 10 the infonnation regardingcommunitycol\c.::rll~ilblJUlthc
refinery. '.-l"evenheless. even withoul these interview~. it sufficient quality and tlll,Huit)' "I'
data were derived through interviews wilh other community spokespersons. Ilowcvcr. an
interview with Environment Minister Patricia COW,Ill may have prol'idcd partinll"rly
important information in tenns of the content of cabinet mcctings ;md the spctiliJ.: m:mllcr
in which regulatory decisions were negoti:l1ed between rerinery rqlrescnt'J1i\"cs. s~nior
Departmcnt of Environment ofrieials and the Minister. Therciorc. the ahsence of this
information from Ihedata collected will uffeclthis research. in particular Ihc rllldillgs
regarding theeonstroints affecting the environmen1<l1 regulatory process lltthc ministerial
level
At the time of both arranging for an interview .mdjusl prior til the inlcrview il~c1r.
the interviewee was fully informed of theethicill guidelines governing the rcsc:lfch and
anonymity and confidentiality was assured. Given the nature of the interview questiolls.
which often llSked the interviewee to be critical of thei r respeeti vc employer or of other
organizations. the assurance of anonymity and confidentiality provetl es.~enti:llto
acquiring accurate data. Although these assurances were granted. the responses of the
interviewees proved to be generally consistent with and supponivc of the \\aIUs quo.' In
short, the interview data obtained from the union representative. cnvironmcilial and legal
representatives. government personnel, company officials and communily spokespersons
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were generally indicarjve of their personal or professional affiliations.
To help facilitate accurate data collection, ten of the twelve interviews were tape
recorded. The two interviews which were not recorded were those conducted with the
management officials of North Atlantic Refining Limited. One senior management
official requested thatlhc interview be conducted in an informal manner while the
interview wilh the second refinrry management representlllive was conducted over the
telephone. Allhough nol recorded. adequate and important informmion was derived from
both of these interviews. In the cases where the interviews were n:cordcd. the presence of
the 1;lpC recorder did not appear to affect either the ease in which Ihe interviewees
responded or the content of the answers provided.
Finally, the interviews were semi-structured, employing open-ended questions and
were not designed using a standardized formal. Although the interviews were designed to
<1ddress issues common to the environmental regulatory process. each interview was
necessari ly tailored to the specific background or expertise of the individual being
interviewed. In the process of conducting the interviews, all of the questions presented
were answered as none of the inlerviewees refused 10 provide a response. Thus, a
significant quanlity and quality of data were obtained from the interview process.
CHAPTER III:
THE POLITICAL ECONOl\IY OF COME 8Y CHANCE: A CASa.: STuny
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 presented <l discussion of the me!hodolog)' employed in this research. By W:1Y
of introduction to the case study, this chapter provides ,Ill overview of the politic'll ;mll
eeonolllic history of the Come By Chalice oil refinery. This willilC followed \"ly .1t1
examination of specific environmental problem~ arising a\ the facility since rcfil1ill~
operation~ began in 1973. In the discussion of environmemal problems. cmphasis is given
to the provincial government's response. p:micularly to thai of officials with the
Department of Environment Unless otherwise specified, governmcllt will refer to "the
provincial government of the province of Newfoundland, its Ministers. electcd and
appointed officials, and all employees, agents and representatives of the rrovillec~ (Eel.
1994:3). The government's response to the facility's environmental problems permits an
examination of sociopolitical conniet and legitimation within the conteu or a '0111,'
industry town' located in an economically underdeveloped region.
The Come By Chaoce oil refinery is located 100 kilometres west of St. 1olill's 011
the Avalon Peninsula of eastern Newfoundland. Situated on Come By ChimeI,' Bay ill
Placentia Bay, the refinery is adjacent to Ihe communities of Come By Chance, Arnold's
Cove and Sunnyside (See Figure 2.1).
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PLACENTIA BAY, NEWFOUNDLAND AND THE LOCAnON OF THE
COME BY CHANCE OIL REFINERY
(Source: Hall et at., 1974)
3.2 The Casl' of Come R~' Ch:mce
To mark the official opening of the Come By Chance refinery, former Conservati\'c
Premier Frank Moores ceremoniously stated that "Newfoundland i~ one of 111l' \\'{\rld's h,st
industrial frontiers in that we are only beginning to tap resources that in other parts ~lf the
world are nearly depleted" (Crocker and Benson, [973:2). nil' con~tlllct;(lilof a IOa,UIIO
barrel per day refinery at Come By Chance represented the first stage in whailloliticialls
of the day envisioned would become a multi-million dollar industrial complex l:tmSislilig
of a second larger reFinery, a petrochemical f;Jcility, ;Jnd ;\ pulp mill. The devclnpll1Cnl Ilf
the Come By Chance refinery was the outcome of substantive political ;ntcllt 10 prollWle
economic and industrial development in the province. According to Rczori {19X6:J). "the
refinery wasconceivcd by former Newfoundland premier Joey Smallwood lI.~ olle 01';\
number of industrial seed projects which wcre to ushcr in a new age of prosperity for Ihe
historically impoverished island." Prior to the refinery's conslruction, thell Prclllit:r JlM:Y
Smallwood himself remarked that "Come By Chance will be turned inln (lne of Canllda's
great industrial centres· (Benson. 1995:4),
As an indication of Premier Smallwood's strong commitment to the development
of industry in the province, the Newfoundland government provided in [971l an
'unsecured' second mortgage loan of approximately $30 million towards the eOlI.~lruclion
of the refinery. The first mortgage holder and principal invc~tor was a consortium 01
British Banks, most notably, Kleinwort Benson. Through the Exports Guurantce
Department of the British government, the banks provided ~eeuredercdit of$125 milliun
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toward.. the estimated $198 million capital cost of the refinery. Additional financing for
the refinery W:t5 obtained through federal government gronts for specific projects and
through equity loans.
Although the refinery wa.~ conslnu:led and developed by a private ccm~y.
Shaheen Natur.al Resoun:t'S COnlp:my Inc. (SNR). the facility was developed through a
consortium of provincial crown corporations to operate under the ownership of Pro\'incinl
Refining Company Limited (PRL). Mr. John M. Shaheen. New York induslr;alisland
pre.~itlcll1 of SNR. then eStablished a subsidiary company called Newfoundland Refining
Company Limited (NRL) to manage the refinery's operations and to facilitate product
sales and <narkcling. Under the terms of an agreement bet\vetll SNR antI tile
Newfoundland government, the company was 10 :tSSUme orrlCial ownership of the
refinery in 15 years upon paying off the first mongage along with payment of an agreed
pun:ha.'ie price. Documented figuft',.~ of Ihe agreed purchase price vary widely from
belWttn $2000 10 S 10 million (McBride and Reid, 1995; Rezori. 1986; Felt and Caner,
1980: W<ltkins. 1911l.
3.2.1 The ProvinciaL'Newfoundland Relining Era
In man}' respects. the initial period of Ihe refinery's development would reflect its
subsequent troubled andcontro\'ersial future. The two year construction process was
hindllred by a series ofopcrationaJ setbacks and luoour disputes (The Evening Telegram,
January 14. 1981). The IJbour problems resuhcd primarily from the decision by NRL 10
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conlroct with a non-union hiring firm. Ahhouglllhc I.thou!" dispUI~' W;u; lUll rl'sn]wtl hI
the s:llisfuction of the province's bbour movemeill. Ctrnstructioll was COlllpkll'd and thl'
refinery was officially opened on October 10 of 197~ (Rczori. 19Io:fI). Till' n.. tillery's
official opening wa~ (1 major political ;ma sociul event for the [(XX) invjll'd dignilaril's.
NRL company president John Shaheen held the $1.4 million gala celebration almar,j till'
ocean liner Queen Elizabeth J1 (Mctlny. 1987; Crocker and Bensoll, 19731.
Soon after initial opennions began. however. NRL cxpcricl1l'cd .~igtliril:;1111
rinancial problems. These difficulties includc(Jf;lilcd aHempts lu Iin;U1cc Ihcc.\paIlSioll \.1
the refinery's operming capacity. rising operating costs. n:strictcd acl,;CSS II' Illl' \ JnilCll
Stotes oil market and high world oil prices. expenditures on wholl w,l.~ \:rilicised ,IS hl.'ing,
an unnecessarily large neel of tankers. ,lnd technical difficulties prtxllll:ing Ihe l"Clllli,,:d
quota of marketable producl at acceplable quality. The company's finilll\:ial dilTi\:ullics
were made public in October of 1975. By FebfUilry ur 1976. illViiS illlnuum:ed Ih;llllle
company was going into receivership through Clilrkson Cornpilny Limiled. :lnd lhallhe
refinery was to be 'mothballed' (McBride and Reid. 1995; Rezori. 19K6; I1le
Newfoundlilnd Quarterly, 1976).
With the demise of NRL. il was reponed that lhe company IUJ(! hecli losing Sill
million dollars a month in its last year or operalion. In addition, lhe government 10Sl its
claim to the unsecured loan. estimaled with accrued intcrest to 10lal 541 million (loJlar.~,
and the principle investor, Kleinworl Benson of Britian, was owed SIlO milliull t.IolJal'~.
Although as Rezori (1986:3) noted..."lhe biggeslloser (was) lhe Japanese trading
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company Alab which provided the refinery with oil. It (endedl up holding 5330 million
in unpaid bills and (wenl) bankrupt shortly after." In the final assessment. NRL had
illcurrcd dehts estimated to be bel ween 5600 and 5700 million dollars and achieved the
diSlinction of being the mOSl indebted company in Canadian ;Jod international bankruptcy
histury (Benson. 1995; Finn. 1986; The Evening Telegram. September 28,19871. By
]cJ77.lhc lkcision was made by the refinery's subsequent receiver Peat. Marwick,
Mitchell of Toronlo to put the facilit)' up for sale
3.2.2 The Petro-Canada Era
Between the years 1977 and 1981. interested investors came forth to submit proposals to
purchase and rC:lctivate the refinery, but these bids were either rejected or fell through due
to poor financial an"Jngements. It was nOI until July of 1981 that the federal crown
corporalion Petro-Canada announced that it would be purchasing the Come By Chance
rerinery from its receivers. IJnder the terms of the sal..:s agreement, the British Bank
KlcinwoTt Benson received $160 million dollars including profits from future production
UpWI the rerinery's reactivation. The government was also granted fU'lire interests in
production profits but did not receive the estimated 541 million previously invested in
NRL. (RcZ('Iri. 19j:J6l.
UnOlble or unwilling to establish a viable operation at Come By Chance, Petro-
Canada itnnounced a year later that il intended to sell the refinery. but promised not to
ui~nwntlc ;Lnd .~cJt it piecemeal for scrap. However, by March of 1984, Petro-Canada was
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unable to attract a buyer for the facilit)' and revCfsed ilS position on dism<ll1llil1!:! Ih\'
refinery. "'ver the following tlVO year period. propo~;;)ls to bOlh diSllMlIlk lUll! n:m:livilll'
the refinery were received. For reasons not made explicitly cleaf wille public. the
deadlines for these proposals were passed and the priv:nc negotiations between
government officials and the various ccmpan}' representatives ended without :1 deal. II
was later revealed that a promising bid 10 reactivate the refinery was rut fnnh hy the
Israeli firm Dor Petrochemical but was rejected by the Newfoundland gu\,'.:rnmclli 11m: to
Ihe company's request for concessions and government ilss;slancc 10 rch:,hililmc thl'
facility (Harris. 1986).
Finally in September of 1986. Petro-Canada announced thm it would he .o;cllillg
the refinery for the nominal fee of$l. The refinery wassoJd to the HascOlcs ramily(lf
Massachusetts. owners of Cumberland Farms. a large retail gasoline and (,"onllcllicllCC
store chain operating in the Nonheastem United Slates. Incorporated in Bcrmud'l hut lint
in Newfoundland, the refinery was registered under the ownership of Newfoundland
Energy Limited (NEL). The refining operation at Corne By Chance hecame a NEL
subsidiary called Newfoundland Processing Limited (NPL). According 10 NEL president
Kenneth Brown. the decision to incorporate NEL in Bermuda was hused nn the firm'.~
desire for corporate 'confidentiality; and to minimize local public attention ill case the
planned operation failed (Walsh. 1986). With the purcha.'iC. NEL announced that it wnultl
be reactivating the facility to "... refine foreign crude for Cumberland Farms Inc. of
Massachusetts. the third largest gasoline distributor in the United Slates· rRc1.ori.
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1986:3).11Ic sale of tile refinery wNELwas made official on November I, 1986.
Thus, Petro-Canada ended a costly ownership of the refinery. In the final analysis,
the federal crown corporation purchased the facility in 1981 for approximately SI5
million, paid off the principle mortgage holders, and spent an estimated $26 million
maintaining it (Atlantic Insight, 1987). Although as Fi"n observes, "the refinery deal caps
10 years of speculation about a facility critics considered a monstrous white elephant"
(Finn. 1986:1).
3.2.3 The Newfoundland Processing Era
The sale and reactivation of the mothballed refinery again provided an occasion for
political rhetoric and fanfare. Then Conservative Premier Brian Peckford was pleased
with his government's efforts to negotiate and secure thc deal. Premier Peekford
comended that the sale to NEL would "end years of industrial failures in Newfoundland
by tak:ng over the $200 million plant which in 1976 fell victim to the energy crunch"
(Thorne, 1986: I). Placing the refinery's sale in a historical context, Premier Peekford
further noted that:
the history of our province is littered with the corpse of failed economic
enterprises, enterprises that took with them untold millions of taxpayers'
dollars... the Come By Chance reopening shows us again that there is reward for
selfo{,:ollfidence, cletennination and hard work (The Newfoundland Herald,
November8·14,1986:16).
The reopening of the Come By Chance refinery was also a source of renewed
optimism for polilicians representing the local communities surrounding the refinery.
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Then Come By Chance Mayor Betty Gilben stated that the refinery's reopening is
"absolutely wonderful... il will mean a lot to Come By Chance and the entire ;lTca :IS far as
jobs and spin-affs are concerned" (O'Neil. [986: I). In the nearby community 01
Sunnyside. Ron White, then chairman of the Come By Chance Business Association,
likewise stated that he "...hopes the area will recover from Ihe economic shock it received
when the refincry closed down 10 years ago" (O'Neil. 1986:1).
The reopening of the refinery was also economically significant for the
Newfoundland government. The sale meant thallhc government W:lS no longer required
to spend public money towards the m:linlenancc orille refinery. In the six m\lll[h period
prior to the signing of the agreement with NEL. the government contributed
approximately $600.000 towards the refinery's mainlenance (The Evening Tcll:grillll.
November 7, 1986). Although the government Iransferred both the refincry's land and
docking facilities to NPL, tile government was pleased lila! puhlic assistance W<lS nOI
required 10 rehabilitate the refinery. This condition of sale wa.~ a significant reason why
the provincial government accepted NEL's bid to purchase and re<lctivate the facility, As
part of the signed agreement, the company commilled to an investment of approxirnalcJy
S70 million towards the rehabilitation and upgrading of the refinery (The Evening
Telegram, November 4, 1986). In part, NEL's capital invesunents towards the cxpansirlO
and upgrade of the facility were related to proposed future plans to utilize l1ibcrniu crude
once the field came into production.
The signing of the agreement between the government :md NEL marked the
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heginning of what can be termed the 'third era' in the history of the Come by Chance
refinery. Although having a troubled past, the viability of the r..cility appeared positive
for NPL as the company began operation~ with a secure 20 year contruct to supply refined
product to Cumberland Farms.
With the IJeginning of the NEUNPLera it appears, however, (hut perhaps both the
company and the provinl.:ial govemment failed to rellee! on some of the difficulties
experienced in the past. One such problem was the labour disputes which plagued the
refinery's initial construction phase. Indeed. "it's ironic, the ink is barely dry on the
agreement 10 reactivate the refinery and the troubles have already SHined" (The Evening
Telegram. January 14. 1987:3). Once again, a labourconflicl arose althe refinery.
Allhough it was nOl explicitly staled lhat union workers were 10 be excluded from the
hiring process, Marco Ltd. of 51. John's, lhe company conlraeted to hire the refinery's
employees, specifically indicaled that [hey would nol be paying union-scale wages. In
rcsponse.lhe construction union.~ held daily demonstrolions outside Ihe refinery. At times
'milil~nl: a number of lhe union protestors were arresled by the RCMP. The provincial
governmenl h:ld initially agreed to mediale a solution to the dispute, but laler decided not
to support the interests of labour lhrough a negotiated settlement. and moved to distance
ilself from lhe conflic!.
Following lhe labour dispute, NPL soon experienced further difficulties at the
refinery. In the fall of 1987 during the refinery's initial reactivation and testing phase, two
fires occurred. TIle fires were reponedly related to the spillage of gasoline at Ihe refinery's
54
gasoline conversioll unit. The lirst fire. occurring all September '27. was prccc:dl'1\ hy an
'explosion,' although there were no reponed injuries to refinery pcrsolllll.'1. A..:conling \<>
:In NPL estimate, it was to lake over a month to implement the necessOIl)' repairs at a cost
estimated at S I million. The second fire occurred on Novemocr '27 'lIthe same
conversion unit but resulted in less damage to Ihe unit's operation. Although this sCf:ond
fire reponedl)' sent five people to hospital with burns (The Evening Tckgr:Ull. Dcccmhl.'f
3,1987).
In terms of the official response to Ihe fires. both NPL officials lind government
safel)' inspectors insisted thatthc fires were nOllhc resull of inadc(lll,IlC Sllfely I'Hlccdul'CS
or precautions :llihe refinery. Although concern regarding the facililY'S safely prm:cdures
was ex.pressed by then Come By Chance Mayor BellY Gilben. According to Mrs. Gilhcrl,
there was..."liule communiC3tion between the refinery and the community ahoUI
coordin3ting responses 10 such emergencies..." and she was "...uncertain whether lhc
plant (had) an emergency medical response team on site. apart from one first aid worker"
(W3Ish, 1987: I). Moreover, a later report indicated that safety procedures at the refinery
were a problem as "Employment and Labour Relations Minish:r Roger Grimes (admitted)
to 200 aecidents...being reported to his department between 1987 and 1992" (The
Evening Telegram, February 14. 1994:4).
In the fall of 1990, there were initial indications that NPL might be el:pcriencing
financial difficulties. An internal memorandum, unintentionally released to the media,
indicated that in the first nine months of operation the company had lost an c.~timatcd $11
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million due to human error (Wangersky. 1990). Also allhis time, the company began to
assess the economic viability of earlier capital investment projects initiated as pan of a
plan 10 upgrade and expand the facility's refining capacity. In short, the company sought
to determine if a future return on the millions of dollars invested in these projects would
he realized. The amount invested was not specified. although an NPL spokesperson did
report that it was a "significant sum that the company might not sec a return on" (Cleary.
1990:2).
Two years later in the fall of 1992, there were initial ind;cations thUllhe refinery
was ugain up for sale. At that time the rumoured sale was reportedly linked 10 financial
difficulties surrounding the refinery's principle owner. Cumberlund Fanns of
Massachusetts. As part of a move to restructure operations. it was reponed thut
CumhcrJand Farms had filed for chapter UbJnkruplcy protection after incurring debts to
creditors eStimaled at $2.7 million (Monon. 1992).
During this s:.Ime period, NPL was also threatened with further financial problems
slemming from a series of legal actions being taken againM Ihe company. In the firsl of
Ihe lWO suits ag3inst NPL. the sheriff of Newfoundland was ordered to take possession of
$1.860.640 US worth ofproduci from the refinery's tanks. This $44 million suit was
brou~hl forth by J. Aron and Company of New York. then principle supplier of crude oil
to Ihe Come By Chance refinery. J. Aron and Company alleged thai NPL had
misappropriated 2.7 million barrels of hydrocarbons for its own commercial use. The
supply company argued thallhe hydrocarbons were used without proper consent and
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payment of due compensation.
The second law suit involved a $27 million claim filed hy General Ek":lric Capillli
Canada Leasing Inc. In December of 1989. the comp.my leased n hydrogen planllll NPL
and later alleged that NPL had violated the terms and conditions of the lkcllsing
agreement (Doyle and Whiffen. 1992).
In both cases. the legal action taken ;Jgaillsi NPL resullcd in a nl'!~alive nlling. In
the J. Arcn and Company suit.lhe company was aW<lrdcd;1 recovery order of $1.li6
million after proving that NPL had withheld qUilOtitics of oil owned by its supplicr. In the
General Electric Capital Canada Lc.,,<;ing Inc. case. NPL WilS required to pay S26.S
million dollars under the tenns of the licensillg agrccmetll (Will. 1994).
Under these difficult legal and financial circumst:Jnces it Wll~ rumollfcd utlile time
that the refinery might not be reopening following u maintenunce ~hutdown scheduled
between August and October of 1992. Also utlhatlimc. the speculation ~urrnundillg
NPL's insecure financial status was further promoted by the company having difficulty
meeting its payroll as 300 workers had to wait a few days to receive their overdue
compensation (Vaughn-Jackson, 1992).
Speculation that the refinery was once again up for ~ale certainly rene<:led the
significant legal and cash flow problems surrounding both NPL'.~ principle investor
Cumberland Farms and the company itself. Indeed, shortly after these significant
problems were revealed, it was publicly announced Ihatthe Swiss bu~ed company Vitol
S.A. Inc. was interested in purchasing the ailing refinery. By September of 1992, as part
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of a move to become the sole procc5~or and provider of crude oil to Come By Chance,
Vitol began issuing debentures 10 provide the company with operating capiml and to
finance the rehabilitation of the rennery. Vitol, for instance, provided approximately S10
million towards the completion of the maintenance turnaround undertaken althe refinery
in late August of 1992. It appears that under NPL management, the refinery's operating
equipmellt had suffered from neglect and poor maintenance, renecting the company's
poor financial position and limited resources (Will, 1994).
3.2.4 The VitnllNorlh Atlantic Refining Era
The mOllc 10 purchase Come By Ch;mee by Vitol represents the fourth and most recent
eTa in lhe history of this troubled and controversial refinery. A reportedly successful and
resourceful company. Vitol is predominantly in the business of buying and selling oil
products. The finn recorded sales of 514 billion in 1992. An international trader of
petroleum products. Vital has its administrative headquaners in Geneva, Switzerland.
The company also maintains a corporate headquarl!:.TS in Amsterdam, with trading offices
in London and Houston. Vital's Houston office. which manages the supply and
distribution of products. is the principle overseer or the Come By Chance operation.
Similar to previous owners of Come By Chance, the refining operation is managed
Ihrough a subsidiary company called Nonh Atlantic Refining Limited (NAR). Like NEL.
Vitol W;L~ unwilling publicly to provide a detailed account of the company's owners or
shareholders as part of a stated desire to maintain corpomte confidentiality (Westcott,
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1994).
Vilot's plan 10 purchase and assume control of the refining "peTilliull Cllcounlcl'I.·d
significant impediments and delays. The actual purchase of the refinery in cwly August of
1994 occurred almost a year and a half after the initial negotiations for the sale hcgan in
December of 1992.
One of the initial delays surrounding the refinery's sale W<lS the issue of till'
estimated $100 million NPLowed its creditors. The specific details orlhc deht ;IS well as
the m<lnner in which this issue was resolved between the two parties \~crc nol fC\'C'l1cd til
the public (Jackson, 1994). The sales agreement was also impeded by a serie.s Ilr sClhat:ks
at the refinery including a major explosion and fire believed to be once :lg:lin partially
attributed to the poor maintenance and operating condition of the rcfincry'.~ eqllipl1lclil.
The explosion and fire which occurred on April 24 of 1994 resulted in a lengthy
operational shutdown involving substantial layoffs, and caused dumages estimatcd ilt $20
million (Connolly and Ducharme. 1994).
Two weeks prior to the deal's anticipated closing date, another significant obslilcle
arose. Vitol was informed by United States Customs authorities thai they were initiating a
review of the terms and conditions of the sales agreement. Vilol negotiated the rurchil~e
of the refinery under the assumption that it would be able to bring Come By Chance
product into the United States (U.S.) duty free. U.S. customs. however, dcluycd the deal's
c100sing in order to determine if the arrangement was consistent with reguhnions under the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). As a result of the intervention hy U.S.
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CUlilOms, the deal was delayed for several more months due to "NAFTA red tape"
(Gullagc.1994:2),
The sales agreement was eventually finalized in August of 1994. The nClual
negotiated purchase price for the refinery was never publicly released. allhough it is
.~pccul:l\ed that Vitol boughllhe refinery for between 5100 and $150 million (Arnold-
Foster, 1994). The refinery required significant capilal investmcnls towards repairs and to
hring the [,lcilily to full prcduclion capacily.
Allhough significant capilal investments were required. NAR manager Dennis
Huckaby stmcd thallhc Come By Chance refinery was a good investmelll for Vitol for a
number or specific n:asons (Flanagan. 1995). According to Huckaby. the refinery
maintains a strategic geographical location as it lies directly in the middle of shipping
lanes between Europe and North America, This location will reportedly enable the
refinery to negotiate bargain prices with crude carrying vessels in search of a purchaser,
purticulurly when purchasers on the Eastern seaboard are not buying. Huckaby noted as
well thal Olltho!.lgh the refinery requires necessary investments in the aTCa of staff skills
development and management training, the wllges at the refinery represent a significant
cusl suvings as they are approximately 25% lower Ihan similar refineries in the U.S.
Furthermore, the deep W"'l":rs of Placentia Bay and the refinery's 'first-class' docking
facilities will pennit the world's largest oil tankers to unload their cargo with relative
C;Jse. Huckaby observed that this advantage will result in transportation cost savings of
Olpproximuldy 40 cenls per burrel. Further cost savings were also expected to be realized
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from the refinery's ability to process sourcrudc: which is between $1 III 54 cheaper than
lighter crude. The existence of the: hydroge., plant and the availability of Span' hydmllcn
capacity were also cited :u being an 3dv:ml:l.gc: to NAR's propor.cd petrochemical
initiatives. Finally. Huckaby noled Ihal suppon for the company from both the
community and the government W,IS 'oulslanding' (Dean-SimmonJi, 19')5).
With the purchase of Come By Ch.mce. Vilol also publicly :mnounCL'(j Ihal lhe
company would be mllking significant capital inveslments of hetween $25 lllilli\ll1 ,lilt!
$50 million to refurbish the refinery. The company's upgrading pl.lIls include.: ulili7:ing.
'hydro cracking' and 'vis-breaking' refining processes which permit lhe firlllin pnK:css:I
wider range of different cmde from anywhere in the world. In turn, this lo:dmology will
enable Vitol to produce lessloxic or 'grr-encr' fuels, cnabling the company til Oll.'Ct
stringent regulalions for gasoline sales to lhe Northeastern U.s. TIle company also
proposed to invesl S8 million towards the construction of a benzcne satur.ltioll plant and
to modify the existing t:mk$ 10 enable more efficient slomge of ga.-.olinc componenls
(Arnold-Foster, 1994).
Once again the news of both the refinery's purchase and thc proposctl invcstments
10 modernize the aging facility was accompanicd by positive politic'll rhetoric. Liberal
Premier Clyde Wells remarked that "Vitol being a major dealer of nil on the world markel
gives me encouragement they know What they're doing and hOlYC the resources to do
it...Thal gives me rea..on to believe thatlhe refinery:lt Clime By Chance h:ls a hright
future" (Tompkins, 1994:1).
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From lhis overview of the refinery's now 23 year history, it is i1pp:m:nt Ih,ll
significant puhlic and private investments and political suppon were mobilized to
maintain the facility's continuctJ although allimcs very tenuous existence. Although ilt
SCYCrallimcs oolh the profitability and the viability orlhe facility indicated a questionable
flllure for the refinery, the Come By Chance facility h'l~ repeatedly managed 10 continue
and survive L'Collumic ruin, closure. llnd the threat of disa.~scmbly.However. the facility's
poor hcallh and safety and overall m:lintcOilnCC record ;lPpcOlrs to have been indicative of
the rcl1ncry's nflclllcnuous fiOilllcial position. Thus. it is in the context of the siSnificall1
economic ;md political suppon mobilized for the refinery's cOlllinued existence that the
r"cility\ environmental problems must be analysed.
3.3 Enyironmenlal Problems at Come By Chance
At the opening ccremony ror the refincry in October or 1913. thcn Minister of Rcgional
&:onnmic Expahilion Don Jamil!SOn gavc hili assur.:ancc thatlhe refinery mct with Ihe
highc."t environmental protcction standards. According to Mr. Jamicson. HMr. Shaheen
voluntarily invesll'tl an extrJ 59 nliltion 10 make sure pollution Jitandanls arc met and we
OIl\.' ;L~Sllred Ilmt this refinery is one or the cleanest in Ihe world H(Crockcr :md Benson.
197.1:1). As will he prescntcil bclow, however. signific:ml c/lvironmcnlal problems have
occurred 1ltthe rclinery Ihroughout it." hi.~tory. The specific cnvironmental h:tzard.~ to be
c;~a11linecl include toxic W;lstC. oil spillage. discharges or hydrogen SUlphide g:L". and
sulphur dio.~idc ,md hyllmc:ubon cmisJiions.
3.3.1 The Problem of Toxic Wa~te
In the fall of 1986, NEL succes~fullynegotiatcd a dC:llto purchnsc ,mil reactil':l\l' thl'
mothballed refinery at Come By Chance. During this same period it was rl'\'cakd hy thl'
media that the refinery site contained three waste sites. One sitc in p:lTlicul,lr received
primary altention as it contained toxic chemicals :lIld rcprcserued <l potential
environmental and community health hazard. Located apIlTO.,imately ROO 1l1ell\'S 11"1111 Ilf
the refinery site, this 'main site' was estimated 10 cover an area of IO.nnO sllll,lrc I1ll'trl'S
and to contain a t(){al volume of 20.000 cubic metres or waste (Wangersky, IlJXfl\
Although the main site was determined to be large <lnu indicative of poor \\'ash,'
management practices. the primary concern was rcl;ltcd to the ",Hure of thl' chcmil.'OIls
present at the site. Studie~ conducted by independent environmentttl consulting nrms,
contracted by the government's environment department. found 'signinc,llll" Icvcl.~ 01
chemical contamination. The contaminants reportedly round :ltthc sitc included oils,
grease, tank bottom sludge. refining by-products, spent refining catalyst. c'lll.~tic soua,
various acids, and heavy metaL~ such a.~ arsenic, cadmium and lead. Althougll the
chemical compound or most concern present at the sile wa.~ polycyclic aromatic
hydrocarbons (PAH), <I compound linked to cancer in humans (Harris and Wangersky,
1986).
Generally, the studies were conducted to analyse the exact nature of the
contaminants, to determine the extent to which the site might pose a thrcatlo the
environment and to human health, and to recommend measures 10 either contain or
63
eliminate the problem. Harris (1986:6) contended that the independent studies were
required al :hc lime bccausc .. ,"no one in Newfoundland, including the minister of the
environment (knew) whlll was chucked into Come By Chance's cesspool back in the days
when construction projc.cIS were more imponam than environmental issues affecting
human health." The limited information av,lilable regarding the site :md its contents also
rctl~"tcd [he dumping practices of NRL. The dumping was never granted proper
,,:ovcrnmcnt approvill and the company itself failed to keep a record or 'waste log' of what
was 11cpositcd at the site (Harris :md W:rngersky. 1986). Harris contended thai when the
refinery dosed in 1976, NRL m:mugement paid lillie regard to the safe disposnl of
Iwzaruous waste, and the.....poriticians of the day didn't pay attention to environmental
issues either" (Harris, 1986:6).
At the main waste site aren. there was funher concern that the site was not
properly contained and th:llthere existeJ the thrent of chemical contaminants leaching
into the water table, This concern panially reOected the determination thill no prior
hydrogeological s:udy had been conducted at the site to determine its adequacy for
containing hazardous waste. Harris and Wangersky (1986: I) observed that:
if no studies were done. government officials would have no way of knowing
where chemical contaminants went once they move through rock formations and
possibly reached the water table, Hydrogeological studies are an imponant
planning clement in waste disposal si\"" because the lype of rock formation
dctcnnines the location's ability to contain wastes within a designated nrea.
Atthc main site. both the nature of the contaminants involved and the possibility of
leachate seepage therefore represented an environmental problem of considerable
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concern. panicularly (or citizens residing :ldjaccnllo lhe site illlhc community (.rCnnw
By Chance.
Although the existence of a toxic WilSie site represented:\ hazard to hoth lhe Incal
cnvironmem and to the residents of the area. for milo)' yem's the community was
completely unaware that the haz<lrd existed. AIlhc time lhe cxi~lcncc "fllie [(lxic wash..'
sile at the refinery was reported 10 the public by lhc media. it was also TCI'C:llcll that
government officials had prior knowledge oflhe site since 1976. hut had decided nul to
take action and remedy the problem (Walsh. 1986).
The Come By Chllnee Mayor at the lime. Beuy Gilbert, lVa~ vcry surprised that it
took so long for the existence of toxic waste at the refinery to ,JeCOIllC puhli..: kl1(1wlcdgc.
Although Mrs. Gilbert notcd thtlt "some people who worked there had to kllOw :lhout it.
but I guess it was only a handful und they kepi it a secret. Sometimes it's prclly easy \(l
keep a secret" (The Evening Tclegmm. December 22,1986: I ).It uppears.lhcrcfmc.1hal
in the absence of routine on-sile insp!:ctions or 1he enforcement of safe W:Jstc disposal
procedures by govcmmem authorities. NRL was able to prevent publ ic knnwlcdgc
regarding the dumping of toxic waste at the refinery site.
In terms of some of the detcrminations mudc in a study conducted hy the
environmental consulting finn Acres Intemutional Inc., it appears that the lncal
community and its residenls werejuslified in their concerns regarding the .~itc and the
potential for watershed eootamination. In reference to this 1987 study. Struwhridgc
; 1989:~, J wrote:
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a "white and yellowish" leachate spring on the west side of the ridge was found to
be contaminated with nickel and heavy metals. Several other springs carried
"floating oil product: And some of the cont:lminated runofLwas floating down a
series of gullies through a ditch and into a creek two miles outside Come By
Chance.
Mayor Belly Gilbert noted in reference to the cOlllaminants found in the creek
that ."Ihut's u fishing creek" ...wpeoplc go trouting there" (Strawbridge, 1989: I).
It "ppcilrs as well thai few protective measures were taken to protect the public
following the determination IImt contaminants were entering a local watercourse. Former
Come By Chance Depmy Mayor Rex Benson observed that. .. "right now there arc no
fences. there are no signs to warn us·' (Strowbridge, 1989:1). Thus, it appears that the
community was weJljllstifred in ilS concerns, as well as in its criticisms of tile way tile
problem W,l~ responded to and managed by provincial environmem officials.
In response to growing media attention and local communilY criticism. the
Environment Minister at Ihe time, Jolin Butt, slated that "tile province has agreed to
accept responsibility for any long-term environmental or Ilealth problems resulting from
unauthorized dumping of toxic chemicals by the refinery's former owner" (The Evening
Telegram, December 22, 1986: I). The government Wl)$ prepared to acceplthis
rc~ponsibility,although Mr. Butt was unable to explain why government authorities Ilad
rcfll~cd to undertake any environmenlal remediation of tile site in the past (Walsh, 1986).
Thc governmcnt 1I1~o implemented Ihc decision not to hold the refinery's former operlltor
NRL kgally accountable for either tllc unauthorized dumping practices onlle costs
incuITed in the site's future remediation. Similarly, thc provincial environment ministry
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assured the new owners NPL thm government would a~Sllme full responsibility ,lilt! incuT
all costs associated with the proposed cJc:m-up effon. To :lvoideslablishillg
'blameworthiness' ior the problem, Environment Mil1i.~ter John Butt :lucmptcd [0
legitimize the negligence of past government rcgulalory and monitoringclTorls
According 10 Minister BUIt. "the knowledge and technology thaI has bL'Cll uc\'c1opcd In
handle hazardous wastes has all bccll developed since the l;lle 1970's liner the Come Oy
Chance refiner)' was mothballed"..."and prol'incial, federal. anl.lmos! olher Cllviflllllllcnl:11
regulatory agencies were in their "infancy" in the early 1970's (But!. 191'6: 1•.
Environment Minister John Butt aloo ;lltcmpted to downplay concern Wilh the
toxic hazards present at the r~finery site and the potential for contaminatiol1 (lflhc 1tIWII'S
watershed. Prior to receiving the tlelerminations or the Acres International stmly.lw
stated lhat "even if there is some leakage from the site...il would be physically i1l1[J(lssihlc
for it to gel into the watershed because of the geography of llie area" (Walsh. 19H(.:I).
Government officials further contended thai the main wa.~te site contained very lillie
hazardous waste. According to Mr. Butt, in the main site... "well over 90 percent of all the
material (was) cement or scrap melal, they are cenainly nOI aboulto endanger the liv(;.~ of
workers or nearby residents" (BUll, 1986:2). In addition, he also contended that hccausc
of the limited amount of hazardous waste at the refinery, the measures required for
remediation would oot.,."C05t Newfoundland taxpayers an:> great amount of money"
(E\'ening Telegram, December 23, 1986: I).
In Ihe final determination. however, the govemment would spend approximately
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$250,000 on five independent studies into the hazardous waste problem. Although the
c.~timaled cost for remediation of the sites was originally set at $400,000, the cost of
clean-up. consolidatIon. and sealing of the sile would later rise 10 approximately $2
million, requiring financial assistance from the fedcnll government to facilitate the
dcanup effon. In addition, the successive environmental assessment studies conducted at
the sile nnd in the surrounding area to detcnninc the extent "f cOlltamination resulted in
significant delays in the onset of the cleanup effort. The government wtls aware of the
toxic waSle problem in 1976.lhe public was infonned orlhe problem JOycars laler. but i\
would ~ 1990 before concerted efforts began to remove this environmental hazard from
the <Irc~ of the rcfincry and the community orComt': B)'~hallce,
3.3.2 Thl' Problem of Oil Spills
In 1973, Premier Fmnk Moores stated in reference to oil and other envirortmenta[
pollution cOOlrols illihe refinery Ihat the government is "...happy that all safeguards (hat
could possibly be laken have been taken in this regard" (The Dai[y News. 1973:7).
A[lhough NRL operated the refinery for only 28 months, the 1986 reactivation of refining
opcrmions at Come By Chance again meant the possibility of oj] spills occurring at lhe
rcfinerysite. Then Opposition Environment Critic Rogcr Simmons noted that "with a
n:fincry this sizc- it has il capacity of 100.000 barrels a day- a wmid-size" spill can be
c;(pectcd every four years or so" (Doy[e. 1988: 14). Moreover, Mr. Simmons funher
ohservcd Ihal between the time of the refinery's reactivation by NPL in the fall of 1986
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and March of 1988 there were reponedly six oil spills at the refin~ry (Doyl~. \988).
Indeed, at the lime oflhe refinery's reactivation Come By Chance Mayor Beny Gilbert.
noted her concerns regarding oil spills at the refinery. Mrs. Gilbert stuted that "a lot of
fishermen are concerned about spills. I can only hope they :lre using oil booms around the
ships"Oohnson.1987:16).
It appears, however.lhm two spills in particu[uf, the first on MardI 5. Hnd the
second on March 7 of \988, brought the potential environmental hazard of uil spills :tIthe
refinery to the immedjate attention of government officials. The first rdatively minor spill
on March 5 was the result of a broken weld on the off loading I:mkcl', leadillg (0 the
release of between 15 to 20 barrels of crude oil into Come By Chance Bay. The sccollll
spill on March 7 was the result of human error and involved a crew mcmhcr failing hI
properly close a valve on the same tanker. This spill resulted in the dischmgc of SOU
barrels of oil into the bay. Of the estimaTed 22.500 gallons of oil spilled. approximlllely
one half was recovered through the use of available containment booms ;Jnd suctioning
equipmem (Walsh, 1988). The other half remained on the surface llnd eithcr moved out
into Placentia Bay or ended up on the shoreline. The oil recovery effort was partially
hampered by high seas and unfavourable wealhcrconditions (Doyle. 1988)
Since the oil spills affected salt water and involved marine tankers. hath the
recovery efforts and the SUbsequent investigation inlo the spills were carried out hy the
Canadian Coast Guard. The investigalion resuhed in the laying of charges for two
breaches of the Oil Pollution Prevention Regulations of the Canada Shipping Act. The
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tanker's owners, Wallcmship Management Company of Hong Kong, were also required to
post bond to cover the "extraordinary" costs of the cleanup (Doyle, 1988:14).
Angered by the presence of oil pollution on hercommunily's shoreline, BellY
Gilbert was highly critical of the offraading practices employed by oillankers at the
refinery. Mrs, Gilbert contended thaI "It's II holy mess OUllhere... 'think iI's a JOI of
slupidityand trying 10 go too fast too soon... When the tankers come in here they don',
care.lhcyjusl want to load:llld unload and 10 hell with it" (Walsh, 1988::!). In response to
such criticism, the Environment and Lands Minister Jim Russell admitted that the
company's resources were inadequme for effectively responding to a large environmental
emergency of this nature. Mr. Russell stated that "the experience in dealing with the
reccnt spill at the Come By Chance refinery indicates there may not be suffiCIent
c<!uipmcnl on site to handle a majorspill" (Doyle, 1988:2). In addition, it was further
indicmed that the refinery did not cOnlain an adequate disposal site for safely storing the
debris nonnally associated with oil spills. Referring to this inadequacy, former
Opposition Environment Critic Roger Simmons argued that the refinery's operator
shouh.l..."be rcady to contain the damage, and to have secure storage sites so the damage
is not continuing to the environment and the fishery and so on" (Doyle, 1988: 14).
When giving his assurance that more effective oil spill response measures would
be implememed :It the refinery. Environment Minister Jim Russell stated that "his
official~ have alre:ldy met with representatives of Newfoundland Processing.
Environment Cannda. and the Coast Guard as a firsl slep towards finning
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recommendations that would see improved response 10 future spill); from Ihis industry
and more formal debriefing is planned" (Doyle. 1988:(4). However. the cnvirClllll1l.'nt
minister failed to explain why an adequme stockpile of oil recovery equipment and a
proper debris storage sile were not in plnee to ensure adequnlc environmental protection
at the time of the refinery's initial reactivation. As well. Mr. Russell did not illdicm~'
whether the provincial government would be developing Of implcrncming rcgulmions
which would govern the adequacy and effcrtivcness of the relinery's oil sllill TC<:llwry
procedures. Indeed, six years later there ;Ire indic:llions lhalthc racililY'S capacity to
manage liquid wastes including oil has worsened llllU is c:!Using local cnvironrm:I1l;L1
damnge. According 10 Woolridge (1994: I):
the workers say things hllVC been getting stcndily worse althe
refinery...Thousands of brnTCls of slop oil nnd water. Reservoirs which llfl.'
supposed to be empty in COlSC of aspill me nearly brimming over. All J..:inrJ.~ ()f
chemicals are spilling into Placentia Bay. '£be compillints go on lrnd 011.
It appears therefore that the provincial cnvironmcm depllrtment did very lillie hl
initiate legal or other measures to force NPL to improve thc compuny's oil spill n.:covery
procedures. Indeed, the 1994 Environmental Compliance Initintive betwcen thc
government and NPL indicates that the proper storage of oil spill debriscontinucs 10 be:l
problem at the refinery. Although under the terms of the compliance agreement
environment officials conceded thai "decisions concerning the disposal site for nil relaled
debris will be lit NPL's discretion..." (Eel. 1994: 12). The government therefore docs not
appear overly concerned that liule was done to remedy the problem in the pust or lhal pasl
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rerformance might predict future behaviour in lhe absence ofstrici regulations and
enforcement.
3.3.3 The Prohlem of Hydrogen SUlphide Gas
In April of 1991, residents of the communities of Sunnyside, Arnold's Cove and Come By
Chance noticed and began to complain of a "stench like rOllen eggs" emanating from the
refinery sile (Cullen. 1991:7). Witllthe wind blowing from the refinery's direction, the
odour was also detected a~ far <lway as the community of Garden Cove, approximately 35
kilometres from the refinery. Come By Chance Mayor at the time, Wilson Gregory,
dcscriherJ the smell as "very sickening" and also nOled its pervasive nalure. According to
Mr. Gregory, the smell of rotten eggs penetrated the clothes. homes and cars of affected
residents, More than an irritant. the odour was causing some residenlS to experience
nausea, stomach and brenlhing problems, and irritation to the skin, eyes, nose and throat.
Concerned Willi the possible effects the gas might be having on their health. more than 30
local residents contacted the provincial environment department between May 13 and
June 5 of 1991 formally to complain (Alyward. 1991),
It w:lsquickly determined lhat the stench and the health problems experienced by
loci.1 residcnts were primarily the resull of hydrogen sulphide gas emanating from the
refinery site. TIle gas was evaporating from 'sour water' which had reponedly 'leaked' into
an impounding basin located at the refinery (CulJen, 1991). Furthermore, "the gas was
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produced because the fuel being processed lit the lime had a sulphurcantl'nt higher HUlll
that of fuels nonna1Jy processed" (The EveningTclegr;ull. June 29. 1991: Illl. Thus. ht'th
the sour crude being processed nnd the sour waler in the impounding b"sin Clll1luincd
unusually high levels of sulphur.
In rcs!>Onse 10 the complainls. Charles M:lClean.thcn cnvimnrncnl;l1 nrri<.:cr fllr till'
refirn:ry, assured both local rcsiderus and politici.ms thill NPL W'IS illvcstig;lling lhe
problem and was proposing a cleanup operation \0 remove the sour waleT frum lhl' hasill
(Alyward. 1991). The company had previously indicated that it would be "installing;,
second sour water stripper, which will ensure that lhe .~{llirwnlcrcol1taininj; the heavier
levels of hydrogen sulphide (would) not be discharged inlo thc impounding hasin whcrc it
evaporates into the air giving off the foul odour" (Cullen, 1\191 :7), A sour waleI' stripller
or 'API separator' removes oil from waleI' so thc oil can be reuscd (Jackson. 1\1941. '111c
hydrogen sulphide and ammonia vapours produced from sour waleI' slripping Ihcll C;UI bc
fed into a sulphur recovery unit where they are recovered and oxidized (EC1. 19l)4).
However,lhere have been significant problems associmed with the rcfim:ry·.~ sulphur
recovery unit since it was implemented in 1971
The provincial environment ministry responded by Slating lhat the rcgulut<JTy
standards governing the emission of hydrogen sulphide gas had never been previously
implemented. An environment ministry spokespel"!'ion noted that the department had
never encountered a hydrogen sulphide gas problem in the provincc before, and IhcreFor(:
did not have monitoring equipment in place for this particular compound. In an ullcmpt to
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rc,~oJve the problem, Frank O'Dea, environmental engineer with the provincial
cnvironmcllI department Slated that his department would ..... try 10 convince refinery
managers to convert their sulphur dioxide monitors to give them the capacity to monitor
hoth gasc.~" (AlywlIrd, 1991 :3). In addition, Mr. O'Dea indicated that his depanmenl
would be conducting periodic calibration checks of the monitoring equipment to ensure
that regulation levels were not being exceeded. The environment ministry, however.
would laler encounter problems due 10 their reli:mce on both lhe refinery's monitoring
equipment and lhccompany's emissions data.
In conclusion. later rep0rls would indicate thai hydrogen sulphide gas continued to
be II problem for area residents well after the initial complaints were made, In March of
1993. it was reported that "there was a problem last year when children at school were
getting sick and basically from what I heard they were throwing up at their desks lind
people suspected it was because of the smell" (Dooley, 1993:3), As well, a review of the
1994 Environmental Compliance Initiative between the provincial environment
department <lnd NPL indicales Ihat the government continues to request thaI the company
improve ils methods for managing sour water production. For instance, the compliance
agreement stllles that "the sour water stripper facility will be modified and exp3nded to
accommod3te all sour wmer produced in the Refinery on a regular basis" (ECI. 1994:9),
3.3.4 The Problem of Atmospheric Emir-sions
At the time ilrell residents were complaining about thc foul odour, similarconccms were
expressed regarding the smoke and the 'blue haze' hunging in Ihe air surrounding till'
refinery. Area residents also began to notice thm specific environmental changes wen::
occurring in Ihe area. Most easily discernable for residents WllS lhe increased acidity of
gardening soil and changes in local air quality. In terms of ;lir quality. area residents
began to complain thul the air had a ~strong sulphuric ... "oily. gas-like SlIldl" (Dean-
Simmons, 1993:2).
The problem of sulphur dioxide and hydrocarbon emissions further scrvelilo
increase existing concerns regarding the potential impact of the refinery's emissiolls 011
the health of arca residents. For instance, Calvin Lockycar, II resident or SUllnyshlc. slalell
that:
my biggest concern is the long tenn health effects. Tl105C of us WIIO :lrc middle
aged probably have Jess to worry ubout because our time is less hut forehildrcl\
growing up here it's not very healthy and I think long term we're going to discover
in ten, twenty years that the emissions are harmful to our health (LockyellT
1993:3).
Dr. Peter Cleary, a physician prJCtising in Arnold's Cove, expressed similar CUlleen!
about the emissions and their possible impact on the health of area residents. When
discussing the issue of potential long lenn toxicity, Dr. Cleary stated that the effects wcn,
"possibly neurological with the hydrogen sulphide component. Sulphur dioxide itsclf...is
certainly an irritant 10 anybody with chronic bronchitis or lung disca.~e" (Cleary, 1993:41·
He expressed funher concern aboul the limited infonnation available to the [}uhJit:
regarding the specific content of the smoke genenlted <II the refinery. Dr. Clemy
contended that:
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the impression, lind its hard to gel a true story because nobody seems willing to
admit exactly what's in that smoke, but the impression is certainly of unburned
hydrocarbons being dumped on everybody's head chronically from that refinery...!
have u funny feeling that it really hasn't been analysed in any depth to see what's
in it (Cleary, 1993:4).
When direct ly Olpproaching NPL \0 discuss community concerns regarding
refinery emissions, area rcsidems and politicians found the company to be disinterested
and uncooperative, and to display only a weak commitmenllo the eventual reduction of
emissions. According to Come By Chance Mayor :Ulhe time. Wilson Gregory:
they said it would be improved and we wouldn't hu\'c lhe problem anymore after
another ~ix or seven months. but from what I've gathered since that they had no
intentions of doing anything about il. Right now they'vejust got it running out
there and that's their concern, us long a~ it's running Iguess thnt'~ their only
concern and what people around here have gOI to put up with then. that's their
problem (Gregory, 1993:5).
Area residents were therefore frustrated and became increasinglr angered by NPL's
limiled response to Iheirconcerns and what was vicwed as poor public relations. The
media also criticized the government for not forcing the company to be accountable 10 the
public. for adopting the position of company 'messenger,' and for essentially 'apologizing'
for NPL's inaction to the problem (The Evening Telegram. November 12. 1993).
Frustrmed by the perceived lack of response to local area concerns. certain residents
began 10 engage in whnt could be described a.~ an 'outside plea for help.' Ron While.
Chairnmn of lhe Concerned Citizens' Commiuee Slated thaI:
I feel we live under a cloud of darkness where light is forbidden 10 shine. The
sacred animal l'm rcferring 10 is IheCome By Chance Oil Refinery. Forrcars
there have been no answers given to the people of this area regarding the
operations of that facility :lnd that terrifies me. We may be living with whnt may
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someday be Cfliled the biggest cover-up in NewfOllndl~l1iJ's history. If anyone
cares for human life in our area. please help now. If youlwvl: inform:uillll .,1)(1111
the operation of the facility, slime it with us please! OllTwmmullitics STINK. 0111'
schools STINK. Our houses STINK. Ourclolhcs STINK... (The Packet. CklUhl'1
5,1993:2).
Allhough area residents and IOC,II community organiz<lliol1s cl11l1;1l1lCII YchclllcllIly
10 express their environmental and hC;llth related concerns. oflicials of the J:!.(l\·crllmcnl's
environment department maintained lhal the refinery was llpcralin~ in l,;'lillpliallcc Wilh
ambient air quality standards as ddined under lhe existing provincial air pullulillll CIIUII\ll
regulations. This determination of compliance referred specifically 10 sl'lIldard~ for
sulphur dioxide emissions only and wa~ based ~olcly on d,l1a providcd by Ih.: rL'fincl)'\
own monitoring program (The Evening Telegram. May IS. 191).'11. The daw for SUlphur
dioxide emissions at the facility was collected at NPL's own m(lIlilllril1g st,ltinllS hlC<lted
in the surrounding communities of Come By Chance, Arnold's Cove. and Sunnyside
Limited government response to the emissionli problem led 10 further cOllflkl ,11111
criticism as area citizens begallto question the govcrnment's legitimacy ami ability til
control industry and prolect the environment. The provinei,,1 govcrnmcm ellvirolll1lel1t
depanment was criticized for several specific reasons. first. the departl11enl was crilieized
for relying on and 'llIking the company's word' in regards to cll1ission.~ data. Secnm1.lhc
data collected refened only to sulphur dioxide and I..ilcr hydrogen sulphide cmi.ssinlls.
while approximately 75 other 'potcntially harmful' compounds arc lliso cmit1cd illlO Ihe
environment (The Evening Telegram, July 5, 1993: Kirby, 1993). Thc dcpartOlclll was
also criticized for nOI conducting routine tests toevaluatc the possihlc eITect of cmissillnli
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on local water and soil. Thi~ criticism in pan. reflecu:d the prim3f}' concern that
lkpanmcnl officials were: not moniloring the type of feedstock or crude oil entering and
lleing prtK"CSSCd althe rt:finery. Sunnyside resident Ron White staled that he ...~ was very
di~lurbcd to find oullherc's very liule being done. Ba."ically. Wh3(scoming OUI (of the
~1:ICksl no \.Inc knows and if they do know. ils only the company that knows...and that's
nOI good enough" rDean-Simmons. 1993:2). The conexm over the Iy~ of feedstock
l:ntering lhe refinery rcncclcd the detcrminOllion lhat for approximately two years NPL
had hccn processing 'heavy hydrocarbons' or residuals oblllincd from Russia referred to
locally as 'Russian Rcsid.' A n:sidu'll refers 10 lhe thick 'sludge' Ih:1I remains following the
rcmo\'OlI orthe lighlcrcomponents from the original crude (Kirb)'. 1993). The Come By
Chance refinery is onc of only a fcw refineries in North America both capable of and
'pcnniued' 10 process this low gr;ldc. high sulphur sour crudc, Givcn thc high sulphur
l"onlent. a refinery processing this particular feedstock is oftcn noted for being a 'pollulion
ha\'cn.' Although. the primal)' rcason for refining this highly polluting substance is the
si,gnificanl profilS Ihal can Ix achieved in comparison 10 processing more expensive
lighter crude (Whalen, 1993). It :lppears, lherefore. thai :l correlation uiSled between the
processing of low grade or high sulphur crude at Come By Chance :md both increased
:urnnsphcric emission~ and ir,cretlscd environmental and heallh related problems affecting
the area. Finally. the provincial government was criticized for not appreciilting or
iUI'estigaling till,; n"turc of NPL's business transactions, given that the majority of the
n)m~l1lY'scrude oil purchases took placc under conditions of relative secrecy on 'the high
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seas' (Whalen. 1993).
In response to the mounting conflict. community pr~%urc ,lIld cril;d~l1I.
provincial environment officials initiated a fe,';cw of NPL's cllv;roll11k'nlal pHlccdllTcs.
including the refinery's air emissions monitorin£ program. This review fC\'cakd "I hal
incorrect readings of sulphur dioxide had been laken from the Ihl"Cl' I\lolliloring statiolls
scI up in the area for over a year" (Dean-Simmons. 1993: I). In addition, till' l'IlI'irull1l1L'IlI
dcpanmem in July of 1993 ordered a clean-up of the fucilily ariel" it was dclt:r1nincd thaI
NPL hall been improperly disposing of gases und liljl1ids (Edwards SI:lCC)'. 19(3).
To address uirquality and health concerns of area residents. Ilw provincial
environment dep,mment hired the Toronto b:ISl,d cunsulting firm COllcnrd EllvimlllllCllwl
to review NPL's existing nir emissions monitoring program. Althou!!h it was nolcllllMI
for this study "all infonnation provided by refinery and cnvironmcllI departlllcnl officials
was to be \Uk"n as accurate without funher verification through doculllelllalioll 1)1' n.:cnrds
searches" (The Evening Telegram. March 6,1994:2). In short. Concort.! was asked 111
determine whether the refinery met with gencrall)' accepted ilir cmissions st.muards and ,,,
determine jf NPL had undertaken the 'c1ean·up' order as outlined in il Millisteriallctter
from Environment Minister <It the lime, P:ltricia Cowall. In addition. Concord W;IS a..kcd
to detennine if air emissions at the refinery constituted a health prohlcm (Dc<lr'Simmolls,
1993).
Even with imposed restrictions on the data utilized, the Concord sLudy !'.upporlcu
m:my of the assumptions and conccrns long exprcs~d by local are!l rcsillcnls rcg.mlilll,l
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air emissions al the refinery. In essence. the report ,Mconfirmed!hal there was a problem
Wilh the depanment's program 10 monitor emissionr.,M and Ihallhc refiner)' was at limes
exceeding the legal air quality standard for sulphur dioxide emissions (~an~Simmons.
1993: I). For instance, emissKlns for sulphur dioxide in 1993 were determined 10 be
ill,255 lonnes, a level which exceeds the province's own slandurds for this panicular
compound (Flanagan, 1994). Furthermore, Concord reponed Ihat on the basj~ of a
cornp:Jr:uive study of four olher refinery's in Cimada, Come By Chance emits an
estimated average of 37.000 lennes of sulphur dioxide per year or sevc:raltimes more
emissions than the next worse poliUling refinery in the country (The Halifax Chronicle
Herald. MlIrch 21,1994: Concord Environmental. 19'::13).10 a furtherrefertnce to sulphur
dioxide emissions. Dean-Simmons noled Ihal "the Wurld Health Org.:lniullion (WHO)
S1andard of 350 micrograms/cubic melre is signifrc.amly lower lh.an the r;ovjncial
sland.ard of 900 micrograms/cubic metre...• and...lhat WHO recommends a never-t'"'-~
exceeded 10 minule average of 500 micrograms/cubic metre~ (Dean-Simmons. 1993:2).
On the ba.~is of boIh the Concord study and the WHO recommended lionils, il appears
therefore lhat the province's airqualily standard for sulphur dioxide represenl5 a potential
environmentul and human health hazanl.
The Concord rcpon wa~ firSl presented on October II of 1993 at a closed meeting
involving only 'hand picked' representatives of the Trinity Placentia Development
Associ:uion. Environment Mininer P:llricia Cowan and other govemmenl officials.
Denying public access 10 the meeting angered many area reside... ts who were demanding
,.
that their perroTtal experiences and health COllCCms be heard by the go\'ernment O\'er IIXl
people gathered outside the municipal building in Come By Ch:lIlC~' hI ~t;lgl' a romla]
protest (Dean·Simmons. 1993). Environment Minister Patricia C(lW3t1 3greetlltl nk."\:l
with the public on October 21 of 1993. stating thai she W:L~ now IlCllcr prcp.1n..'1Ilo
address the public's concerns given the necessary 'experts' would he in 'llh.'nd'll\cclll
answer questions. Allhis meeting, Ms. Cowan ildmiucd lhallhc COllcmd study I\'.IS nul
particularly comprehensive in regards 10 addressing "dcquatcly rho..: public's prim:u)'
concern of the effects of refinery air emis~ions on IOClll health.
In order 10 appease the public's concerns. the EnvimnmClll Millis[n :1l1ll01l1lccd :ll
the meeting that NPL had commilu:d (0 a SI5 million clean-up of the f;lcility. Mure
specifically, the company had agreed to measul'CS to improve air cmi~..iom. incilldill~
processing a less sulphurous or 'sweeter' crude. overhauling the refinery's burners fur;1
more complete burning process and activating lhe Sulphur Recovery Unil (SRUI.
Reportedly cap;1ble of eliminating between 75% and 95% of the sulphur emissions, the
SRU was installed when the refinery was constructed bUl ha... mrcly been in
operation,...·and when il did it didn't work properly· (The Evcning Tclcgrolffi, M;lrch 7.
1994:8). According to the 1994 compliance agreement betwccn the provincial
environment department and NPL. the operation and con~islcnt pcrform;mce nf:.l SRU is
"in accordance with Accepted Industry Praclices or Standards... " (Eel, 1t)t)4:5j
The Concord study and NPL's proposed maintenance program did nOl, howevcr,
adequately address the health concerns of area residenl". In responsc, both lhe provincial
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departments of environment and health announced that anOlher siudy would be conducted
to examine further the relationship between refinery emissions and regional health
problems. This sludy conducted by Dr. Lesbia Smith. an Environmental Health and
Toxicology consultant from Toronto, again con finned some of the concerns of area
residents. Her report indicated that general health problems as well as significant health
risks, particularly respiratory problems, Ciln resull from excessive exposure to sulphur
dioxide. Although an extensive long-term study would be required to documem a direct
relationship between Ihe refinery's emissions and local heallh problems. Dr. Smith agreed
with ffilln)' oflhe recommendations made in the Concord report. In particular, she noted
the need for..."appropriatc monitoring, evaluation and feedback for control of operations
when problems arise. The implementation of these recommendations will minimize the
impact of this industry on both community health and environmental quality" (Dean-
Simmons, 1994:14).
In essence, both of these studies, conducted on behalf of the government,
indicllted that the present standards for monitoring air emissions at the refinery were
inadequate und represented u potential environmental and regional health hazard. The
studies also indicated that thc underlying problem was not one of regional health but the
govemment's unwillingness to impose strict environmental regulatory standards and to
enforce those standards through the effective monitoring of the refinery's operations. As
well. it was argued that "the province still needs environmental laws with teeth and a
minister who is just as strong an advocate for peoph:: ..lid the environment as she is for
.,
business" (The Ev~ning Telegram. January 30. 1994:4).
By January of 1994. the-emissions reduction progr.lm agreed 10 t.y NPL h:ulnOI
been completed. In response. local area represent:1!i\'~ formed a community liaison
committee referred to as lhe 'Regional Environment::tl Group.' Th.... primary purpos.: <If 11"11,'
committee was to lobby the provincial govemmcnt..."for legislation for heller st:lndards
of emission conlrol. including a struclUre of pcllllitics for "fe;leh of rcgul;lliollS"
(Hebbard, 1994:3). The committee was p<lnicularly concerned th<lllhc provincial
environment depanment did not have a penalty or fine structure in place I'm violation of
pollution control standards. In addition. the group would inform the local CtlllllllLlllitics Ill"
what was happening al the refinery in regards 10 operations ,lIId polenli:.l cnvir<llllllClIl:11
concerns (WestcOIt. 1994).
The purchase of the refinery by Vital in Augusl of 1994 in many ways served 10
lessen the existing 'pressure' and connicl bclween the govenllllCnt and the commUnilic...
surrounding !he refinery. Wilh Ihe purchase. Vitol announced a eommitmcm 10 capilal
improvement investments of belween $20 million and $50 million and announced Ihat a
compliance agreement with the provincial environment depal1mcm had hccn reached
regarding planned recluclions in air emissions at thc rcllnery(Murphy, 1Y95}. However,
Murphy (1995) noted that many of the proposed cllpital inveslmenls :lIld upgrading
iniliatives planned for lhe refinery are condilional upon Vital's bid 10 have Come By
Chance become a lram.-shipping sile for future Hibernia crude. In the <.lbsence of slrict
penalties and enforcement procedures. il appears that the government is once :Jg:Jin
"
willing 10 'wait and st:e' if the company follows lhrough with its commitment to improved
environmental practic:esalthe refinery.
Over the 23 year history. the ~peated attempts 10 achieve an economically viable
refining operation at Come By OJ.:l1Ice have coincided with the hope that "(he facility
would promote economic development and provide employment opportunities 10 this
underdeveloped region of the province. An examination of the envjronm~ntal problems
:md confljcl.~ ari.~ing from the refinery indicated thaI the government's response to both
the h:l7.urds and the demands of local residents was woefully inadequate. Allhough
government offici:lls repeatedly staled that measures would be laken 10 eliminate or to
reduce the risks associated with the environmental hazards al the refinery. these hazards
were never effectively regulated or eliminated. Indeed. aI one point Environment and
Lands Minister Pat Cowan spoke of shutting NPL down if more cffective pollution
control measures wcre not implememcd at the refinery. This. of course, did not happen. In
most ca.o;es. the environmcnt31 problems appear to have become worse even though
considerable pUblic: pressure \V3S exened on Ihe government to address these problems. In
many respects, the government was either ill-prepared or lacked the necessary resources
crfcctively to lllOllitor and regulate the environmental hazards associated with a corporate
industrial complex like Come By Chance. Indeed, a 1990 media report indicmed that the
government maintained an agreement with NPL not to inspect the refinery without prior
comp.my notice and approval and as of 1990 •...the province has so far chosen not to
inspcctlhe refinery oper.ll;on~ (Wangersky. 1990:2).
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This chapter has provided a political and economic history of the refinery;ls wdl
as an analysis of Ihe environmental problems and conflicts resulting from the racililY's
operation. Moreover. an analysis has been presented of the govcrnmcnl's rc.~pollSC lilth..:
conflicts occurring allhe refinery and its environmental prohlems. which indudl'd lIlxic
waste, oil spillage, hydrogen sulphide gas :md sulphur tlioxidc c1l1i.~sions. The chapll'r
indicated that the government was ineffective at implementing and cnr\lrcil1~ both
existing regulatory and monitoring procedures. and at controlling.lhe Cl\\'iwnnll'nl:i1
hazards allhc refinery. In m;lny rcsptcts, the environmental hazards prcscll1cd "fl'
consistent with the wa~te stream of a refinery or:lll induslri:ll complex or lhis ~iZl' <1Iul
type. Do political and financial rc~ourcc conslrainl~ ;lffeellhc implcmcnl;llioll 01
environmental regulatory policy governing ':Ie Corne By Chancc refiner)'"! C1l;lplcl's.:l mul
5 will examine the various constraints affecting the environmental regulalory pro(;,:s~
governing this facility.
CHAPTER IV:
RESEARCH FINDINGS (PART ONE): POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL
RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
4.1 Introduction
The iment of this research is to examine the political economy of environmental problems
resulling from the opcmtion of 'In industrial fllcility. In the preceding chaptcr. an
overview of the political and economic history of the Come By Chance refinery as well as
a lkseriplioll of specific environmental probkJlls allributed to this facility was presented.
Thl' specific environmentnl problcm which is given particular attention in this research is
the refinery's atmospheric emissions and their impact on local air quality. Of all the
l'llVironmental hazards associnted with the refinery. atmospheric emissions proved to
have had the greatest negative impact on the communities adjncent to thc facility. In ordcr
to examine the political economy of environmental hazards. this research has attempted
to determine if political and fimmcial resource constraints affect the implementation of
environmental regulatory policy as it applies specifically to the refinery and generally to
industry in Newfoundland.
The political resources which are mobilized by various interest groups who may
compete 10 influence policy processes include money, infonnation, the threat or force,
jobs and votes (Schrecker, 1984/85). Doem and Phidd (1988:107) funherobserve that
within governments. "a scarcity of resources also accounts for shifting priorities. Many
priority concems nnd policy fields have in3dequatc resources of time. money. personnel.
lind political will," For the implementation of environmental regulutory policy to be
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effective, political will is an essential exercise of power ;md thcrdon' r,:cl.'i\'l,"ll particular
attention in this re~enrch. However.:l government's willingness to n:spnllllill industrial
environmental problems through regulatory procedures is innllClll'cli and :\lh'c'~'d (1)
seveml factors. These faclon; include the perceived impact of the environmelltal
regulatory process on employment ;lndjoh crcation. illlU 1:011111c11ng pulitic;l1 <I!1\ll'llJicy
agendas within government. In addition. this process is affected hy media ,md l1uhlic
pressure, the qUilntity and expertise of regulatory personnel and till' financi;d Il:Stll1r~'cs III
government regulatory 'Igencics. This research Cl'aminL'iJ each or Ihese f,ICI'lfS in rdalillil
to the environmental regultllory proccss govcrning Ihe Come By Chancc n:riIlCI)'.
4,2 Political Will
Outlining the specific stages of the policy process. Docm and PhitltJ (!9KX:tJ6\ C.~pl;lill
thai "the intent of implementation is to produce results in :I reliahJc. prctJil:lahle way 10
meet the ideas and objectives sought" For uny policy initiative to he reliahle .11111
effective. sustained political will and ongoing suppon is required both throughollt the
policy process and following implementation. However. a'\ discll.'\sed in Clmpler I.
environmental regulatory policy in Canada ha~ been criticized ror heing V:Ig.UC, unrcalisti..:
and rarely achieving ils promulgated objective.".
In the COnteXI of this research. political will refers 10 lhe governlllelll's wilJingnes.'\
and intent to impose regulalory controls in response to the :Jlmmphcril: emi!oo.'\iolls
problem at the refinery. Panicular reference i." made to the period from 1991 10 19lJ1
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when community complaints regarding oirquality in the I'icinity of the refinery received
cxtcmivc public and medii! ~l1lentiol1.
In evaluating the government's willingness to respond to the atmospheric
emissions problem illlhc refinery, the rescorch findings indicate 'polarized' resulls.
Several interviewees viewed the government's political will to be both adequate and
effective while olhers maintained the government displayed limited willingness 10 impose
regulatory conlroL~ on the refinery's operator. The results also indicate Ihm the
respondents plcscntcd views which arc generally consistCOI wilh nnd supportive of their
professional or personal arfiJialions al1d positions. For example.•m interviewee currently
employed with the Department of Environment argued in support of the actions taken by
the government and by his department in response to Ihe environmental problems at the
refinery. However. other interviewees, including fonner regulatory officials and
t:OlTIlTIunity spokespersons. were openly eriticnl of the government's willingness to
respond to the.<;e problems. Arguing thm the government's political will was adequate, a
lawyer with expertise in environmental/aw and the regulatory regime goveming the
rcl"inerystated:
I have never sensed that there was n limited political will. I've never sensed that
there were political powers that were operating to rein in the regulutOfs.•.1've never
lwd 11 sense Ihm a minister or a premier. for example, was saying 10 his
investigation people. "leave the refinery alone."
1\ regulatory official with the Department of Environment further argued that political
lVilllV:L~ evident from the govcmment's decision to impose a ministerial order on
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Newfoundland Processing Limited (NPl). Generally speaking. this order required NPL [0
initiate a clean-up of the various sources of obnoxious odours emanating fwm the
refinery site and to implement a process for responding 10 community complainls.
Although soon after the ministerial order \V:lS issued. negotiations hcg:m for the s;lk (If
the refinery. Eighteen months l:.ller the [:leilily was purchased hy Vitol S.!\. to IX'
managed and operated by North Atlantic Refining Limited. As pan of 1111.' terms ;111(1
conditions of sale, the government negotiated un 'environmental compliil1H.:C illilialiw'
intended to impose more effective environment,,1 controls tllllhc new operator or the
refinery. Similnr compliance agreemems had never been imposed on Newfoundland
Processing Limited or any other previous operator. Referring to the government is.~lIin~:l
ministerial order to NPL, an environment department regulatory official :Irgued:
.. .1 guess the political will wns there because when the lid vice was Illissed lip, the
ministerial orders were issued and the company was in the proce.~s of allell1ptitJ~
to abide by those orders, and then they went into negotiatioll.~ with the new
owners. The will was here to enforce the ugreerncnt upon them as:1 condilioll of
sale, and it seems to be successful to dale.
Outside the sample of refinery management, regulatory and legill ornei"ls, other
interviewees argued that the government displayed limited willingness to res]lOtll.l
effectively to the environmental problems at the refinery. Forexamplc,:111 cnvironmclIlal
consultant argued that limited political will was cvident because:
... they weren't reguluting it at all, they had no impact whatsoever on the refinery's
decisions. I think when things were at their absolute worst, they were fcehly trying
to get the company to comply with basic standards, bUlthc comp:.Illy WilS heing
completely unresponsive. Then there was a sale, of course, and lhey were more
concerned then, transferring it to a company lhal they could have a ocner wmking
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rcJ:Jtionshipwilh.
Furthermore, the government's political will was held to he limited and was viewed as 01
considerable problem by a union representative al the refinery. Referring 10 the restricted
crrorls pUI forth by;m environlTlent department regulator. a United Steelworkers of
AlIlcric:I {USWAj refinery employee ohserved:
...you h:Jd llIen like (rcgululor) had done everything he could do in his power, just
to try (0 help us Ihere. ilild sli11. he was slopped by politics aud nOlhing e1se...he
:Jclually wid me himself. Like where he'd wrote up SlOp work orders... Might of
wenl above his IcycLand the minister of the environment slopped ii, so politics
killed it.
Therefore. in this bra'ld assessment of polilicill will. the respondents presented
nlkn oppo.~ing positions which were generally consistent with or representative of their
:ISSlIllled community or professional uffiliations and interests. As well, the positions of the
respondellts rcnccted their pcr.~onal expectutions in terms of how the government 'Willi
supposed' to resJlond to the atmospheric emissions problem at the refinery.
4.2.II'olitieal Will and Concerns Ahoul Emplovment
Corporate thre:lts of capital flight. disinvestment and Ihe loss of jobs represent powerful
COlullermeasures to increased regulatory :lIld enforcement effons by government. Often
Illese countcrmC;Jsures are employed ".hen government regulators attempt to impose
strieler control over the polluting activities of the regulated induslry. In many instances,
thc regulated finn argues that forced investment in expensive pollution abatement
technology thut will never provide an adequule return. compromises the company's
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economic viability and could lherefore rc.~tlh in potc111ial joh IO.~ses Ill' pl;llll dllSllrl'
(Grossman and Knzis, 1991; Schreckcr, 1(90).
This research also attempted to e.~alllinc the rcl:llionship hctwecn Ihl'
government's willingness to impose slrictcrcnviromllenlall'ontrols \,n Ihl' rcrilll.'r~'
operator and their potential impael on employlllent allhc facililY. This relationship lI"as
idcnlified specifically as it is often argu('u. p:lrlinl1;lrly by business prnpnlll'nis ali~IlI'd
with lhe Right of the political spectrum. that gOl'ernmelll rl'gulations all' :IllIlIlIlI'IXSS;lI'Y
'cost to the economy.' and restrict corpomle erforts to mise prorits. eXflatld inl'cslmt:nts
and therefore create employmenl. FurthcmlOrc, it is argned Ihat governml'lli '1'<'d t;qll':
including environmental rcgulations, rcprcsents II signifit:ltlll cost to lhe firm thiltcall pnly
be 'made up' by reducing other opemting expenses such as those ass{l(:iall'd with 1;lhl,tIr
costs (Overton, 1995).
The research findings indicate that the majority or interviewees held 11l;1( tltl'
government was reluctant to impose strictercnvironmcntal sl<lndard.s Oil Nl'L llue tIl 11K:
potentiul impact these measures would havc on employment ;It the rdinery. For inslam;e,
the environmental consultant interviewed contcndcd:
...thcy were relUCtant for om: primal'y reasulll.ll1d tllat was lllcir(:lllicern ,llllllll
jobs, the financial situation being what it is and loe;ll pressure III keellthc Illill~
open at all costs, The thing started up ..gain after muny years of heing dcfull(:(
purely and simply for the purpuse of providingjuhs, Wid Imtl1r<lll.Ji llit.y wt:rcn'l
going to want to close it down again.
The government's limited political will WliS also seen as rcllcclillg hru;IlICI
political issues such as the poor state of the Newfoundland Cl,;Ollomy and t:"nt:erus llial
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job losses would lead to conscqucnti:Jl rcductioll~ in gO\'ernnll'ul1,LX rCWHIICS.
Describing tne political <lnd economic prc.'SUTI.'~ .~l1rr(l\l]1din!! cIlI"irOlllllclllal rl'gu];}l<1ry
decisions. and the often limited SUPfXlrl for Slrict cllfon:t'llIent lrom s~ni,)r polilidans. a
fonner refinery regulutor wilh lhe Dcp:H1nlenl of Environment ami Lands 1I01,'d:
... it'~ certainly frJSlrating whcn you'n: son of ill the fronllincs. :md yon kll,'\\'lhal
you're not going 10 get a lot of. shall we say, p"litic:i1 support. fo[' l:,killg:1 \-cry
severe action against ,1 whalcver,;L Come By Ch:mce nr;l C"rner Br..ok !'ulp ,mil
Pnper or whalevcT. .. You know lhat yOLl call l1egoti;ltc. you C,LIl pll~h il. hUl IheSt.'
guys aiways have hunging over the province's head, you ktHlW. if~'IlL'l'ush us hIll
f<lr, we'll go somewhere clse... YolL c,m sec if I was ,L pl.lilician. I'd I...· <-,x,""lly the
same way, you know. God. can you afConlto 1(lSt.' four hundred johs. six Illmdrl·d
jobs. whatcver il i~? You know. it's a big deaL in a dcspt.'r:lte provinel' lih' Ihis,
where every job counts for somelhing
As lhis person indicales. gO\'ernmcnl environmental regulatory aml ";lfon:cllIenl ded.~illlL.~
arc often innuenced and affected by economic considcrat;lllls such ,IS their illlp;u:t Oil
employment. panicularly in 'single industry towns' (Gould. 19lJ4).ln Ih\: \:;\se OrCnll\c By
Chance. for example. the refinery is cconomically significanl 10 the region surrnumling
the facilit)', both in tems of capital in\'e~trncnl und as ;!major cmr)oycr paying rdatively
high 'industrial' wages.
Ahhough nine respondents held that employment considerations served 10
constrnin the government's willingne~s to im!>osc stricl cnvironmcntal controls nn Nf>L.
the current provinr:ial environme:lInl regUlator o\'crseeing the refinery disagreed wilh lhis
position. Referring specifically 10 internal discussior:s between offieial.~ oflllc
cnviror,menl department and othcr governmcnt ministries like Imluslry. Trade and
Technology. this person argued:
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I'm not ilwafC of ilny ~jlUlltjon~where we had to back down from an internal
llovcmmcnl decision rcl;lted [0 a pOlcnlial job loss or where we have been
overruled on an enforcement issue or an environmental complia'lce issue because
another govcOlmcm dcpanmcnl feels thill it's going to tllrn into ajob loss.
III addition, the datil derived from :In interview with a federal regulator from Environment
ClIlad;1 indicated that the environmental rcguhltory proccs~, particularly in rcgurds to
cnforccll1l;nl dccisions. is rcl<llivcly siraighlforward. Although many faclors call innucnce
the 'JU!COIllC of regulatory dcci~inns. Ihis [ccler:!l regul:J1or argued that issues such as
[)oJilica[ will and conflicting policy agendas have no disccrnablc impacl on regulatory
procedures ,llihe fedcrallcvel. According to this official. the factors influencing
rcgul;lIory decisions more often reOccl a particular firm's compliance record. in uddition
In cconomic considerations sueh as the company's ability to afford und implement
ch:mgcs over II negotiatcd pcriod of lime. Howel'er. both current and former provincial
rcgll1mmy offkials did indicate thut political und poli~y agendas do at times conOict and
alTeet environmcntal protection and regulatory decisions.
·U.2 J1oli1ical Will and ConOieting Policy Agendas
In the cnvironmcnlill policy arena, goveroments assume conflicting and often
eontradiclOry 'dual roles.' In C:mada. provincial governments maintain primaf)'
responsibility for prolecting environmental resources while Ut the s:Jme time promote
thl'irexploit:ltion through economic ;md resource development policies (Gould. 1994). In
Canada. there arc also variations in environmental legislation as well as in the extent to
which provinciol go\'cmmcnt~ strictly enforce industry ~nll1p1i:UK'C. Fur in.st:uK,'. the'
province of Ontorio "."has been the l.:adingjurisdictioll in Cm;ld;l and in r:l~t ,In,' "f the·
leadingjurisdietions in the world in cnvironmental mlcs'· (Miuclstacdl. 1')l)(,:1111
Although in most eoses. unks~ an actual crisis O\:Cllrs, industry will\:'l\llinul' hI r"sisl
legislation ond government will continue to resist enlilft:in~ cuntr,}l "WI" ill,lllSIl'~
(Milibond. 1989: Snider, 1987).
The findings from this I'CSC:lfCh indica1c that ten or tIll' ill1,'r\'i~\\','cs ,'i,'w,'d tlw
provincial government as mainl;'lining a 'pro business· eCllnllmk p"li,·y ;lj.:enda thai b
incompmible with ,lClcquate environment;ll regulation. This agenda has heen ('\'i,klll 0 .... 1"
recent years by Ihe provincial go.'crnmcnt's m'lIlY CClllllllllic ueVdLJplllClIl IlIiliiltit·,·S.
primarily directed towards attracting commercial invcstment :lIld illdustri'll ~apit:ll 1\, till'
province. According to a regulolory official with Ihe Dep:lrtnR'lIt of Envj((lill1lCnl. pLJlkks
directed towards promoting indu.stri'll development in the prnvincc do olkn "indircctly'·
conflict with policy proposals for grc<l1er environmental protcction. This l:tlllnil:t
primarily arises between the interests of environmental proteelion represented hy Ihe
environment deportment and larger government depanmeots with economic developmcnl
mondates. According to this regulatory official:
11's ouvious which side is usually fovoured, If you look within governmcnl. there\
IT&T (Industry, Trade and Technology), which is several times larger than our
department. There's the Economic Recovery Commission. Then:\ a nUlllhcr of
groups slrictly defined for. there for development. Mines i.~ there to develop
mines. forestry is there to exploit the forest."vinually a large scgmentuf thc
government is designed to enCOLirage employment and thcrefore it"s very clear that
government and the people have clearly fovourcd johs over the ellvironmclll.
When ;lskeu if government is moving beyond the now eI<lssic dichotomy of jobs versus
the cnvironrm:nt <lnu shifting to develop policy guidelines which incorpor<ltc and promotc
\usl;,in:Jb1c development' principles and praetic<:s. this regulatory official slllted th:n "I
might hl: overiy optimistic but I would say there has been a vcrI' small shin so far." Both
t:uneut and former environment department employees also noted thilt the government's
prim:lry agenda of economic development renecls the fuct that depunmental resources are
inconsistent with the rC:llities of po])uti(Jn in the province and the less than
l:Olllprchellsivc nature of existill,g environmental regulations :md enfo~ement policies.
A formcrenvironrnent department offici:!1 described the policy agenda of the
provinci<l! government as "swinging like a pendulum: In other words, political u£cndas
shift hetween policies driven prim:lfily by economit: considerations. rcturning very slowly
tn incorporate some minor ch:mgcs to environmental regulatory and protection policies.
This former environment department official contended:
...hcre in Newfoundland pendulums don't seem to swing very fast. They swing
:lwfully slow and nothing concrete was ever done in the environment depanment
:illthe while I was therc...lhere were little bits and pieces of amendments put in
place to fix this or to pmch that hole. but nothing concrete has ever been done.
Several interviewees further noted thaI the political will for policies promoting
strict regulatory st;lndards and environmental protection is construined by the limited
power nnd prestige oceorded the environment ponfolio within the cabinet 'hiemrchy' of
go\'ernment. For c.~i1mple. un environmenlallawyer nOled:
Ministers who were miniSTers oflhe environment tended to be first time ministers
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without preyiou~ cabinet cxperience. and were oncn nntthere vcry IllH~. YOII
know, they'd get in, get their feet weI. !cilrn wl1:1t it wa... to sil at thl.' l'abinl't 1:11111.',
tlnd then if they were c:.lbinet mmeriill, they'd hi:: llllwcli on III anolhn ]1nrthllio. S,I
it was kind of cabinet kindergarten, .11 1eilSt Ilwl's how il Illllkcd frum thl' outsilk'.
Seyeral interviewees made specific reference tothc polilical status ;lUd l.';lhll1l.'t influclll'c
afforded Pmricia Cowan. then Minister uf Environml.'nl. durill~ the 1\)91-1""_\ pcrind
when considerable COlllrQyersy surrounded the atmosphl.'ric l'rnissillils prohlelll:ll till'
refinery, A community spokesperson stated:
I pitied Pat Cowan wilen she was there. Honest w God, Imcan, sill: \\':lS s.111IChOII)'
put out on a limb, and somebody was going 10 cut it off and let ht:r fall. 1 rcally
think that she wanted to sec the thing cleaned up, hut she didn't hawth1.' pOW1.'1'lll
the influence in cnbinClto make it happen. l1l1ean, shc jusl didn'l ha\'c it. ;111(1 sill'
was sort of scnt adrift. "You go out there and deal with them pcullie. ))0 \Vltatl'vCl
it tokes to gel this problem solved. Don't spend any mOlll'Y. We wun't hc .::h:llIgiul-:
the regulations because of the fuss that's going on there.. "
On the basis of these findings, it appt:urs thai the govcrnment's willingness 10 undcrtakc
both regulatory and environmental initiatives is generally constr<lincd hy hoth l:ollnil:lillg
political agendas and the political power afforded those individuals ill cahinet
representing the interests of environmental protection. These findings indicating that the
'institutional sel(·interest of the state' and prOVincial politiciuns ure primarily directcd
towards supporting and promoting the capital accumulation process is cOlisislCllt wilh
arguments presented in otherreseareh (ie, Schrecker, 19&4/85: orfc, 19H4j. Although in
the case of Come by Chance, community action and subsequent media allention appcilrs
to have at least prompted government officials into undertaking an inYc.stigatio!l 01' the
sources of the air quality complaints.
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4.2.3 '·orint....1 Will and the l'..l«Jia
Ahhough the fC.search lindinp indicate Ihal the majority of interviewees ,·jewed the
government as displaying limited political will in Tl:sponding to the environmental
prohlcms <lIthe refinery. severnl interviewees outlined the positive effects of bringing air
IJLi:llity concerns to the :mention of lh(" media. Given wl1'l1 was perceived to be a limited
response hy holh NPL management and environment dcp:lnmenl officials. st\'cml
interviewees noted 111011 nC1:!a!in: media ;lllcntl01l served to develop greater public
aW;lrcncs~ oflhe problems. k,lIJil1g eventually 10 a politic:d response. For c'wmplc. a
regulatory Orfici:llwilh the [)(>p.lOntenl of En\·jronmenl observed that both community
Clll11p]:lims am! su!>sl:quenl media ul1cntion -made some people in government sit up and
realize thatlhc ilems Ih::lI we had been saying were a problem for some time. were quite a
s.:riOUli problem wilh regard to community complaioL'i. and th:l.I tht:y should be dealt with
c\"Cn if we didn't ha\'C specilie regulatory IimilS :tnd par::tmelers." Funher outlining the
importance of bring the problems at the refinery (0 lhe anemion of lhe media. a USWA
uninn cmpto)'ce OIl the refinery explained:
I had people approoch me from the Fiflh Eslale. CSC Prime Time News and so
on. TIley wercjumpinglike 10 do an interview. and we wanted to give il to them.
SO WI;' didn't do Ihou because again a lot of it was media hype. BUI when il did
conic 10 Ihe Ia.~(. when eBC wa.~ in there doing il- we decided either this goes to
the public or we're going to have somebtxly kill~u, wdl. kt'~ gU.ull was the only
choice. we hau to do it. They would not look :It anylhing, the government would
nOI push :mylhing,
A community spokesperson representing the interesls of OIr<:a residents concluded thOlI
"once Ihe media ~ot involved. lhat's when the government son of switched over," This
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indicates thaI pol;tic,i1 will is nOl::l constant but is \'ari:lbk amJ SU"jl'CIIU ;nlllll.'IK,'. In
the presence of considerable public criticism anJ nJeui,1 'l1IC'lllion. till' l:n\,;rtIUIlk.'nl
depanrnem inili:lIcd an inveslig:nion into the SOUfCt'l' of til\.' obnoxitlus lllklurs l'lII:IIl:llllJ~
from the refiJl(:ry. This investigation resuhcd in the gon:rnnlC11l issuing ;11II;,,;sl,'ri;\1
order. requiring NPL 10 begin a process of dc:ming up thl' SOIlTt:,,·S nf till.' UdOUTS. to
implement me:lSUTt.'S to begin improving the 4uanlil~ ,lilt! (]ll:llity tlf th,,' st:ll:k "missions
and to initiate procedures for responding 10 cOIllIllunilY complaints. III :ldditi"n. thl'
government sought the advice of the Toronto-holsed consulting lirlll CtlllCllI'd
Environment.1! and an cm,lronmcnli.l1 hcallh experlln dctcrm;lIt" til... princillle ~'atlscs "f
the ::Iir qU::I]ilY complaints and their pOIcntlal impact lIuthe he:llih of Illell rCSitR'lI1l'o. Thus.
medi::l ::Ittention ::Ippean 10 h:l\'c served :10 imponant role in prompting.:1 gu\'cnUlIctll
respon~ to the 3tmospheric emissions problem at the ~finery,
4.3 Quantil)· and Expertise or Regulator,. I'crsonnel
4.3.1 The bsue of Numbers
The environmental regulatory process is ohen constrained by rc.'iOurcc limit;ltiOll~:I:-. well
::IS the expertise ::Ind the number of personnel available to routinely inspL'Ct fur lIud enforce
industry compliance. and to conduct thorough investigations if nOIHompliance is
suspected (Yeager, 1991). However, regullllory officials from both the federal :11)(1
provincial levels of government maintain there is an atk:quate number of pcrsnnnd
available to monitor industrial operations in the province crfectively. In ildtlitilln. an
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environmental J<lwycr argucuthat "because Newfoundland doesn't have very many
industrial fOlCilitics.lhc people in the Industrial Environment Engineering Division can
com:C!Ilratc thcircffons on two or three facilities Ih<ll require their attention. They do pay
Inls oflltlCnlion." In the Department of Environment. there ure currently S regulatory
personnel employed to monitor and enforce the environmental regulations governing the
polluting ilClivilics of 1111 of Ihc province's industrial opcrmions,
Although regulatory oFfici"l.~ generally maintained that the number of personnel
was ildcqUillc to oversee industry in the province efreclively. a provincial regulator did
indicillc Ihal more personnel woulu improve the department's ability to "pro actively"
respond tll industrial environment:!1 problems. This interviewee observed that:
.. .there's a lot of small or unique industry problems that it would be nice to gel in
and look m some oflhesc things in advance. In acenain number of cases we are
responding reactively to problem situations and only responding when they
become problems. Ideally, il"d be nice 10 be proactive and spot things before they
come up, but in alt honc,~IY I don't think we have an adequate number of staff to
he able \0 do that. When things do become problems we manage to deal with
them, Sometimes it lakes a certain period of time. but, in general, I think staffing
is adequate to handle the induslries we have,
In most cases, any desired increases in staffing were viewed as both unrealistic and
unlikely given current governmcnt initiatives towards deficit reduction and the recent
[;lyoffs of public sector emploYl'C.~. Furthennorc, a regulatory official wilh the
Department of Environment argued thllt stllffing limitations in the depaltment generally
rct1l'ctthe public's unwillingness to pay for environmental protection, This intcrviewee
st:lted:
...Ihat's a polilical question. If I were 10 say. no, lliero.: isn't. t11el1111)" blls.~ Wllllhllll'
down my back. If I say yes there is. th,lt's not tell in!:, till' tmth either. Thl'l"~"s neWl
enough. If you were to employ cvcry single persoll in this provinl"l' in
environmental protection. you could nevcr cover cwrythillg that 11l'cded tl' Ill'
done. just like if you put every dollar into health C;II'C, YliU could ne\'cr kcep
everybody he:!lthy all the timc.... Peoplc decide how lI1\1ch they'l"l.' 1'1\'p:I1\'\1 to I':IY
on the environment. and you get what you pay for.
The data derived from interviews wilh regul;ltory ol"1"icials further imlil.::ltetllhat
staffing limitations necessarily !cad to the development of departllll'l1lal 'priorit)' Ii.~ts.' III
essence, the department ranks and responds ~irstto those prohlell1s rcpr,'scl11ing till'
greatest environment:!l risk or potential h:lrm. In :ldJition, a fonner rcgulatllry "I'fki:d
with the Depanment of Environment noted thallhc departmcnt orten 1"cspllmktl fitsl III
those problems that generaled the most complaints or ·'".issucs which ill"l.' ealls;ll~ liS 1111)1\'
verbal abuse, etc...and unfonunately lhaltcnds 10 be the WllY, whell you're ltndcrslartl'd
with a lot of problems, that lends 10 be the way you opcmle. You tend tll S:ly. if it ain't
broken, don't fix it:' This interviewee funher noted that during the mid Il.lHOs whcn there
were several complex environmental concerns surrounding the commclc1:11 :lnd indl1_~lrial
operations at Hope Brook, 51. Lolwrenee, Long Harbour and Come By Challcc.
depal1menlal slaffing did prove inadequate, particularly in tcrms of inspecting :lIId
enforcing compliance with environment:!1 regulations. This former regulatory lIHieial
recalled:
We gol six guys doing all of that, so you know you need six guys minimum, If
you were going 10 enforce a.~ opposed 10 negotiate and illspcet complianl,;c, hUI if
you were going 10 enforce compliance, you would need six guy.s virtually full time
at the refinery. Well, maybe that's an exaggeration, hut you'd certainly need:1
vinuallyconstant presence out there....Thcn there's a hunch of minor .sluff Ihal's
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going oo...you arc lucky if you're getting iI ~uy 00110 the refinery once a month.
In lerms of current regulatory procedures and the: len:1 of inspection at the
refinery. it Olppcal'S ,h,lI with the recent change in ownership and subsequent
improvements in environmental mOlnagemcnt :llihe facility. the Come By Chance refinery
i~ lin longer lhe t1cpanfl'K"nlal priority it once wa.~. A USWA union representative
ohscrvcuthal:
...right now the W:llch dogging unit. J guess you could call il. the overseeing by the
govcrnmcm i.~:l 101 Jess now thun it ever \V;JS hcc:Juse they bnsic:llly. once they
S:IW thatlilc comp:my slarted to increase. improve their environmental slalUS and
soon.lhcyhackcdoff.
Therefore. there h:IS been a slight (ie. two staff) increa.o;e in the number of industrial
cIlVironmcnlal regulatory personnel in the Departm~nt of Environment since the mid
1980s. 1lJc current level of personnel appears to be adequate when departmental priority
lists arc manageable. although limilations requill: slaff 10 'rext' 10 industrial problems
either on the ba.'iis of complainu or the problem's relative level of environmental risk.
".3.2 Comne(('n('y and Exper1il':e nf Regulatorv Perlionnel
"nlC interviews with regulalory personnel. refinery management "nd legal officials,
indicate that there exists sufcicienl departmental knowledge and expertise to regulate
cffectively i1nd oversee thl: refinery as well as the province's other industrial operations.
For instance, an environmenlullilwyer nrgued thnt:
...everythin{: thntl've seen from the Department of Environment, both federally
and provind"l1y. indicates to me that the people wilh that responsibility are
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competent and know what they're doing...once again. [Will wh:n I em llndcrslallll.
the level of regul~lionsor the level of monitoring and the level of i11tl'fWlllion hy
Newfoundhllld regulatory officials with respccll~' lhe refinery is lllllulll (,r lilll'
wilh what you'd expect in most other jurisdictions in CUWd'I...
Referring specifically to the Come By Ch;JllCC ~fit1cry. an environlllent (kl':tflll1l'lIt
regulatory offieinl noted thai sufficient know1edg... and cxpenis," Ilf rdil1il1~ illduslr~
operations and processes were similarlycvidcflt :tIthe lime oftlw n'rinay's l"1I1stn1l'li,)ll
liS they lire currently. This rcgul:lIor observed:
.. .from reviewing correspondence and memos :md minutes. I rllink llwlllwrc \\':t.~
more than anequate expertise here ilnd it W;l~ ;1150 augmentcd hy Environmcnl
Canada personnel nationlll1y who were down. And I think Ih~y pTllh;lhly did :1 lilt
of ground work for the province based on relinery e.~pcTicncl· inlllhl'r ;lrc;ls as II'
agendas (he province should pursue with reg;lrd to cnsuring thai Ih..: start lip of thl'
refinery didn't result in signil1cant problems. Currently... yeah, nJiCC a~;li:l. I'd S;I)'
yes we do. You know, with thc problems that have appeared over the last few
years, we've obviously significantly increased our experience ...
Outside the sample of regulatory, refinery management and legal ornci.. I.~,
however, most interviewees indicated that the provincial government's fC!!ul,l!ory
personnel did not possess sufficient expertise to effeclively ovcr.'\Ce :lnd rcgul:IIC :11I
industrial facilily like the refinery. Referring to Ihe competency of the environmenl
minister specifically and departmental stOlff generally, an environrncnlal COlisull;ult
argued:
POll Cowan as Minister was completely incompetent. I don'l mind saying th;l!. I
would say that to Pat Cowan herself. In fact, aClually, I have... ll's Peen my
contention all along that we don't havc the e,'(perli~e in our Department of
Environment to adequately deal wilh these high tcch industries. I milY he
overlooking somebody who's a genius at this kind of thing, I don't know, hUI nonc
of the people I've encountered have impressed ml: with;1 huge amount of
knowledge.
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A community spokesperson also compared the competency and expertise of the
regulalOry engineering swff within the Depurtment of Environment 10 the engineering
personnel employed :lIthe refinery. According to this interviewee. the more experienced
,lIld competent industrial engineers lend to pursue a career in industry given the
aVili)ilbility or .~ignificantly grealer financial rewards, With specific reference to expertise
regarding the ltfinery's atmospheric emissions. this spokesperson argued:
I mean the people they gOI working in Ihcirdepartmcnl is certainly not as
qUidificd 10 talk about emissions as lhe people who's working in thai refinery
today..Jhcy got experts in there, and I mean, they know now much smoke is
produced in a h;llf:1 barrel of oil. and everything like thn!. The government don't
have the expertise in thcir office~ to really get OUt and t;llk to those people and
really muscle them down. you know. I mean, it's going [0 take some smnn people,
working for Ihe departments and governmcnt is not paying the wages, I mean.
some of those fellen:. engineers. chemical engineers. they're probably gelling in
excess of II hundred thousand dollars. whereas government then are only paying
sixty. seventy thousand dollars. So. I mean,those chemical engine~rs are going to
worl; for refineries. and not for government departments. so that's a problem.
Finally, the imerview data from a USWA union represemati'le indicated that an
oflicial assigned by the Department of Eovironment to oversee the refinery's operations
ilppcarcd to have received minimal prior training from the depanment in regards to
refining proccsses and essemially received 'on the job training'through the assistance of
refinery personnel. In reference to overseeing atmospheric emissions, this union
reprcscntiUiveobserved:
...weil what it would come down 10 is that the Department of the Environment
trusted the company to report if the emissions went over until an (environment
department official) was assigned there full-time. And (he) told me his self, he
had \0 b:lsical1y learn. He was not an oil refinery engineer or anything. he was just
an environmental engineer :tnd a new engineer basically, I don't know how long
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he: was wilh the IXp;lnmc,lI of En\'ironmc:nl. hill he ~Ol llncxpcnis..' in \.il
refineries and so on. right? Nol as such as rcg:mllo )~3rs of l'xl',:ri'·Ik."\· IIr
anything, right? He had 10 ba.~ic:llly learn the proccs.slns ~Ir. Lik,' wh,'!! I h:Mlltl
come out there and ~l down Wilh him amllOld him 1rn.'fo\.'11I..'\Ich SIIH..lks.l.... "hIli"
know whall was talkins aboullhcre. I had to c.~plain lohil1llll all'" whal il \\":IS
about. Aoo no offense like I S.1Y 10 him. thaI's just the war il W:L';.
According to an environment dcp;utlltclll official. the I\l'CCSS;l~'ll1JininJ:: f"r n'~llialing thl'
refinery can be parti311y obtained throug.h oil refining and induslry rclal"d wurSt'S ,Ifli.'rcll
outside the province in locations such "s Tesas. Funhcrmorc.II11' slx:dlil" lminin).:
requirements are identified by Ihe person in the position whl) lhcll suhmils a rl'lIUl'SI ll1al
the training be provided by the dcparlmcnl. The I'rtlvillcial AtlllilllT Gener:11 rcr.ortc,1 in
19941hal employ~s of the Dcp:lrtment of Environment musl slIhmil a pcrsonal l\'ljlll'Sl
for lT3ining because ~ ...Ihere is no fonnal process in place 10 idenlify imli\'iduallr:linint
no.:eds~ (Marshall. 1994:123). Addilional training for ovc:rsccinglhl' refillcry h nht..i...c,1
through self·instruclion :md from materials galhcrctl from source.. such ;1.... l·{lllc~c
progmms and Ihe American PClroleum Institulc. Allhougit a.. indicalL'(1 ahove. il1llklrt:1ll1
and essential trnining is obtained 'on the' job' from the rclinery's pmcc...s en~inccrs whn
explain 10 the regulalor step by step the functions and flUrpClsc.\ uf the ""ri(ltls pTlIt:c...s
units,
While it appears to be the cuntention of leg:J1 (lCl1ionncl. rerinery managcmelll ,lIId
regulalory oflicials that there is sufficient expertise 10 oversee lUld rcguilltc induslry in the
province effectively, Olher interviewees dis:lgrced with this asscssmcnl. '!lIC prohlclIIs
relating to the expertise of provincial regulatory pcrsunnel we~ ~ener:Jlly secn ll~ hciug
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r~I;ltl:1I1u the govcrnmclIl not providing dcpanmcnt:.ll ~IarfWilh the specialized Ir:linint;
rcquircu 10 Tcgulalc a particular inuustrial operutioncffcclivcly.
4.4 Financial Resource Constraints
ACl;llrdin~ to Capulo i 1(89). environment:]l regulatory <lnd enforcement :Jgencic~ in
Cliladil operale under l:Ondilion.~ of financ;ul constraint and often ..... lack the resources to
gCllhc Juh donc" (McMullan. 1992;911. In a general way. this research e.x<lmincd
~1l\'crl1Il1Cnl financial con~lfaints and their possihle impact in terms of regulating bOlh the
ClIllle fly Chance refinery and imJuslry in the province generally. The research findings
d~'rivcd from this analysis generally indic;lle lhal sufficient financial resources arc
currently <lviJil"blc for the monitoring of the province's industrial operations. With
spl.'l.·ific reference 10 monitoring the rdinery. an environment dep:lrtment official
contends:
I know thut we have the resources available to maintain the effort that we'rc
maintaining ;It the moment which I see as certainly being adequate. particularly in
light of th>: improvements that have occurred out there in the last couple of years.
One more slaff might be nice. I don't think that's an absolute necessity. I think that
we can continue to regulate the refinery with the resources that we have.
Tltis regulatory official also noted that although current departmental finances are
sufficient to support currelll monitoring efforts. 'extra' resources would probably not be
;lI'ailahlc for initi,ltives such as a terrestrial effects monitoring programme at the refinery.
TI1l' official commented that·
...if the government opto.:d to do a terrestrial crfects programme out there or if I
desire it, I don't think the monel,' would be il\'ail:tblc for ic Bill W11;lI \\'c'w heen
doing is pursuing industry to ll~dcrtake these studies themsclves in COlljlllK'tioll
,md consultation with the department, and thm what's occurring oultherl' '" Cunw
By Chance.
Similar to the issue of departme11lal staffing, sCI'ernl intervicwces 11\1lelltl1at
budgetary restrictions result in decisions regarding departmCnlal prioritie.... hased ilg:lin Ull
relative severit}' or the immediacy of existing problems. ACl.:ortling lU a fc(kr:11 reglllmnr.
"you put your balance where it has to go. Everybody docs Ih:1I. Ifalillf a suddl.:lI.
everybody decided to be bad, you could gel in a lot of trouble. IdOll't kIll'\\', hut you'd
find the resourcessomewherc."
Although the intrrviews with federal and provincial regulalor." indic:lle lhal
existing fimmcial resources are sufficient to monitor the province's indllstry effel.:lively,;I
regulatory official with the IXpartmcnt of Environment did stmc th;lt environmenl
riepartments will never receive sufficient financing rehllive tn lhe extent of suciety's
pollution problems. According to this official.... "lhere·s itlways things you would like to
do and need to be done, and there's never enough dollars...ll1C fact that then:\ I}lllllltinll
out there means that we haven't done everything lhat can be done."
Finally, the provincial government's relative commitment to providing rl.:S(lurce~
for environmental protection is perhaps a reflection of budgetary expenditures fllr lhe
opemtion of ministerial departmcnts. In reviewing the 1995 provincial bud~etl;lhlcd hy
Finance Minister Winston B3ker, the government's gross expenditure for lhe Ministry of
Environment was $7.2 million. In comparison.thc gross expenditure for the upcrution
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and the numerous 'eoterprises' of the Ministry of Indusuy. Trade and Technology was
$50.1 million. On the hush of this simple comparison. it appears thai the government i!l
more commillcd 10 the "identification of new business investments. tr.Jdc opponunilies
;ulli market development for I~ Province" than 10 the financing of programs and policies
directed towards environmental protection (Government of Newfoundland and L1brador.
M;lrch 23. 1995:31. Thus. it aprc;u.~ ttl:Jllhe pro\'incial govcmrnclI\'s cum:nt coml,litment
tu policies based on the principles of 'sustainable development';s perhaps limited given
the inequitable distrihution of lhe government's budgCIDfy e.~rcndilurcs.
CHAPTER V:
RESEARCH FINDINGS (PART TWO): REGUl.ATORY ANn LEGAL
CONSTRAINTS A!\'D THE POLITICAL RESOURCES OF NI'I.
5.llnlroduclioll
In Chapter <I. the research findings pertaining to regulatory eOllS1nlint~
associated with political will. the qu:mtilY and quality of regulatory
personnel and deparlmentnl financial rc~ollrces were prcsenled. A r~\'i~w (ll
the literature also indicates that tht:: implemcnt;llion of ~n\'ironl1lenlal
regulatory policy is fUrlher constrained by factors such ;l.~ the content 01
environment;!l regulations. enforcement proceduTCs, the Icg;11 system ;llld hy
the political resources of the rcgu}<Jted finn. It will be <Jrglleu here that
the ability of the regulated firm to mobilize political rcsourl'CS to
constrain the environmental regulatory process is not a constant hut \';lric.~
with the political climate ovel lime and is typically rnoslcffecti\'c wllcn
the government in power promotes a 'pro-business' political agenth This
chapter examines the research findings in relation to each ofthes\,: ractors
with specific reference to refinery operator Newfoundland Processing
Limited.
S.:! Regulatory Com::trajnt~
Laws, statutes and regulations represenlthe outcome of politicul policies
through which governments attempt to constrain or modify economic hclwviuur
in the private sector (Thompson, 1980), In the context of air pollutinn.
rrovinci~1 regul<ltions gener~1Jy outline objective standards for
environmental quality relati\'e to specified limits or calculated
r~ramctcrs for pol:utant~ emitled into the atmosphere. In Newfoundland.
"the provincial Air Pollution Control Regulations use both ambient air and
point.of-impingement standards to determine complianee... the i1mbient air
standards generally follow the federal maximum acccptcd values. while the
point-of·impingcmcntlcvcl.~ arc ~imihlr 10 Ontario'~" (Concord
Environmental. 1993;6-9). To determine regulatory compliance with the
point-of impingement standards guveming the refinery. sulphur dioxide
(S02) emissions are monitored on an hourly, daily. me-nthly and ye"rly basis
using a network of reccptors loc<lted in the communities surrounding the
facility. As mentioned above. 502 emissions arc also cillculated in terms of
"province-wide standard (ie. ktlyear) or a maximum of S02 emissions
generally based on federal guidelines. The 1993 Concord Environmental
ll993:6-9) report explains thaI:
Newfoundland reduced its sulphur dioxide emissions from 58 kt in 1980
to 43 kl in 1986. The federal-provincial accord (to reduce acid rain)
sels the maximum sulphur dioxide emissions for the province al 45 kt,
so that at that time it was below its target. However, due to current
refinery operations the province now exceeds the target.
Therefore, the quantity of 502 emilled at the refinery can also be
c:llculaled relative to the facility's 'contribution' to Ihe provincial
m:lximum standard for 502.
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However, in the. environmental policy field. the o~iective content of
legislation and regulutions has been criticized for being unrealistic ;11
terms of defining pollUlion parameters prccisdy.•md for being vague.
difficult to enforce and generally ineffective for controlling the
behaviour of large industrial polluters (Webb, 1990; Emond. 1982: Swa;gcl1.
1982). More importantly, t:nvironmt:ntal lcgislation is criticizcd for
outlining only mitigating measures for pollution cORtrol instcad of
operating from the premise of actual prevention (Seis, 1993; Steidlmcicr,
1993). In the case of the refinery, datll derived from the interviews
indiealCS that the air pollution control regulations governing the facility
proved to be ineffective in providing acceptable community standards for
ambient air quality. According to these data, existing air pollution
control regulations were ineffective ftlr a number of reasons.
First, the regulations were found to be outdated. in need of review
and not applicable to specific emissions problems encountered at the
refinery. According to a regulator with the Department of Environment,
"...we could certainly do with improved standards. I believe the air
pollution control regulations date from the early 70's, so Ihey arc
certainly due for review and replacement. M In addition. the existing
regulations do not contain standards governing hydrocarbon concentrations
in ambient air. Hydrocarbons, in particular. were identified as being a
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principal cause of the aJrquality problems in the vicinity of the refinery
from 1991 to 1993. Hydrocarbons were also a primary source of citizen
compJ<linls regarding the 'blue smoke' and the 'propane oily smells.' The
provincial regulator for air emissions at the refinery noted:
...we've run into situations that weren't contemplated during the draft of the
previous legislmion and Ollf regulations. and it has stymied us. For example.
hydrocarbon conccnlratjon~ in ambient air. That may have been an ideal solUlion
10 deal with the community complaints a couple of years ago, but unfortunately it
was an item that we wQu)dhave liked to have had and itjusl wasn't in OUTback
pocket 10 use... We knew hydrocarbon odours were a big concern out there but we
were left without the regulatory device to do it..So [hat left u~ with no regulatory
muscle in tenns of going after Ihem for that. We had 10 pursue them on a nui.~ance
odour basis.
According to II number of interviewees. the hydrocarbon emissions problem was
prinwily the result of unbumt hydrocarbons being emitled from the refinery's heaters.
Gcnerally spcllking. the refinery heaters heal the refinery fuel oil to a range of extreme
temperaturcs causing a process similar to distillation to occur. The various components of
thc distilled fuel oil are then removed and sold in the fonn of more familiar hydrocarbons
such as gasoline. diesel fuel and home heating oil. Although the process of refining fuel
oil or '\vaSle oil' is a standard procedure for a 'sour crude' refinery like Come By Chance,
the high hydrocarbon emissions were generally attributed to the age, poor maintenance
and inefficiency of the refinery's sub-standard burners.
Although the previously cited regulatory official indicated that the existing
provinciill environmental regul:ltions proved inadequate in regards to the hydrocarbon
odour problem. another regulator interviewed from the Depanment of Environment
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argued that the issue of refinery odours is consi~lcnt with problcm~ cncollnt~T<:d ill olhl'f
jurisdictions. This regulatory official contended:
I think the problem may be the rcgulatiollf, don't address the llrobkms Ih;l\ Wl'l\'
there. The problem was probably more odour thim sulphurdioxidl' :lIld d<.:aliull
with an odour is not as easy as dealing wilh a chcmicill because you tim'! plll:1
number on odour. So nlllybc the reguhltions were inadcqllalc in \h<ll sells":. hill nil
more so than probably the regulations anywhere clse. It's somclhil1~ thaI ]X'opk
have not come \0 grips wilh. so we're no further off lhe track than :myhody l'ls... Ill'
no furthc:r behind than anybody else.
According to this official. SUlphur dioxide (502) emissiolls were unly part nflll..:
problem in terms of nmbiem nir quality concerns m thc refinery. Ahhough (I 1')93
evaluation of air emissions a\ lhe Come By Chance refinery by theeonsuhing firm
Concord Environmelllal did indicate lhal the rcfillery'~ S02 emissions were six :\Ild ~, half
times greater than any comparuble refinery of its size ill Cunuda. As discl1ssL'<l ill Clwph':l
3. the high gross total of S02emissions at Come By Chance were generally (lllribUlelll0
f;\Ctors such as the fucility's malfunctioning sulphur recovery unit uud the .~igJlific~mt
number of open vents at the refinery. Several interviewees llrgued Ih.. t the inerc:n,c in
hydrocarbon ..nd S02 emissions between 1991 and J993 was also partially rd:ucd tn
economic factors such as thecompany's decision to refine uless expensive feedstock.
These interviewees noted that the visible quallty of the cmissions noticeably changed
nfter Newfoundland Processing Limited (NPL) switched from refining the 'sweeter: 11Iw
sulphur :md more expensive North Sea Brent crude to con.~iderablyless expensive bUI
high SUlphur 'sour' crude. According to tbese interviewees, without the proper functiolling
oflhe refinery's sulphur recovery unit, the switch to refining high sulphur fuel oil would
112
haw: significantly affected lhe level of 502 emissions emitted at the refinery.
AilhOllgh the S02 emissions at the ref:nery were found to be excessive as
compared 10 other refincries in Canada. only on a few occasions did refineryoperalor
NPLocmally violate Ute regulaled limit for thiscompound.ln the opinion ofscveral
interviewees, the ambitnt air quality standards for the province are simply too "generous."
Forcxamplc. a community spokesperson argued that:
... the problem IV.'S lhe way thallhe ambient air is done. It's divided into so many
parts per million, but it's also done province wide. So yes. that refinery has a
negligible effect on the environment of Newfoundland as a whole. So they are
complying wilh the new environmental laws, hut I'm not living on a stretch across
Ncwfoundland...I'm much more worried aoout a forty kilometre radius than about
everylhing e1se...That's what we were saying constantly 10 the Depanment of the
Environment. You have to be much more specific in what's being belched Oll! to
the atmosphere in a local arc.a, notjusltell us no. this is not dangerous to the
health of all Newfoundlanders. Ofcourse we know iI's nOI dangerous. If it was,
god help us all, from one refinery.
FUrlh(rmore, sever011 intervieWteS nott'd Utat the province's air pollution conlrOl standards
as applied to Ute refinery's emissions are too generous relal.i\'C to the limited number of
industrial pollution sources in lilt province. For example, a union represem,lIive observed
thallhc Long Harbour phosphorus plant is now closed and the electrical generating
station at Hollyrood installed fillers to reduce theemissionscomingofft.he facility's
heatcn;. Therefore. "Come By Chance has all kinds of leeway to goup! ...The times what
Ihe govemment cal led excecdillg the emissions, they basically were exceeding emissions
for the whole damn province. that's what they were doing."
It appears thallhe existing provincial .ambient air standards proved to be
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problematic, panicularly in terms of providing air quality stlmdilrds accept,lok lothe
communities adjacent to the refinery. Indeed. one interviewee cited a Cllll1p:lrislill mal.1.:
between the air pollution control regulations governing Come By Chance \\'1111 rdineries
operating in otherjurisdiclions. According 10,l USWA union represent,lIi"c:
...there was a guy who came up here from R.A. Parson.~ Limited whkh is thl'
original designers of the sul()hur p1:ml back in the 1970s,I0 look O\"er thl' pl:llll
and tell what needed to be done with her. And he saiJ.lhc only other place yUll
see it as bad. when you come in the roadway ami sec the cmissillllS that arc going
off the place, is in lhe... Philippines. And he said, anywhere ill Ihe stale (If
Caiifomiaor even any of the eastern st;\tcs. you'd be shut down ill f1vc minutes.
He said to have what was coming out of that p!;ICC. California would simi you
down. It was just lIsimple as that. But bcC;:IUSC there's 110 cnvirollmcllwl
regulations here, there's still no environmental regulatinns here. Likc the ligures
cI'en now that's been going out inlo the atmosphere. yOll wouldn'l get iIW;\y w;lll il
anywhere else.
This union representative also compared occupational health and s;\fcty
regulations in Newfoundland wilh those found elsewhere in Canada. Acc{\rding [0 this
interviewee. "YOll go through the OCcupalional Health and SarelY (OH&SI Act (lr
Newfoul1dland and you go through Ihe OH&S Act of Alberla and it's likc chalk ;lUli
cheese when it comes down to refineries," Referring to the existing Act as well as
recently proposed amendments, this interviewee observed Ihat in comp;lrison to Alhcrt;l,
NewfourKIland's legislation contains rew basic provisions pcrtuining spcciricalty to
industrial workplaces such as "confined spaces and the isol<ltion or pipelines."
Furthennorc. limited regulatory provisions pertaining directly to industry generally and
the refinery in particular. have on occasion constrained the union's ability 10 have sarety
concerns at the refinery adequately addressed by OH&S officials. Citing an example 01
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:-uch an occurrence, the union representative staled:
...regarding hydrogen sulphide gas monitors. stationary monitors put in the unit.
Now in Alberta Ihis is a given. I mean to say, you go up in any refinery in Alberta
and so on, you'll find hydrogen sulphide gas monitors...And we would try to gel
them. We had men go down, knocked down, knocked out with H2S. :lnd if we
hadn't got the <lir packs OUIIO them, they would have been dead. And the
government was told this. The answers I got back from Ken Dunphy, the manager
or Occupational Health :md Silfety. was that there was nothing in the Occupational
Health nnd Sufely Act of Newfoundlund that says thaI the company has 10 have
hydrogen sulphide gas monitors on Ihe units. That wa~ it, so Ihal was Itml. Same
thing with the life boat, we tried to get a life boat put on the jetty. Same answer.
Nothing in the regulations that says lhat they have to put it there...
A review of the OH&$ regulations of Newfoundland and Alberta indicates that
unlike Alberta. Newfoundland's OH&S regulations do not contain a section which
Olltline.~ workpl:!ce exposure limit~ for specific chemic:!1 hazards. In Alberta'~OH&S
rcgulmions, lhe seelion pel1aining to 'Occup;ltional Exposure Limits for Chemical
SubSlanccs' outlines the specific limils for workplace exposure to hydrogen sulphide
(H2S). Forcxnmple, over an 8 hour period, the exposure limit is 10 ppm and 14 mglm
cubed and the total 'ceiling' occup;ltional exposure limit is 20ppm and 28 mg/m cubed
(01-1&5 Gcneral Regulations. Province of Alberta, 1995). When dctennined to be a
potellli:ll occupalional hazard. H25 monitors musilherefore be installed in a work unit if
an employer is to properly evaluate whether they are in compliance with Alberta's OH&S
regulalions.
Given the above examples of both the limited environmental and health nnd safely
regulatory constraints and Ihe inefficiencies in relation to the refinery, this research also
addressed the issue of regulator)' amendment and refonn. In reference to amending the air
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pollution control regulations as a menns of addressing the uir quality proh!l'ms '11 CIHllt'
By Chance, a regulatory official stated that:
".it sounds like il simple solution, but it docs take a significant amount of litn~ til
review possible regulations, items thnt are necessary for inclusion, ilclllS that
would be enforceable by the deportment and then to ha\'c those rcguliltions dt'ilftcd
and adop' ' ...J promulguted...it's a "cry time consuming proces:; mul itl.:lIultln't
be done on short order.
Interviews with provincial regulatory officials revt:alcd thlltthc pnl\'incc's cxiMing
environmental regulations are currently undergoing:m cXlensivc review, Tht, rcviell' Ill'
environmental regulations is occurring in conjunction with a larger govcnllllellt initiative
to amend provincial regulations held to be negatively arrccting butll potential
development proposals C," well as existing commerci:1I activitie,~, For in,~t:\l1ce. a wirnary
objective of the government's recently proposed reforms to the cnvironmental as,~eSSlllclit
process is "to determine the extent to which the existing environmental aSSCSSll1elll
process may be creating unnecessary impediments lo economic and business lIcvclOJl1l1elll
in the province..." (Government of Newfoundlnnd and Labrador, 1995: I I, [n short. the
intent of this initiative is to streamline government regulatory proccdures, indudiul:
making it easier to obtain pollution pennits, and to make government services 'user
friendly' for business and prospective capital investors. Referring to the proposed
amendments to the Environment Act, regulatory officials with the Department of
Environment argued that unless they're subsequently "watered down," the changes will
generally strengthen the department's ability to control pollution ilnd prolect the
environment. Although in the environmental regulatory process, the existence of 'stronger
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legululioos' t1oe.'i IlOl necessarily lead to their actual enforeemenl.
It appears therefore. that the constl1l.inlS associated with 1M provirn's existing air
pollution control regulations are similar to those problems identified in olher research
(Webb, \990; Emond, 1982: Swaigen. 1982). Referring to Newfoundland's
cnvironmcmullegislation gcnemlly.lhe AudilorGcneral also reported in 1994 that
- ...much ofthc legislation is outdated and vague, w'·, :ng it difficult 10 enforce
compliance" (M:m;hall, 1994). In short. Ih~ prollince's ambient air JXlllution standards
were ineffective for controlling the specific atmospheric emissions problems encountered
ala large industrial racility like the refinery.
5.2.1 Regulatory l"sredioR and Compliance
Asignirteanl consu:l.jnl affecting the environmental regulatory process is not just the
regulations governing pollution activities but also the extent to which the regulations are
actually enforced. A!, Aalders (1993) observes, the 'paradox' of environmenial regulation
is tholt regulatory inspectors more often employ an accommodative and conciliatory
approach 10 enforcement than a stringent. penal style of enforcement. Industry violations
ofregululOl)' standards often do nOI result in a fine or a penalty being levied against the
polluter. More often. regulatory officials will attempt to bargain for future compliance
(Nemetz. 1986).
In reference to the Come By Chance refinery, the research data indicate that
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durin1! the period in which NPL opernlcd the refi~ry. signifIC3111 COtlCt'n1l' regaf(h:l~
compliance and the erfeclh'cncss of rcgubtol)' ;n.~p«tiondid :lriSC. AC\.·\lnlin~ 11':1
USWA union representative. govemmenl health and 5afcl)' in5p'-'<:10l'"5 wen.' casily
manipulated by refinery m:magcmcnt and Ihe inspcdors Ihcl1IscI\'Cs wen: siA;nificalilly
under qualified to canyau! inspections at the facilil)' properly. The USWA n:pn'SI;'I1I:ll;W
interviewed observed:
... the operation's managcr...would question the inspector It) <l pni111 thaI he W:IS
crossing OUI directives thut he already wrote,directives 11IIcim that wcr<:
violations of the OH&S Act ..He didn't know the dirrcrcncc. illSllcclordidll't klluw
the difference. And this is why we kicked up holy hill!. like I say. \\'l' pill
resolutions inlO the FederJlion of i...:lbour ~nd everything. else, hut it W:L~" W:l.~h:
of fucl.:ing lime to send ~n inspector who didn't know what thc chrisl he was
looking ~I, An inspector had 10 come oul and ask me what H2S is, Wh:ltthe chri.'il
is Ihe good of an inspeclor...And like a lot of times,Ihe din.-ctivcs were wroll.' ul1
and they would not even come back 10 sce if they were carried olll ...lllI.'y wouldn't
even recheck back on it.
Problems associated with regulatory inefflCienc)' and oon-compli:mcc were furtlll.'r
evident by the num~r of health and safet)' violations which occurred during Ihe pcritlll
NPLoperalcd the refinery. In 1994. "Employment and Labour Relalion..~ Minister RUbocr
Grimes (admitted) to 200 accidcnu...being reported to his department belwccn 11)87 iUllI
199r (The Evening Telegram, February 14. 1994:4). And according tuthe USWA uniull
representati~'",cited above:
there were 256 violations of the (OH&Sj uet. Therc were 69 workplace viulatiullS
alone. And l'd say out oflhc 256, ('d say a 100 of them, probably to a 120
casily...this is over a five year period...were repeated...! don't know if any other
facility has had that mallY violations who ha.~ not been issued 11.~tup work orderur
has not been shut down. 1don't know of any. If Ihere ha.~. it's news to me. Bccau.o;c
of tile faclthat il was repc:lted andrcpeatcd and repeated. We kncw.:lntI it W:l.~
118
UfIJy by Ilick that we didn', have: J;Omebody killed. ThaI's all. pure luck. Like I can
!illy incidents off the top of my head, that the regular public. if they knew about il.
they'd shullhc pl:JCe down their seh·cs.
Although out orficially documented:1." specific violations of the pro\'incc's air
pnllUlion conlrol regulationJ>.thc venting of various gases directly into the: atmosphere
W;t" p;JnicularJ)' evident :11 the refinery. According [0 a USWA IInion reprcsenl:ui\'e.
"lhcy'lllcJl you. e\'en ildmillhcir selves that basically anything thallhey could vent 10
:lllllilsphrrt.· \v:l" going to atmosphere. If it wa"n', a problem. if ilwas something Ih:11
wasn't pUt1il1l.! .~omc body down, thm's where it was to." For eX:lmple. "the vacuum tower
slcarn injector velllS. They were pUlling out roughly 200 and 300 ppm hydrogen sulphidc
~.t\. This was.1 steam vcm. it was going to atmosphere...They were nOl supposed to be
I!nin~ IU atmosphcre. RightllOlV thcy're nOI going 10 atmosphere: This interviewee also
nhsc-rvcd untreated sour w:l.lercontaincd in the facility's impounding bnsins being pul
under pressure. "pumping it bn.~ically into n spr.J.y and releasing it- into Ihe atmosphere.
Iknzene in a gasc..'Ous state was also released. causing workers. to go -home spewing their
gutS up. sick a.~ a dog. had the wors.t kind of headaches and eYef)1hing because of it.- In
;lddition. pressurized cooling lubes blcw out of an improperly maintnined process unit.
'nlis resulted in OJ "hydrogen cloud. this was seventeen thousand ppm hydrogen sulphide
(I I!S) going OUI over the control room, oyer the tank farm and out over the Bay. If it had
l'Ollll' hack the other way. il would hal'e struck the henters. and with the hydrogen, she
wtluld have hkw to hell." In:tll cases of environmental and workplace incidents and
l'iulaliolls at the refinery. union rcprcsent:ttiYes form:tlly complained to both company
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management and government officials. In rcfcr...nce 10 addn.-ssing hc:dlh and s;lklY
concerns at the refinery, a USWA union represent.lIi"... cxpl:Jins:
We had meelings wilh them (lhe company!. we had mcctings wilh 'h,'
government. we had meetin!Vi with the inspeclon;. 1spo1<.: m)'~lf J;Cwmllillll"s,
including 011 a govemment sponsored s}'fll(lOsium on On:upOItil}l\;\!. t1calth ;I1l11
Safel)' (OH&S), ::about Ihe facl thaI they never issued a SlOp worl.: onkr \IT nc\'cr
fined the company and IIOld this plain and plump [0 lhcm... th.' lkpmy minis"':r Ilr
labour was there. the director of the OH&S division was there, the lII;lIl:1~~'r Ilf Ih...
OH&S dh'ision was there.
These brief examples of environmental and hC;lhh :lntl sarelY viulalinliS apl'lCar hi
indic:llC that both regulatory inspection procedures and enforcing c(lmpliancl' pr(l\'l::d htllh
ineffectivc and problem~tic lit the refincry. Although the l::xtcnl of p<lsl \'ltll,l1iollS wnuld
appear to indicate adopting stricter inspection anJ enforcement me;l~nres.a ctlllll1111nilY
spokesperson noted that lhe government and thc refinery still mailllain a Itln~ slandin~
policy regarding inspeclions at the facility. According 10 Ihis SpokCSPCTliOIi. rcgul,llnry
officials continue 10 be required to provide three days notice prinr tn a yisil ,mtl 'surprisc'
inspeclions are nOI pennilied by the refinery opc~tor.
This inspection policy appears 10 renectthecurrcnt shifllowartls ·rq;ulaltlry cn·
oper.ltion" and from government enforcing compliance 10 "industry sclf'nJtlniloring,"
According to a former Depanment of Environment omeial, Ihe~ changes in cnforcclllcni
polic)' <Ire generally related to government initiutives In aUraet cllpit<ll invcsunent <lml
industrial deYelopment to the province while reducing enYironmental rcgulatury
expenditures. in par1icular, those goyemmenl expenditures associated with maintOlilling:l
staff of regulalory enfon:ement personnel. In reference III changing regubtory
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enforcement procedures, the former department official noted that:
...politically they saw th:1t having too much in place is a bad thing because you
don't want to scare people ofLRather than protect the environment, it's changed
[0 doing it in a co-operative sense with respect 10 compliance agreements and
empowering the industries Ihemse)ve~ to take care of their own ball coun...We're
going to monitor you monitoring yourself. and Ihcn if something goes wrong.
well, then we'll stop you. But rather Ihan have hordes of resource people, herds of
environmental inspectors out there every day watching everything you do, we
cun'lafford thaI.
The ubove examples of limited enforcement appear to indicate that OH&S and
environmental regulatory procedures in Newfoundland are finnly located on the
coo~ration or compliance end of the enforcement continuum as the government attempts
(0 promole economic policies favourable to capital investment while also reducing the
number of enforcement personnel. For example, a former regulatory official explained
thaI iI significant and perhaps syntbolic rcduction took place in the Spring of 1995 when
the government eliminated its Environmental Enforcement Branch, a division specifically
mandmeci to enforce the province's environmental legislation, Thus, there are currently
only 8 regulatory personnel assigned to enforce the province's environmental regulations
on a full-time ba.~is, These are employed within the Depanment of Environment's
Industrial Environment Engineering Division,
Finally, in reference to lite Auditor General's 1994 evaluation of Ihe Depanment
of Environment's monitoring procedures, it was noted thaI "the Department does nol have
a current and complete inventory of dischargers, discharges and diS<'.harge points 10 aid in
1Il0niloring...and tracking compliance with legislation and standards" (Marshall,
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1994: 121). In addition. the Auditor General found that:
There is no clearly defined work plan to prescribe the nature and fretlllcncy of
monitoring activities. The monitoring proces!i relics to a great ~X1~n' on self·
reporting by dischargers. As a result. the Deparlment cannOI ensure that ;,11
dischargers are monitored on a regular or cyclical basis :lIltl violalions Illa\' remain
undetecled for extended periods (Marshall. 1994: 129). .
5.3 Constrainls R)' Thc Le~al S)'s!cm
In the environmental regulatory proc(":;s.the legal systcm represcnls the 'threat of forn"
but is often employed by governments only as a last resor1 when unlOlwful [lOIlU1crS have
repeatedly refused to comply with imposed regulatory limits (Ye;Lger. 19911. A~ well.
legal determinations ofreguJatory offenses through :'10 assessment of the environmental
impact of pollutants is often constrained by faclors such as 'scien1ific ullcert;,inty" and
'knowledge gaps' (Richardson et al., 1993; Thompson. 1980).
The research findings derived from imerviews with l'cgulalory officials haviug
direct experience and participation in the legal system indicate thallcgal processes in
Newfoundl::md often constrain rcgul<ltory efforts to achieve both cnforcemcntllnd
environmental protection goals. For cxample. a fanner regululor with the Department of
Environment states in reference to enforcing compliance wilh provinciul air pollution
control regulations that:
It's difficult because it requires a [01 of effort and a lot of work. a lot of personnel
to io actual fact galher evidence of an environmental violation... let's talk ahaut air
pollution in a refinery... that's probably one of the more difficult one.~ bc(;<!usc you
measure il on a <lmbient monitor. You know. if you wanted to take that 10
court... the court would probably end up prosecuting them on ant violation but you
122
would have to show that there were consistent violations. Just to show that your
monitor wa,o; working, you'd have to have your monitor calibrated on a regular
basis which would almost require. jf there was a violalion gonna lake place in the
next hour, that I would have 10 have calibrated il now. Who calibrated it? I would
then have to show the credentials of the person and the equipment thai l calibrated
the monitor with...The other thing is... !>uppose. you could successfully collect all
the evidence, you lenow, meet all the requirements of the law, you go 10 coon.
Usually you'll find Ihatlhe public prosecutor, who comes out crthe Department of
Justice, and the judge- the legal sYSIl~m that supposedly is gonna look at this issue.
is not very knowledge:lbJe on the technicalities of it. They don't understand what
sulphur dioxide is or you start !:llking about micrograms per cubic metre per
hour... this was an ;lIlowahle level. and they'll say why? ..It's vel)' difficult to
cxplOlin these issues. Suppose you even get past that. The statures. and the record
ofpros\':cutions in environmental cases in general tend to give companies very
small fines ...Maybe;, severe fine might be five thousand bucks. You know it's
cost you many more than five thousand bucks to get that fine. and then you look at
the company who might have. you know, cash nows of many times five thOUSand
bucks per day being fined five thousand bucks...there are well known cases where
the.o;c guys w:llked out smiling. Their bigg.cst expense was not Ihe fine they had 10
pay. their biggest expense was the lawyers they had to pay.
Olher Ihim conslmints rehued 10 gathering evidence. the limited sc!emific knowledge of
lcg;d officials and 1M often negligible fines imposed on industrial polluters. imerviewees
further observed problems relating 10 lhe extensive lime required 10 receive legal advice
from the provincial justice department and to bring a case to court. Refcrring to
enforcement delays. a fonner environment departrnem emplo~e noted:
...quite often you need an answer on something quickly or you need to write up
something and $Cnd it to the Justice Depanment for refeTTlllto get their
interpretation on whether you can proceed or not. And I mean. I actually still have
copies of letters. of things that I sent over to the Justice Depal1ment and waited
two years. three years. and never got replies back. And I've sent over reminders
and even eomplllined on the telephone and complained at meelings, and the
answer. well. we're just too busy...And once it becomes a eourt ease, of course
there are delays and postponements, and lhere are stays of proceedings and this
sort of thing.. We've had ca.\Cs that have been delayed and got into the COUI1S for
1\\>0 or three years, still in the court system.
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The constrnints affectin~ plOviut:ial t:nvironmcntal .:nforccmcnl procedures ;lppC:lr wi)\,"
p<lnially indicative of systemic 'overload' and ju~ticc department officials operating under
conditions of severely limited resources. For eXllmplc. lhc interviewee cited ahove ulSl\
noted that:
...when I was with environment. we had C,l~CS where people were found guilty in
court and were required to pay 11 fine. and were given sixty or ninel)' days 10 p;l}'
the fine. It was never paid. And you know there was no process in pluee for the
courts to go back and follow up and see if Ihat fine has been pilid...Aml unless we
ourselves used to follow up on these things, 10 find out if they wen:: hcing puid or
not, it was just left. So basically you can go to court and get a fine andjusl wait
for a while and some one will forget about it. ..Thc legal process. that's Ihe
responsibility of the Justice Department and the whole court system, hut they
weren't being followed up, and the reason being they don't hm.'c the 11I1WCr.
resources, they don't have the funds available, and so on and so forth.
Finally, regul:ltory officials noted that the legal and courts systems gcnerally
constrain efforts to protect the environment. For example, a former regulatory nfl1ci;ll
with the Department of Environment contended:
...any province or probably the feds who is working for the environment. 'lIld hilS
as their backing a set of environmental regulations, then irrespective or how good
or bad these regulations are, most of these guys ure not looking for COllrt ca~es.
And the reason is thaI most guys very quickly work out that it doesn't gct you
anywhere. That really, if your job is to protect the environment, and you're serious
about it. the last thing you really want to do is end up in court because you'll never
protect the environment in courts. Sad as that may seem, in my opinion, nol many
guys might aClual1y say this openly, but in my opinion, it's very dirricuh 10 protect
the environment from within the eourt system.
Given these constraints associated with protecting the environment through the legal
system, most of the regulatory officials interviewed argued that bargaining for compliance
becomes the preferred and most effective approach to enforcing compliance with
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environmenLal regulations. A federal regulator observed that Mwhal you arc prepared to do
iii 10 explain to the company what the rules are. Then you keep your part of the bargain.
am1lhey are obligated to keep theirs. That's the way it works here:. 3llyway.w
Therefore. it appearJO Ihal regul:l1ory enforcement procedures in Newfoundland arc:
conslr.tined and affected by similar factors 10 those identified by other rc:5~archers
examining legal procedures lind environmental protection in other jurisdictions. Indicated
in other research, constraints such 3slhe limited legal lmd ju"liciul knowledge and
undc:rstanding of the 'science of pollUlion,' negligible fines (or pollution offenses and the
tendency 10 enforce environmental regulations through negOliatcd compliance appeOlr to
he similarly relevant to the regulatory and enforcement process in Newfoundland.
5.4 The Political Resources of Newfoundland Processing Limited
Political resources used 10 influence the behaviour of others may include money.
infonnation.the thre:u of force. and the right to make laws (Schrecker. 1984185). In the
environmental regulatOf)' p~s. the regulated firm often maintains direct control over
imponant infonnation such 015 self-regulatory data.lcchnological pollution abatement
options and financial information (Rankin and Finkle. 1982, Thompson. 1980). As a
re.~ult. the environmental regulatory process can encounter problems such as significant
delays in ilchieving compliance with the regulated firm (Yeager, 1991: Webb.1988:
TIlOmpson.1980).
The empirical data derivcd from the interviews reveals that the environmental
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regulatory process governing the Come By Chance refinery was oonstrnined h}' specific
actions taken by refineryoperntor Newfoundland Processing Limited (NPL). In POll1iclIl:lr,
these data indicate that the princip:al resources mobilized by NPL laconsl...in the
regulatory process were the control of vital information and delaying coml'li:llll~ wilh
scncduled regul:lIory agreements.
5.4.1 Controlling Information
The problem of accessing information from NPL developed sool1 :Ifler Joe;,] wlI1ll1unilics
began to raise concerns regarding both the possible environmental and human health
effecls resulting from the refinery-s emissions and the disccrnablc (iL-ciine in local air
quality. To address these concerns, ilrca community repre.~cnlalivcs first approached NPL
officials to obtain an explanation for the visible changes in the refinery's slack emissions.
Several interviewees, including government regulators, noted th:l.l NPL officials natly
refused either to discuss, provide information or offer an explanation for the change in
emissions. And in this case, the burden of proof appeal1\ to be with tnc complainam.
According to a community spokesperson:
...ifthey had come across at the beginning and said well all right. right
now we're having a problem with the SRU (Sulphur Recovery Unit),
which is what removes the sulphur from the atmosphere, and it's down. iI's
not working. Then a lot of people in the local area would have SOlid all
right, what are you emilling? .. fine. But how long is it going to continue'!
Instead of that there was nothing wrong with the refinery...you don't need
to know, it's 11 business. it's part of 11 business, and we have no inlemion of
giving you inform:ltion...we're operating within government standards, so
if we're operating within government standards. it's none of your
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business... Up unlil that time, until they were actually forced, we had no
kind of correspondence with them at all. We would send in letters, gel no
reply back, or a reply thai due to thc fact that this is a private company. we
have no intention of releasing what could be delicate information.
After being refused desired information and not provided a satisfactory
cxplan:ltion from refinery officials, community representatives then proceeded to address
their concerns to the government and in particular forwarded their complaints to officials
with thc Depanmenl of Environment. According to a spokesperson representing area
re~idcnIS, environment officials placated their concerns by minimizing the potential harm
or impact resulting from the st:lck emissions. This spokesperson stated:
...they came out dead solid on the side of the refinery when we were complaining.
I mean they put us down, 1mean like we were silly to be complaining. 1mean we
had nothing 10 worry about and things like thai. II wasjusl a bit of sulphur. and
things. I mean the refinery people were trying to do their beSl. Basically the
government was on the side of industry.
Diss;ltisfied with the response provided by both NPL and government officials. area
residents began 10 assess and mobilize community resources. An organization of
'concemed citizens' was fonned, which then proceeded to bring the concerns of residents
to the attention of the media. Media involvemem and publication was viewed by
community represent:ltives as being the most effective medium through which to pressure
lhe govemmcntlO take action against the refinery operator. A community representative
explained:
...the way we looked at it was ifweenn make enough noise, government will
respond. But we had to make a lot of noise before they were willing to respond,
really. And the mini·,. rat the lime was Pat Cowan. Basically we had loembanass
her every way we could and that's what we did...
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Once government officials appeared willing to respond to the air quality concerns
of the area residents, community representatives proceeded to request spccilk
information from the Department of Environment. In p:micular. samples of the emissions
data generated by the refinery's sulphur dioxide (502) monitoring network were
requested. Once again the community's request for information proved prohlematic. An
interviewee representing the local communities rccaned:
...we contacted the Depanmenl of the Environment. BUllhc Dcp:lrlmClll nf the
Environment had units lhal were supposed 10 be monitoring lhe emissions. 511 we
asked them for the data on their machinery. All of a 5uddcr. it callie back thallhc
machinery was down and wasn't operating Olier this period of time thaI we were
interested in. It was down for longer than two months. In some e:ISCS.:1 lot longer.
We weren't quite sure. We could probably get the informa1ion no\\'. hut at thaI
time. we knew they were down for at least two months. Perhaps longer.
TIte interview data further indicate that the installation of monitors. over.~ecillg their
calibration and maintenance, down I03ding the data generated. and later forwarding this
information to environmenl department officials for analysis is a process controlled by the
refinery oper.tlor. As indicated above. the emissions monitoring program did expericnce
problems when NPL was responsible for overseeing the program. A regul:llory official
with the Department of Environment explained:
I guess the problems that we did see with the monitoring effort were thatlhc
quality control and experience in maintaining the equipment was lacking..Jn
terms of capital budgets for supplies. calibrations, that did have an impact on the
quality of the data and there was a significant proportion of invalid data during the
first few years of NPL's operations...in the past they tended to just collect the dnl:l
and forward it to us without great concern for what it showed or mennt or
whether it was providing information that wa~ an approximation or reality versus
just numbers that the equipment was generating.
128
Although this interviewee was critical oflhe quality of the information provided by NPL,
another regulatory official from the Department of Environment argued that the
government shou:ct assume at least partial responsibility for the problems associated with
the emissions monitoring program. Uncertain whether NPL intenlionally provided
inllccurate emissions data to confound regulatory procedures, this official stated:
I can'l remember the ellacl details of ii, but I know thai we did determine lh:u it
was unreliable and it's not strictly the company's fault. I mean there is some
obligation on government to ensure thill the data provided is up to the standards
that we want, so we do have to [etthem know the standards. You could fall down
there to some degree. So that's why, you know, I do say they did provide it, but
whether it was used to interfere with the process or not, I'm not sure.
Although it would be particularly difficult for environment depanment officials to 'prove'
that NPL had been impeding regulatory procedures by manipulating emissions data since
the company was solely responsible for the monitors as well as theircalibr..tion and
maintenance.
Further problems associated with inaccurate infonnation from the monitoring
network were attributed to delays in retrieving the site data and the region's complex
terrain and atmospheric conditions. According to an environmental lawyer, the inherent
delays associated with refinery officials having to visit each monitoring site and then
down loading the emissions data meant that "the refinery could see what had happened
but couldn't see what was happening, so they couldn't adjust their process to address a
problem in realtime." Computer systems with data transfer modems have since been
instllJ1ed to help alleviate this problem and the information from the network's monitoring
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sites is presently coming into Ihe refinery on a realtime b:lSis. The emissions data from
the monitors are then logged and then forwarded to the D~partmcnl of Ell\'ironrn~nllln u
monthly basis. Although the installation of data transfer modems hus improved the
accessibility of data generated al each of the four stationary monitoring siles.lhe rdlllvc
accuracy of the data generated continues 10 be significantly affected by 'lakeshore cffccis'
and changes in local atmospheric conditions. The environmental lawyer intcr\'k'wcd
noted:
...if the emissions are going straight up in the aiT and blowing OUI into Placcnli:l
Bay or crossing into Trinity Bay and disappearing into the high lltmosphere.they
are still emissions, no doubt about that, but they ore not Boing 10 be picked lip by
the monilors because they don't impinge upon lhe monilors. The same emissions.
or even smaller quantities. could show higher peaks on lhe monilors if you h;lIl all
inversion layer and it pushed the emissions down.
The above problems associated with changing atmospheric conditions and the rclillivc
accuracy of the S02 emissions dala has led several interviewees to recommend that a
'mobile' moniloring system be implemenled. In particular. community rcprc.~cnt:nivcs
argued that daily meterological conditions such a.~ fog and wind direction shuuld bc
consistently factored into monitoring procedures. In other words, it wus recommcndcd
lhal a monitoring receplor be situaled in the "most sensitive" location where it will
generate data reflective of 'troe loadings' and the actual dispersion pattern of the refinery's
emissions. According to the community representalives interviewed, both rcrincry and
environment department officials considered this recommendation of a mobile monitor to
be too expensive, particularly in terms of personnel and equipment costs. Currently, lhe
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stationary 502 monitors are situated ir. a 'radius' around the refinery in the communities
of Come By Chance, Arnold's Cove <Ind Sunnyside. with a fourth monitoring stalion mo~
rccelllly introduced to the Hibernia site at Bull Ann.
As indicated above, the emissions monitoring program did encounter specific
problems when NPL was 1'eSF''lnsiblc for the operation and maintenance of the network.
Indeed, in 1993, the consulting firm Concord Environmental. hired by the provincial
govcmmenllO study the emL~sions problems al the rdinery. recommended that the
Department of Environment assume full responsibility for overseeing the monitoring
pro~ram. According to the Concord Environmental report (J993:7·3). "the sulphur
dioxide monitoring network seems adequate but is not known to be aCCUfllle since quality
control practices need improvement and regular application, nor are the results used in a
pro-active way. We recommend Ihal lEE Division take over lhe operation of the
nclworK. R To dale,lhis recommendation has nOi been implemented. According to a
regulalory official, Ihe depanment's responsibilities currently involve conducling rouline
checks on Ihe performance of Ihe monitors. Perhaps lhe govemmenl's decision not 10
as.<;umc full responsibility for the network might be related to the maintenance and other
costs :l..~soeiated with 3cquiring the infonnation from the monitors. An environment
dcpanment official noted:
Nonh Atlantic Refining, they pay for all aspecls of the monilOring, they perfonn
alllhe maintenance, provide all supplies, all ongoing costs for the network are
borne by Ihc company. All equipment was purchased by them. All sites are
administered by them. Allihal we really do with regard to Ihe monitoring efron is
oversee the perfonnnnce of lhe monitors. We hnve direclnccess 10 Ihe monitoring
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equipment and call it up to check it frequently.
Thus, the refinery operator slill maintains primary conlrol over the monitoring
network, generating the S02 emissions data and making this information llV:lil:lhlc til
regulatory officials with the Department of Environment. In terms of controlling.
infonmltion generally. a community represclllative observed 111m refinery orli:i:lls
maintain considerable influence over the milnner in which inform<ltion rcgilrding rellner)'
operations is discussed and presented to the public. In reference to monthly lllL'clings
involving environment department personnel, refinery offici;lls ano community
representatives, this interviewee commented:
Well, what I found from attending those meetings is that when you go to lIleeting.~
even now, the opcrutor and their engineers. the company's enginecrs, will cOllie
out and they'll spend eighty-five percent of the meeting talking abolltthings
they're doing, technical things and everything like thut. Ami you've gOI
government people there, your people from yourdepartmenls, they llml Iheir
heads. They know a lillie about what's going on, but you can certainly sec llml
they're not very knowledgeable about what's happening at the refinery..J mC,llI
those refinery engineers can certainly talk circles around all of us. am.lthc
government people the same way.
This interviewee therefore indicates that public access to 'luality dat,l, but pcrh;lr.~ JIlore
importantly, understandable and useable information is constrained by the ofteri highly
technical and limiting language used in presenting inforrn<ltion regarding refinery
operations. Therefore, the rerinery operator maintains primary control over regulatory
information such as emissions data as well <IS the manner in which informiltinn regarding
refinery operations is disseminated to the public.
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5.4.2 Ilelaving Compliance
Delaying compliance with ~dleduled regulatory agreements was atl()(her tactic used by
NPL 10 constrain the environment"'l regulatory process althe refinery. According loa
rc~ul:lloryofficial with the Oepanment of Environmem. NPL used what could perhaps be
described a.~ systematic methods for delaying compliance. This interviewee contended:
Newfoundland Processing tcnded to manipul:nt the process through delay. If we
would bring:m issue up wilh them. essentially they would object to it and fail to
respond 10 it for a period of lime, object 10 it in correspondence. knowing that was
going 10 buy them another several days. several weeks or several months for a
response based on the importance of the issue althe lime. Ilhink they used thaI
quile well by proposing to do things. setting a schedule. and then falling slightly
ochilld the ~hedule or dramatically behind the schedule. and generating another
round of discussion. They would provoke interest by the department in discussion
and changing Ihe schedule a little bit and then fall behind it again. It seemed to be
effective for lhem. It was frustrating in the depanment seeing il being done. but
we had to in all fairness give them Ihe opportunity (0 respond and IIOl: Iry and
short circuilthe process. BUI they were politically sman in thai ~gMd and they
worked it r3ther\.\.'CII.
It appears thai NPL cle.1rly constrained and manipulated the environmenla!
regulatOf)' pr<X:css through delay. However. the empiricnl daHt derived from interviews
does nOI indicate that the company publicly employed 100 blackmail' or threatened
negative consequences such as refinery closure in response to imposed changes in
environnrnml regulatory standards. Although it was indicated that any statements to this
affect would have been made during private discussions at the ministerial level. For
c.~ample. a community representative stated:
No. I'm cenainJy no! aware of their evcr Ihrealening it, and J would say thallhey
never threatened it publicly. but fm saying that when they're behind closed doors
and they're negotiating with government on regulations. they got input in helping
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them set up some of the~e regulalions, I'm sure they call ~ay itlhell.
In .addition, an environmenl department regulmol)' official specul:lled lhal NPL was abk
to influence regulatory procedures given their power and significance as ;1 large employer
in the region. In terms of influence, "I think they did have thaI. Thcy'w I,ll king hundreds
of jobs, they very clearly had the power to influence. I'm SUle they did. hut [ mean' W;ISIl'[
aWlm:: of it...they mel with Ihe Minister."
Thus, sevcml interviewees argued lhat NPL maintained significlml power :Ind
influence over regulatory decisions O! th(: refinery. As well it was argued lh:\l corporale
uses of power. influence and threalening negative repercussions in response to imposed
environmental standards is inherent w the regulawry process, Referring to NPL
employing threats of closure and job blackmaiL ~m environmental consult~l11t interviewed
stated:
Yes of course, that's what they do. Thars their tool, lhat's their mcchunism, that's
their Icver..,We push them too far and the company is just going to slly we c:m'l
afford to make those changes, And we're just going to have to close down. Krugcr
does it out in Comer Brook. Thal's what industry doc.~, That's their game.
In reference to the influence of industry gcnerally and I\"L in particular, an environment
department regulatory official funher noted lhat "they've used whatever per"uaSlon :"~Y
could in those ways.. .1 think it's the case with everyone, thaI whatever regulatory regime
you put in place, if it's going to have a negative impact on someone, they will do
whatever they fecI is appropriate to address their concerns and their p:micu]ar il11ercsts,"
A management official with the current refinery operator Nonh Atlamic Refining
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Limited agreed. According 10 this official, imposed changes 10 environmental standards
will be resisted, particularly when the changes require investments in environmental
technology which are not easily recovered and may compromise the company's
competitive position in the marketplace. In addition. this official argued that any imposed
changes to environmental regulatory standards should apply to all finns in a particular
industry and not.1 single firm within a given region. Otherwise the 'level playing field' of
competition will be compromised. And it is economically compromised firms that
typically violate or resist changes in environmental standards. Furthermore, this
interviewee observed that given NPL's vcry compromised financial position it would be
of no surprise to him if the company employed any or all menns available to avoid
complying with the orders 10 improve environmental standards at the refinery. Indeed,
both NPL's compromised financial position and Ihe company's management style wete
frequently cited reasons for the company delaying compliance with imposed changes to
environmental standards.
As mentioned above, NPL's financial position was noted by several interviewees
as being one of the primary reasons for delaying compliance and for Ihe company's
manipulation of Ihe environmental regulatory process. As discussed in Chapter 3, in 1992
NPL's parent company Cumberland Farms had applied for bankruptcy protection, the
cornp:my was forced 10 pay substantial tines resulting from a series of law suits, and at
lhe time of the sale to Vitol S.A" NPL had reportedly owed $100 million to its creditors
(Jackson, 1994: Doyle ;lOr Whiffen, 1992: Morton, 1992). Describing the prohlems
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associated with NPL's financial position. II regulatory official wilh lhe DepaTIl\1C11I of
Environment explained:
the difficulty with Newfoundland Processing wa... [0 get them to conlloit the
money in the first place. and then once the)' had committed it. for [hemIn actually
find the money and spend it. And that was the most difficult aspect. They were
operating with their back so close to the wallihallhey had very little manoeuvring
room in terms of capital expenditures. I think that wa~ the prime reason behind
their allempts todduy.
In addition, a USWA refinery employee :lrgued thaI one orlhe primary rC:lsnns for the
company's violations of health and safely and environmental rcgulmions W:l~ due to the
company's unwillingness to make the required financial expenditures to improve
conditions at the refinery. Allhough this interviewee also ,lrgued that compli,lIlce delays
should also be attributed to the current status of Newfoundland regulations ;llId their
enforcement. According 10 the USWA union employee:
Money, I think it was they didn't want to spend any money. That was the whole
root orthe problem...you can have what you like there in regards to safety
commiltees... environmental technicians on staff, you can have safety tcchniciuns
on staff, it doesn'l mauer.1f you haven't got commitment from top manOlgemem
and from the owners, you're not going to get nothing because the Ncwfnundlaml
regulations are so lax, on occupational health and safety, particularly to
refineries...The environmental regulations the same thing. It's not an industrial
province. And the government...don't even want to put anything in the acts
because of trying to attract investment into the province, amI they're not concerned
if the person's following the act or not...if Vitol came down tomorrow und said we
cannot do this right now, and we need another year to do this, they'll gel it. They
do. There's no difference between here at this oil refinery and on the west coasl.l
mean to say, Kruger over there in Comer Brook has been putting oul for years,
waste water into the Humber, and so on, and they didn't push them when the: paper
mill prices were down. They push him now, the paper prices are up, because they
know they're making money, but they're nol going 10 push one damn tiling jf they
thinks there is any kind of idea that the company is leaving the province or
shutting down... lt's politics.
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It was also indicated that the delays and the government's reluctance to enforce
compliance we~ related to NPL's significant outstanding debts., including monies owed
directly to the government. The USWA union representative cited above nOled:
They knew the position mer were in, in regards to being on the edge of going
bonom up. All the time right? The government, they owed the government over
eight hundred thousand doll:us. Newfoundland Hydro. in unpaid hydro bills. And
they wouldn't even push that, because they knew if they did push ii, they would
put up a nap. right? And again. it's like they say, you can't draw blood out of fl
turnip.
These data indicllle that NPL's precarious financial status proved to be a
significant reason why the company delayed compliance with the imposed changes to
environmental regulatory standards governing the refinery. Th~ findings also revealed
th:lll'\':gulalory non-compliance was more generally related 10 the company's managcmcnt
attitudes. panicularly lowards such con('cms as environmental Quality standards and
employee hcallh and safclY. A number of intcrviewees made refe~nce to me general
al~:tudes and management $lyle ofNPL executive personnel.ln reference to the
compa.ny's willingness 10 discuss and provide infonnalion 10 area residents, an
environmental lawyer interviewed observed thai Mit may have jusl been a management
slyle. I think thatlhere is a kind of-throw up the barricades· mentality mal typifies
certain business cwners.MFurthermore, the federal regulator inlerviewed noted in
reference to NPL that:
...how you manage it depends a lot on upper management. It depends on what
comes down from lhe lop. You have a choice. You could either maintain the
status QUo and just stay within the regulations but don't do anylIJing proactive, or
you can be proactive and then apply your problem or even CUI costs...lf they're
happy Slaying within your regulations, then fair enough, thaI's lhe way they want
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10 do business. Legally. that's :lUthey h:lvc to do...TIley ju.~1 could h,l\'e been
belter corporate citizens....they could have spent more molley on maintenancc. a
few repairs here and there. and things like thai.
Thus, these data reveal that the environmental regulatory process goveming the Come By
Chance facility was further constrained by the refinery operator's cOnlrol of impoJtanl
technical infonnation regarding atmospheric emissions and through delay:; in o.:ompli;l1lcc.
In particular.lhe delays in compliance were attributed to NPL's precarious financi:ll
position as well as the attitudes of refinery man:lgemcnt lownrds issues orhcallh ami
safel}' and environmental protection. On the basis of the govcmmcnt's response 10
previous regul3tory violations and with no objective penult}' or fine stnlClUrC corllainct! in
Ihe regUlations. NPL would accurately perceive lhal in delaying compliance th~rc W'l~
little likelihood of ::my legal :lelian being commenced against them.
CHAPTER VI:
THFSIS SUMMARY AND PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
6.1 Conclusions
This research has examined spccinc financial and political resource constraints affecting
the implementation of environmental regulatory policy governing industry in
Newfoundland generally and the Come By Chance oil refine!)' in particulnr. It is therefore
import:lnlto discuss the reasons why these specific limitations exist and the extent to
which they are attributable to the political economy of Newfoundland.
In this research, the poor slate of the Newfoundland economy as well as related
employment concerns were idemified as potential constr:l.ints afrecting the government's
willingness to impose stricter regulatory standards in response to the atmospheric
emissions problem at the refinery. Furthermore, Strict environmental regulatory standards
were perceived as having a potentially negative impact on new capital investments in the
province generally and on employment atlhe refinery in paniculnr. Given the province's
\'ery high r.tle of unemployment, limited employment oppol1unitte5 such as those at the
refinery a,<;sume greater social, political and economic significance. Thus, the poor state
of the Newfoundland ecooomy appears to CQn~rain the government's willingness to
implement stricterenvironmental standards, particularly those governing the province's
industrialpollutcrs.
Surprisingly, this assel1ion is supported by the governl'I1Cnt's own Economic
Recovery Commission (ERC) in their recently published report entitled,~
Environment and the Economy' An Examination of Is~ues and Opportunities in
139
Newfoundland and Labrador. In this 1995 report. the ERe st:lled thaI:
Resource developments in Newfoundland and Labrador ha\'o: foclIscd on the need
to generate wealth and create jobs. The prO\'incc's weak industrial base :Ind poor
economy have been a persistent deterrent (0 introducing environmen1:ll
requirements... (Elton and Poynter. 1995:9).
In 1993. the Department or tile Environment went outside the province. seeking
the advice of Ontario·based environmental consultants in order to ,lddrcss the ,liT quality
complaints of citizens residing adjacent to the refinery. The decision to COlllr;lct wilh
'outside experts' was presumably necessary due to the limited resources of the dCp'U1111CIll.
Indeed. the province's poor economic status was al:;o found 10 cause specific fiu;llll.:i'll and
human resource constr:Jints, affecting the environmental regulatory process governing
both tne refinery and industry in Ihe province gener.lIly. Although there arc rcl.llivdy few
industrial facilities operating in the province, departmental staffing and resource
limitations often requirc regulatory personnel to respond to industriill environmcnlill
problems in a reactive manner. In addition, these problems arc morc often identified
either on the basis of complaints or by reports voluntarily provided by the regulated firm
rather than by proactive measures such as consistent monitoring and enforcement
procedures. Furthcnnore, this research revealed that NPL refinery munagcment cxerei.~cd
considerable influence over the Occupational Health and Safety (OH&Sj insf1Cction
process, affecting the outcome of important enforcement decisions made by OI-l&S
personnel assigned to inspect the facility. Thus, the health and safety compliance and
inspection problems at the refinery were found to be gcnerully attributable In the
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government's limited resources, particularly those resources necessary to ~rovide OH&S
inspectors with the specialized training required to inspect the facility effectively.
The unregulated venting of various gases directly to atmosphere was also found to
he cvidcllt at Ihc refinery. representing significant hazards 10 both refinery personnel and
the surrounding local environment. It appears, therefore, that effeclive and routine
im;pcClion and enforcement procedures 0.1 the refinery were either n01 panicularly
important to the government or were compromised by the limited resources allocated for
these functions. The latter opinion is supported by Ihe ERe. According to the ERe•
.....Villiutions and potential violations in all areas of environmental managemellt are 50
\\Iitlc.~prcad that the financial and human re~uurces are simply not available to deal with
them" (Elton and Poynter, 1995:44). Referring specifically to th~ rcsourc~ limitations
affecting the Depanment of Environment's Industrial Environmental Engineering
Divi~ion.thc ERe further noted:
...the Depanment of Environment has a separate Division to address issues of
industrial compliance but does not have the resources to monitor and
enforce...The Industrial Environmental Engineering Division depends heavily on
the company's monitoring programs in making its decisions. sueh as whether to
prosecute a company for violation of provincial standards, (and)... large induSlrial
finns have been successful in having the province delay deadlines for
environmental targets. Departmental officials indicate that compliance requests
are often ignored and. despite violations by our large industries. there has never
been a prosecution under the law (Elton and Poynter, 1995:45-46).
III light of the government's record of failing to prosecute industrial violators of
provinciul environmental standards. this research also found that the implementation of
t:lIvironmcntal regul:ltory policy in Newfoundland is affected by the legal system and by
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the limited resources of llle provincial Depilnment of Justice. Ahhough similar III
problems encountered in other jurisdictions. the cnforcclllcllI of environmental
regulations in Newfoundland is gencl':ll1y affccted by legal officials posSl'ssill£ a limited
knowledge of environmental science; difficulties associ"led with scienlifk uncertainty as
it relates to the gathering of'irrefutable' evidence; and lhe onen ncgligibk fines illl(lllscd
by the courts for pollution related oHcoses. Furthermore, si£nificunt time delays :\!Tccl
both efforts to proceed with enforcement and the pruccssing of clI\'imnlllcnlal ca'il's in
court. In short, these delays arc generally atlribuled \0 systemic o\'crlomlwhich rene..:ls
the limited resources of the Department of Justice. For in!>t~mce. in non·illduslri;ll ~llses
that actually proceed to court and result in a convictiOIl involVing a fine, the justke
department (.:urrently has no system in place to confirm later whether or Illlilhe intl}(lsed
rines have actually been paid.
As a result of these problems. environmental regulatory orrici<ll!> in Newfoundland
often choose [0 avoid enforcement through the legal system and instead prefer to
negotiate for regulatory compliance. This preference toward bargaining forcomplimlce
with industrial polluters as opposed to employing strict standllrds of enforcement is
generally consistent with regulatory procedures in other jurisdictions of Canada.
Negotiating for regulatory compliance in Newfoundland and othcr provincc~ thcrefnrc
serves to iIlustrnte an inherent contradiction within the existing '[cgalistic'commlll1d-
penalty model which guides the 'cnforcemcnt' of environmental regulations in Can:lda.
In overseeing the operation or the Come By Chance relinery. it is evident that the
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provincial government~ nol to employ strict enfon:emenl measures or a command-
pcoOllty approoch to regulation. Funhermore. refinery opc:r.:IIOf NPL was able to
manipulate the environmental regulatory process by maintaining primaryc:ontrol over
important emissions-rel31ed information and by delaying compliance with negOli'lled
regulatory agrttmenlS. Consequently. both community representatives and environmental
deranment offici:lls experienced difficulties acquiring specific information from NPL
Cxpl,lining the qualitative and qU:Jnlilativc changes 10 the refinery's stack emissions.
Similar to problems encountered in other jurisdictions. information control and
delaying compliance represent important instruments of power IIsed by regulated
industries 10 resist imposed pollution control standards and to generailyco'lstrain the
implemcntation or cnvironmenlal regulations by government. Citing an example of
industry resistance to imposed pollution control standards. the ERe noted that:
Thc Come By Chance Oil Rcfineryhas avoided variousenvironmcntal
requirements with potential safety implications. For Instance, the province
requested thai the former operator (NPL) post iI $100,000 bond for the
establishment and usc of ah~dous waste site designaled by the. province. but
t~ bond wa.<; IlOI deposited ilnd the company stockpiled its waste in an
undesigmlled site (Ellon and Poynter, 1995:11). (Parentheses added)
In Newroundland generally, the ERC further contends that -...industry has exercised
consilkmblc innuence over go\'emmcnt's aClions in pushing for enhanced environmental
measufCS" (Elton and Poynter, 1995:9).
Although NPL was able lode:lay compliance effectively. the environmental
regulatory process al the: ~finery wa.<; also compromised by the content of the province's
existing environment31 regul3tions. In Canada. the implcrtK'ntatiol1 o( cn\'irolln~lIt;11
regulator)' policy h:l5 been found to ~ affectcd by oflclI \'ague rC1;ulalol)' l'land:lrds
proven 10 be unrealistic (or go~ming industrial pollution (Webb. 19H5l. III
Newfoundland. the province's existing em'ironmenl:!1 rcgulJtions were gcncrJlly
detcnnincd to be inconsistent with the reality o( pollution in the province. In p;lrlieul:lr.
the regulations controlling air pollution were found to he outdmed, in need of rcpla.:emellt
llnd ineffeclive for providing the local communities adj:leelllio Ihe refinery Wi1h
acceptable standards of ambient ,IiI' quality. For install.:e. the uhscnec of rcgLl];11ury
standards governing hydrocarbon emissions and rd:llcd oduurs served tIl li1l1i1thc
government's ability to legally respond to these problems in a forcdul :lnd effeeti,,'c
manner. Ho....'Cver.limitations relating 10 political will, the n:!\(\urces tI( the ell\'imnmenl
depatlment as well as lhe power and influence of NPL mayuplain why the existilll!-
standards were not amended or new regulations drofted to OOdrc~.; the atmospheric
emissions problem al the refinery more effectively. Although. the ERC ohserves Ih:1I
limited political will or the "government's weak commitmcnllo the environn,,=nt hi d:llc
is also illustrated by a reluctance 10 enforce environmental regulations hy industry ;lIld;1
reluctance to implement environmental initiatives which may have co.';! implicalions fur
consumers or industry" (Elton and Poynter, 1995:97).
Finally. the environmental regulatory proctss is often comtraincd hy the
provincial government's role in environmental protection. For many years in
Newfoundland. provincial government economic policie..; have been direclcd toward
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promoting conditions favourable to capital and commercial investment in the province.
Significantly large financial expenditures in support of ministry operntions and other
economic initiatives such as (he Ministryof Indu~lry.Trade and Technology and the
Enterprise Newfoundland and LabradorCorpor31ion serve to illustrate the government's
primary economic development agenda.
In the political economy of Newfoundland, the economic policy agenda often
conniels with policy initiatives for greater environmental protection. The govemrnent's
primary politic:ll agenda is evident in the less than comprehensive conlent of the
province's existing cnl'ironmcntal rc~ulalions.lhc comparatively small budgetary
expenditures ,lnoented for the Dcpanmem of Environment, the minimal influence and
prcstigc accorded thc environment portfolio in cabinet, as well as the government's
limited commitment to promoting and adopting ecologically sustainable land lise
pl:mning policies and practices. Furthennore, Iheeconomic development agenda rehlles
10 lhe governmcnt's current regulatory reform initiatives involving efforts to remove
regulatory b;uriers seen as impeding proposed capital investment and development
opportunities in the province. Tllese regulatory refonn initiatives as well as the recent
reduction in full-lime environmemal enforcement personnel appear to indicate a gradual
policy shift towards greater cooperation with business interests and the deregulation of
industry. Thus, in the Newfoundland political economy. any policy connict between tile
government's dual role in environmental protection and resource development is generally
decided in favour of the economic development agenda. And any policy initiatives
l'IS
promoting stricten... ironmentul regulation i1nd protection will Ill' in clinnil'l wilh polic;l'.~
promoting the capitnl nccumu]ution process and the 'instiul1ioll;11 sclf-inlcrl'st Oflhl' stall"
in Newfoundland,
However, this research found thai eOllsiucr:lhlc publil- pl\'SSUrl' lmd lllt:llia
lltlention did prompt the govemmeru to initiatc ;m ilwesli~:lli{)11 into till' :Iir quality
eompluirts brought fonh by thc citizens residing adjacent 10 thl' n.'finery, And IIl1lih' tIll'
divisions which onen surround environmental conlliets of this Iypc_ lll,th 1111: puhlil' aud
the refinery's unionizcdemployecs were mutually supportive ufc:II,:h tlthefs' CtHH,'crnS
rc£arding the mmospheric emissions problem at the facililY_ Ahhough rcllill-ry 1ll.'I"Sllllllci
were undcrst:tndnbly protective ofthcir employment SlalUS, hoth partics~I'11L'rall}' ;1~rl'I'(1
lhat stricter regulatory measures weI\' required 10 respond to Ihe f:n:iI ily's cnvinulllIcnt;ll
problcmseffectivcly,
This rcseurch has therefore found lhal specific ummci:tl :md pulitical \:Clllsirainis
affect and influence government implementotion or environmenl:ll rcgul:llory p"licy in
Newfoundland, Moreover, this case study oflhc Corne By Chance refinery itlcmificJ
several inherent weuknesses of the command-penally modcl or cnvironrllcnl'.I1 rq;ul:ltitili.
Generally speaking, this approach to strictly regulating industrial p(lilutinn (If!Cll filih III
achieve its promulgated objectives, Again, the specific problelll~ as.~oci<lled with this
model include: cnvironmenlullegisllltion und regulUlions with limited ohjeellvc eoulcnl
for pollution prevention: industry-governmenl negotiUlions til Ihe exclusjull of olher
concerned publics; and significum problems relating to nO/H;oll1plillncc and cn!llKcmcnl.
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Thus. ,hi), rCl>curch found thaI many or the problems associated with the command penalty
mudel of regul'llion arc to be found with environmental regulation in Newfoundland.
GiVl,:!l the political economy of the command-penalty model and the limitations which
oneil compmllilsc ib effecti\'\,: implementation. further research toward more effective
intlllslnal pollution control policlcs is proposed.
6.2 Proposals For Further Research
(,.2.1 CnlllllltJllil\' Regulation
rWllllhis ta.s..: .study of tl1(' Come By Chance refinery :md the examinution or the
illrnnsphcrir emissions problem in particular. it is apparcnl lhal local communities are
llftClllhc 'cnd users' of industrial pollution and therefore bear the external costs of this
p(,llution. As Naud (1995:64) observes:
one of the main weaknesses of the market economy derives from the fact that
external costs resulting from polluting activities are born not by those who are
principally responsible for those activllies but by the other members of society.
In ;1I1 cffllTtlO respond to the significam atmospheric emissions problem at the refinery,
~oncernell citizen's mobilized community resources and fonnrtlthe 'Community Liaison
Cnl1lmillCc.' This committee was established for several specific reasons: to promote
grc;llL'r communication between the refinery and the citizens of all communities adjacent
t,l the facility: to provide an o~n forum whereby the concerns of committee members can
l'lt' frel'ly disclissed: to help promote greater public confidence in the operation of the
refinery; tll provide a forum to address community concerns to representatives from both
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provincial and federallcycls of government: lmd to provide the opportunity for refinery
. 'prcsent:ltivcs and the communjtie~ to meet on a regular basis (Constitutilln. NPUCOllK'
By Chance Area Community Liaison Comrnincc. 1993).
Since the establishment of the commiucc in 1993. LfC:! rcsidCnls h:ll'l' cxpcricncl~d
improved community relations with the rcfincry·.~ opcr.l1or. have witnessed a visihk
improvement in the quality and quantit)' of the refincry\ slack emissions. lmu l;cllcral!y
have greater confidence in the overall environmental nmnagcl11cnt of tile f:lcilily hy the
current operator North Atlantic Refining Limited (NARL). 111 many re.~pccls. NARL\
improved record of regulato!)' compliance :md superior cnvironmcntalm:lIlagclllclll of thc
refinery reflects a greater commitment to these concerns hy NARL scnior lJI;1uagclllcrll as
well as the company's stronger financial position. Since laking over the 1":ldlity in Atlgll.~1
of 1994. NARL has reponedly made $3.4 million in 'environmental inl'cslll\cl\t,; <11 the
refinery, including $1.8 million to revamp the Sulphur Recovery Plant and Sllll.UOO
invested in S02 monitoring equipment (Personal Correspondence. M:lrch S, 11)1)(,).
The establishment oflhe Community Liaison Commitlee at Comc By Chance
illustrates an inherent need for greater 'social regulation' of industry and dirccl puhlic
participation in the environmcntlll regulatory process. This panicipation serves lO m:tke
the decisions of government regulatory officials more :tccounlublc to thc public. As
Tingley (1994:7) explains, ".,.those who engage in public consull/ltion perform II public
policy audit function wherc they rcvicw government policy and accounllo those who arc
unable or unwilling to undertuke .~uch a review on their own." FurthennOfc, it i.~ argued
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thai community participation in environmental decisions go .....beyond citizen
involvement in conventional intcrvcmion to aelllal citizen management of an economic
resource with regurd for ecological, cullUral and spiritual as well as economic values"
(rc,~tcr, 1992:38). The recent demand for 'citizen's rights' in environmental decisions
rencets the factlhal many communities hay" witnessed their local environment tInd
natural resource base being ex.ploited for profit with liule regard for the future
suslainability of either the resource or the community. The citizen panicipati<ln
rnOYCmClll of the 1990s is not only questioning "the undemocratic structure of business
enterprise" but :lisa "challenging Ihe fundamental assumptions 35 well as Ihe
org:mizutional structure of litleral democratic capitalism" (Tester, 1992:40).
Direct public participation in the environmental regulatory process represents a
significant change from the predominant regulatory model involving bilateral bargaining
:md the participation of only ministry officials ,md industry representatives. A few
jurisdictions in C::mada (ie. Yukon. NWT, Ontario) huve introduced 'environmental rights'
legislation which outlines greater public participation early in thedecision making
proces.~ and facilitales the 'triangulation' of regulatory bargaining. The triangulation of
regUlatory bargaining generally refers to the inclusion of the public in the bargaining
process as a means 10 circumventing the accountability problems often associated with
the more predominant bilateral model. As Roman and Hoey (1993:65) further explain,
~the purpose of Irill1lgulation is not to slow the process down but, rather, to ensure that the
officials enguged in barguining take into account the opinions of interested persons as 10
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whether the: proposed instrument should be: granted and. if so. on what Icnn.~.~
In addition 10 regulatory triangulation. it is proposed that em'ironmental policy
research funher examine the potential role of community.induslr)' cnviwlImcnl:d
monitoring programs. Although the selected community rcprcscmath'l$ would ~
required 10 possess considerable technical knowledge. these indh'idua]s wlluld routinely
monitor and evaluate the firm's environmental management pr(lccdurc.~ ,,,\(I rC[HlrI an)'
concerns to both the compnn)' and the comr.1unity. For instance. oil rt:fineries have :111
untold number of pipes. seals and valves whil.:h may le:!k vapours illlo the i1lll1o.~phl·rc due
to wear and poor maintenance. Given the signific:lOt number of cnnnccliuns :mtl \':11\'1:5 at
a refinery, vapour leaks often go undctectcd for lengthy periods (l/' timc. Tn imrroVl' the
rate of leak detection. it is proposed that community monitors p;tnicipate in II mutine
Inspection program. As Epstein and Wiener (1994: 16) observe:. Wa qUar1erly wlC:lk
detection and repair" (LDAR) program checks each componcnllhat can leak once every
three months. Such a program can prevent enough release... 10 pay for itself in savc-d r..IW
materials.-
Further policy research is therefore required 10 examine the various ways in which
communities can be become more directly involved in the environmental regulatory
process governing local industry and actively panicipatc in Ihose decision... which directly
affect Ihe health of citizens and the local environment. Research and policies advancing
the socinl regulation of an industrial operation like Come By Chance represent imfXlrtant
steps toward improving the current model and methods of environmental regulution.
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Although social regulation perhaps represents an important intennediate stage, tht:
fundamental objective of environmental research in this area must he to further advance
policies which promote the development of ecologically sustainable industrial processes.
6.2.2 Ecologically Sustainahle Industrv
The negative externalities resulting from industrial production, particularly the discharge
of joorg.mic industrial pollut:mts and hazardous wilste, severely threaten the earth's life
support systems. bie-diversity and the integrity of ecosystems. Furthennore. the biotic
systems which sustain hum:m and mlturallife aTC currently showing indications of
molt:cular change ;to; they are proving incapable of ahsorbing or assimilating man-made
waste and toxins (Hawken. 1993).
In many respects, the concepts of ecological 'sustainability' and 'sustainable
devclopmenl' were developed in response to the above environmental hazards and other
concerns <lssociated with industrial development and production. The concept of
suswinability has existed since the 1970s but it was the 1987 Brundtland Commission
report Our Common Future that elevated this concept to the level of international political
forums and to the forefront of environmental policy discussion and research. For many
years. researchers from multiple disciplines have engag¢d in an ongoing effort to further
define and opcr:ttionalize this concept. But as the Netherlands Scientific Council for
Govemmelll Policy (NSCGP) explains:
It is, however. critically imponantto acknowledge that there are a number of
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highly divergent and in some cases conflicting perceptions ofslIslainahilily that
exist side by side. Each of these perceptions provides its own interpretation of the
two most important aspects of suslain:lblc dcveloprnl.'lll: the ecological norms ;llId
values to be respected and the socia-economic norms and v,lIues to I~ rcSPCCll'd
(NSCGP, 1995:31),
A complex and controversial concept. sustain:lbility generally ICfcrs III "the
pcr.;istence over an :Ipparently indefinite future of certain necessary :Ind llcsirc:d
characteristics orlhe socio-politic:!l system and its nalUf:l1 covimllmen!" tRnhinsoll ct ;11..
1990:39). Allhough a 'two-sided' concept. particul:IT emphasis is given by many
researchers to defining sustainabiJity in lenns or 'environmental utilii'Allinn SP:lCC' fEllS)
or the detennination of the em'ironment's 'carrying c;lpacity: ACi.:ording tll thc NSCGI'
(1995:32):
In this respect sustainablc dcvelopment ha~ been intcrprctcd ;lS a form of
economic development which ensures thm lhe resulting cnvironmelllal hurdell call
be "ecologically assimilated." By this is meant lhalthe future functioning or
regeneration systems. absorption capacities and other elements of the EUS ;Irc
qualitatively and quantitatively guaranteed as regard the exploitOllion [)I)tenti<ll.
However, the development and use of specific sustainability indicators such as EUS is
currently plagued by scientific uncertainty, particularly in tenns of detcmlining the
precise risks of industrial pollution to complex and unique ecosy.~tcms.Given this
uncertainty, any assessment of what constitutes a sustainable or unsu.~tainahlcactivily
more often necessitates nonnative and ethical judgements ba~cd on relotive risk. A.~ the
NSCGP (1995:21) observe:
The inability to foresee the future means that any a~sessment ha'iCd on the
sustainability of future trends must derive from an estimate of the a~socjatcd ri.~h.
The estimate may vary depending on whether a more environmental-risk.avoiding
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or cnvironmcntal-risk-acccptingallitudc isadop/cd.
The current command-penallY model of environmental regulation 'manages'
industrial pollution but does nOl promote or facilitate efforts (0 eliminate this hazard or its
potentially life-threatening consequences. Therefore. avoiding the risks associated with
industrial pollution and promoting a sustainable future will require further research
tuw:mls eliminating this ronn of pollution altogether.
In particular, current research efforts should continue \0 examine how industries
c'lIl he 'c1uslcrcu' together. industrial processes illlcgrmcd as a IOLalthroughput and
designed to greater resemble or assimilate. the self-sustaining and self-regulatory
'oper;uions' of natural systems. In short, the waste or 'outpulS' generated through industrial
production must be ill a fonn that call bc effectively utilized a.~ an 'input' in other
productive processes. And if the output faclOr is not to be used in production,
environmental laws must require that all legally allowable wasle be in a fonn that is
easily absorbed and utilized as a natural input of ecological systems (Pauli, 1995:
Hawken. 1993). Pauli (1995:29) explains that with industrial clusters:
All fonns of wa.~te will have 10 be integrated into the mechanism: waste from one
indust!)', in whatever fonn. must become an input factor for another business.
Companies will decide 10 locate next to each olher because they need each other's
waste. Cities and coumies will target specific investments, because they realize
that 3ltracting one indust!)' is likely to attract another, while also solving a
pressing environmental problem.
Although the concept of industrial clusters represents an 'ideal type,' a previous step to the
intcgmtion of industrial processes should be that environmental law "...force indust!)' to
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usc alternative technology. with the aim being Ihc c\'cntual dinlination of l·mis.~ions all
together" (5ei5, 1993:76). For in5tan~. environmentalla",s bounded in 'hioccmrism'
would force industri:1.1 firms to uSC: altcl1kIlive sources of power such a.~ hydrolngkal.
wind and solar technologies which are R more commensurate with lhe CCOlllgy of the
planctfl (Scis, 1993:76).
The integration of industrial processes ilnd cnvironmcnlallaws hl.lumll.'d in
bioccntrism for the purpose of elimin:lling industrial emissions arc imptlTI:lIl1 ;nut
achievable goals. BUl as Puuli (1995:26) nOles "indu.~lry must he willin!; III put its pr....sclll
selection of row m:llerials under scrutiny, rethink the manufacturing ilild di.~lrihulion
process. and engage in a search for zero-emissioos manufacturing. R
Thus. ecological sustainability will not be achieved by ~illlply adoplilll: sllictcr
regulatory enforc:ement prnctices based on the current command-penally model nf
environmental regulation. It will require instead fund,lnlCntal changes in the ideologic:11
assumptions of capitalist social organiution and the methods of prudllclirnl. II will be
crilical to change the assumptions surrounding humanily's place in Ilaturc lno 1000gcrc.:an
the environment be viewed as a sourc:e of unbridled exploitation or as a wa..tc
depository), to develop a greater understanding of the 'true' ecological costs ;I.~socialcd
with the externalities of industriul pollution, and to derive a better understanding that the
purpose of environmentlllinw may be to force change rather than simply reguMe or
'mllnage' ecologically destructive human behaviour. The existing structural 'elutions of
power, ownership and authority under capitalism musl change so that industrial
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production and resource development are not based solely on consideralions such as
profit, bUI arc democratically determined through the collective decisions of community
members. Only when these social and Slructural changes are implemented will ecological
sustain:JhiJity he achieved. Soci:ll regulation and the integration of industrial processes
therefore represent arcas of further environmental policy research as well as necessary
sleps lowilrd an ecologically suslmnablc fUlure.
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